Felan v. State

• Decision Date: 12 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2-00-013-CR,2-00-013-CR
• Citation: 44 S.W.3d 249
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) RAUL ANTONIO FELAN, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, STATE
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 249

44 S.W.3d 249 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001)

RAUL ANTONIO FELAN, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, STATE

No. 2-00-013-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

April 12, 2001

Rehearing Overruled May 17, 2001.

FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

PANEL B: LIVINGSTON, HOLMAN, and GARDNER, JJ.

OPINION

GARDNER, JUSTICE

I. Introduction

Appellant Raul Antonio Felan appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of J.L., a child under the age of 14. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by excluding relevant impeachment evidence and by denying his motion for continuance. Appellant further contends the jury charge on punishment contained a misstatement of the law regarding the award of parole and good conduct time. We affirm.

II. Factual Background

The undisputed evidence presented at the guilt and innocence phase of Appellant's trial established the following events:

When she first met Appellant at a local park in the fall of 1997, J.L., the victim, was 13 years old and was in the seventh grade. Appellant was 28 years old at the time and lived with his mother. Upon meeting, both Appellant and J.L. lied to each other about their ages J.L. told Appellant that she was 16 years old, and Appellant told J.L. that he was 20 or 21 years old. Appellant also gave J.L. a false name, telling her that his name was "Tony Camacho." That very same day, Appellant and J.L. went for a drive in Appellant's truck and, after consuming alcohol,¹ had sexual intercourse. J.L. began to see Appellant two or three times a week. They usually drove around in Appellant's truck. In addition to engaging in sexual intercourse and other sexual acts on numerous occasions, they got high on marijuana, speed, and acid, which Appellant supplied. J.L. testified that, before she met Appellant, she had never consumed alcohol and had never been high on marijuana or acid. Sometimes they had sex in Appellant's truck, and other times they went to motels or to Appellant's house when his mother was at work. J.L. kept her relationship with Appellant secret from her parents, but her sister, Blanca, and her friends were aware that J.L. was seeing Appellant on a frequent basis.

J.L. considered Appellant to be her boyfriend, and their relationship continued into February of 1998. In February, J.L. was "shocked" and felt "stupid" when Appellant told her that he had a daughter in the sixth grade. On February 15, 1998, J.L. was further disillusioned when one of Appellant's friends revealed to her that Appellant was not 20 years old, but really 28 years old, and that his real name was not "Tony Camacho," but actually Raul Felan. The affair finally ended on February 16, 1998, when J.L. was arrested and placed in the Dallas County Juvenile Detention Center because she threatened her sister, Blanca, for making a derogatory comment about Appellant.

On February 27, 1998, pursuant to an investigation involving another teenage girl's allegations about Appellant, Arlington Police Detective James Sumrall interviewed J.L. at the Dallas Juvenile Detention Center. During the course of the interview, J.L. provided Sumrall with details of her affair with Appellant.

Appellant was subsequently charged by a three-count indictment for sexual assault of J.L., a child under the age of 14. Having an extensive criminal history, Appellant's indictment also included a habitual offender allegation and an enhancement paragraph.²

After pleading not guilty to all charges against him, Appellant was found guilty by the jury. Appellant entered a plea of "true" to the habitual offender allegation and stipulated to his prior convictions, after which the jury sentenced him to 60 years' confinement.

III. Discussion

A. Exclusion of Impeachment Evidence Regarding Complainant's Bias

In his first issue, Appellant asserts a due process violation of his right to confront the complainant when the trial court prevented Appellant from introducing allegedly relevant impeachment evidence regarding the victim. Specifically, Appellant complains that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that he claims would have shown that J.L. was willing to lie to authorities and would have demonstrated her bias or animus against him.

1. Appellant's Proffered Evidence

Appellant attempted to introduce evidence that the police contacted J.L. while investigating allegations that Appellant was involved with another teenage girl, V.R. V.R. had alleged she "possibly had been drugged and sexually abused" by Appellant at a motel, and that J.L. was present on that occasion. Charges were filed against Appellant in connection with V.R.'s allegations.

The trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of this evidence. In the ensuing voir dire examination of Detective Sumrall, Appellant elicited testimony about J.L.'s statement to the police regarding V.R.'s claim that, while Appellant had sexual relations with her, J.L. was present. According to Detective Sumrall's testimony, J.L. made the following statement to the police:

I know [V.R.]. I have heard what [V.R.] has said. I have never been to a motel with [V.R.] She is a liar. I do not like her because she loves Tony [Appellant]. She is not to be with my man. I have told her to stay away from him.

Further, in an attempt to place J.L.'s credibility at issue by showing that Sumrall did not believe J.L.'s statement, Appellant elicited the following testimony:

Q. Right. When you received the information from [J.L.] contained in this statement that [V.R.] was not at the Fiesta Motel, one of two things has to be true. Number one, either [V.R.'s] lying when she says she was at the hotel, or [J.L.] is lying saying that she wasn't. Isn't that a fair deduction?

A. That is a fair deduction, yes.

Q. And if you thought that [J.L.] was being truthful with you when she said that [V.R.] was not at the motel, you would not have filed the [V.R.] case, would you?

A. Can you repeat the question? I want to make sure I'm understanding.

Q. Sure. Okay. If you had believed at the time you took this statement from [J.L.] that her statement to you that [V.R.] was not at the motel -- that's what she told you, she wasn't there?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. If you believed that, then you would not have filed a case against [V.R.], would you? I mean against Tony [Appellant] on [V.R.]?

A. It was a separate case, and I used each case on its own merit from the victim's statements.

Q. But at least you had conflicting statements?

A. Correct.

Q. One of which is [V.R.] saying, "I woke up nude with this man," and one from [J.L.] saying she never was there?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, somebody's wrong, right, obviously?

A. Fair deduction again.

Q. Okay, thank you.

Appellant argued to the trial court that Detective Sumrall's testimony about the [V.R.] investigation, including the victim's statement to him, established that J.L. had an animus toward Appellant, that "she's lying all over the place," and that "the business of this is just one more in a series of a long line of lies that [J.L.] tells people in authority." The State objected to the introduction of this evidence on several grounds, including relevance and potential for prejudice. The trial court sustained the State's objection by stating that, although "the probative value is not outweighed by the prejudicial effect," the evidence "is not relevant at this time."

On appeal, Appellant contends that this evidence was admissible (1) to impeach J.L.'s general credibility and (2) to show bias, animus, or motive to lie in this particular case. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that it was not admissible on either ground.

2. Standard of Review

As an appellate court, we review the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 158 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). Therefore, we will not reverse a trial court as long as its ruling was within the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Green, 934 S.W.2d at 102; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391; Couchman, 3 S.W.3d at 158. Moreover, if the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is correct under any theory of law, even if the trial court gives the wrong reason for its ruling, we must affirm the court's decision to admit the evidence. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Couchman, 3 S.W.3d at 158; Pettigrew v. State, 908 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd).

"Great latitude should be allowed the accused in showing any fact that would tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, and animus on the part of any witness testifying against [him]." Recer v. State, 821 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); see also, Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); McDaniel v. State, 3 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd); Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. ref'd). However, the trial court has considerable discretion in determining how and when bias may be proved, and what collateral evidence is material for that purpose. Recer, 821 S.W.2d at 717 (citing Green v. State, 676 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). The court may properly limit the scope of cross-examination to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, endangering the witness, and the injection of cumulative or collateral evidence. Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 613; Roberts v. State, 963 S.W.2d 894, 901 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.). Thus, the trial court exceeds its discretion only when it prohibits a defendant from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness. Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d...