Mather v. Cunningham

• Decision Date: 31 October 1910
• Citation: 107 Me. 242,78 A. 102
• Parties: MATHER et al. v. CUNNINGHAM et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

78 A. 102

107 Me. 242

MATHER et al.

v. CUNNINGHAM et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 31, 1910.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Waldo County, at Law.

Action by Augusta C. Mather and another against Edward R. Cunningham and another. The case was reported to the law court, and from a ruling of such court, refusing to pass upon costs, plaintiffs bring exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

See, also, 105 Me. 326, 74 Atl. 809; 106 Me. 115, 75 Atl. 323.

Argued before EMERY, C. J., and SAVAGE, PEABODY, SPEAR, and KING, JJ.

Littlefield & Littlefield and Arthur S. Littlefield, for plaintiffs.

W. Henry White and Dunton & Morse, for defendants.

SPEAR, J. This case comes up on exceptions by the appellants. The history of the case is this: Henry H. Cunningham died in Shanghai June 10, 1905. Albert W. Cunningham was appointed administrator of his estate by the probate court in the county of Waldo. An appeal from this appointment was taken and heard at the April term, 1908, of the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as a Supreme Court of Probate. At the conclusion of the evidence the presiding justice made this order: "This case having come on to be heard by me at the April term of the Supreme Judicial Court in Waldo county, I, the undersigned justice, being of opinion that questions of law are involved of sufficient importance and doubt to justify the same, and the parties agreeing thereto, the same is reported * * * and the law court is to determine the rights of the parties." It will be here observed that the appellate court made no decree respecting costs or any other matter presented to it, but reported every matter upon which it had a right to pass to the decision of the law court. The law court finally disposed of the case upon the following certificate:

"It is now ordered that the clerk of said law court make upon the docket under said action the following entry, and certify the same to the clerk of said court for the county of Waldo, to wit: Appeal sustained. Decree of the court below reversed."

As the opinion was silent upon the question of costs, no costs were allowed to either party. Alvord v. Stone, 78 Me. 296, 4 Atl. 697; Peabody v. Mattocks, 88 Me. 167, 33 Atl. 900. The appellants, however, claim that the question of costs could not be passed upon by the law court in the case as reported, and filed a decree at the April term, 1909, in the Supreme Court of Probate in Waldo county in all respects in conformity with the opinion of court, with the exception that it provided for the allowance of one bill of cost for the appellants. The presiding justice did not sign the decree. At the June term, 1909, of the law court at Bangor the appellants filed a petition praying for the recall of the certificate of decision and amendate in the case, and restoration of the case to the law docket and allowance of costs. This petition was dismissed. At the January term, 1910, of the Supreme Judicial Court for Waldo county the appellants filed a petition praying the sitting justice to "pass upon said decree in relation to said matters of cost." The presiding justice denied the petition and ruled "as a matter of law" that he had "no jurisdiction in the matter at that time." The appellants excepted to this ruling and assert that under the statute, authorizing the report of cases, the law court had no authority in the original case to exercise any jurisdiction upon the question of costs. They contend that an examination of the powers of the law court confirms this conclusion. Rev. St. c. 79, § 40, provides: "The following cases only come before the court as a court of law; cases in which there are motions for new trials upon evidence reported by the justice; questions of law arising on reports of cases; bills of exceptions; agreed statements of facts; cases civil or criminal, presenting questions of law and questions arising in equity," etc. Their contention is that the report of this case brings it under the second group and submitted to the law court only the questions of law relating to the issue of domicile; that the authority of the law court was confirmed to determining only the questions of law; and that it "had nothing to do with the question of costs in probate cases." We think this interpretation too restricted. There was nothing in the report that qualified a full consideration of the case. The clause of the statute under which the original case was reported, in which the question of costs was determined, is expressed in the most comprehensive language. The word "case" is used in its unrestricted sense. When used in the statute it had a well-established meaning and the Legislature is presumed to have understood it. It is defined by reliable authorities as follows: Words and Phrases, vol. 1, p. 985. "A case is a contested...