McDaniel v. State

• Decision Date: 16 September 1999
• Citation: 3 S.W.3d 176
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999) JANET McDANIEL, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, STATE NO. 2-98-206-CR
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 176

3 S.W.3d 176 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999)

JANET McDANIEL, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, STATE

NO. 2-98-206-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

September 16, 1999

Rehearing Overruled Nov. 4, 1999.

FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 1 OF DENTON COUNTY

WILLIAM BRIGHAM, JUSTICE.

PANEL B: LIVINGSTON, BRIGHAM, and HOLMAN, JJ.

OPINION

A jury found Appellant Janet McDaniel guilty of forgery. In eleven points, she contends the trial court erred when it denied her motion to quash, excluded certain character evidence, charged the jury that a person's mental state may be inferred, and limited her cross-examination of the complainant.

We will focus solely on the issue of whether it was error to prohibit cross-examination of the complainant regarding the existence of a child support arrearage judgment against him in Appellant's favor. Because we determine that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting constitutionally guaranteed cross-examination, and that such error was not harmless, we reverse the conviction and remand this case for trial.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by information and complaint with one count of forgery; she entered a plea of not guilty. After hearing pretrial motions, a jury was selected, and the State called a single witness, Greg McDaniel, ("complainant") who is Appellant's ex-husband. The defense proposed two witnesses¹ in the guilt-innocence phase, one of which testified in the jury's presence that in her opinion, the complainant was untruthful and dishonest regarding Appellant and the family situation. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and assessed punishment at 30 days' confinement plus a $2,000 fine. The trial court suspended imposition of the jail sentence and ordered that Appellant be placed on community supervision for two years. Appellant gave timely notice of appeal.

Appellant's tenth point is dispositive; therefore, we will only address it.

IMPROPER RESTRICTION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

Appellant contends in point ten that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting Appellant's cross-examination of the complaining witness concerning bias in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The complainant testified that the day after their divorce hearing, he learned about a Visa card that had been opened in his name. He obtained a copy of the application for the card. He recognized Appellant's printing and signature on the application. The application also contained a signature purporting to be his, but it was not. He never gave Appellant permission to sign his name on the application, nor did he ever discuss applying for that card with her. Two weeks after the application was made, Appellant had the mail diverted to a post office box, and as a result, the complainant never received any bills from that credit card company. The complainant further testified that Appellant admitted to him that she had signed his name on the credit card application in question.

Appellant's counsel, during cross-examination, introduced five paychecks that the complainant received in 1990, two of which were endorsed by Appellant with the name "Greg McDaniel.² There was only one credit card account application that the complainant was claiming to be a forgery.³

After confirming that complainant and Appellant had gone through a bitter divorce, counsel for Appellant attempted to cross-examine the complainant about a $9,480 child support arrearage judgment held by Appellant against complainant at the time of trial. After the jury was excused in accordance with a pretrial ruling,⁴ the following exchange occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [T]here's a $10,000 judgment for back child support against [complainant] involving this case where he owes [Appellant] that amount of money, maybe 9,000 and some change.

THE COURT: Involving this case, the forgery case?

[DEFENSE]: No, in the divorce. Well, I say in this case, in the divorce case that is the subject of this case. The point is there's a civil judgment against this witness involving [Appellant].

THE COURT: When was the judgment taken?

[DEFENSE]: It was taken October 1, 1997. It's in effect now, and it's our intention that it affects his credibility as a witness.

THE COURT: And for what dates were they as to when the child support wasn't paid?

[DEFENSE]: January 1996 through March of 1997. The total arrearage at the time of this order was $9,480.

THE COURT: And how in the world could that have any relevancy to something that happened five years before?

[DEFENSE]: It's our position that this affects his credibility and his motive for testifying right now on April 22, 1998, the fact that this judgment, at any time that it was entered, as long as it's valid gives him a reason to slant his testimony and to say things that are not true to get back at Janet because she's the one that has the judgment against him.

THE COURT: State have any objection to that?

[PROSECUTOR]: Well, arguably the same thing goes - - we could relitigate their entire divorce because that goes to motive of both he and any other witnesses that come, and that's absolutely irrelevant as to whether or not she forged a document back in 1991. The charge has been pending ever since, and what happened in '96 or '97 as the Defense Counsel just stated is completely irrelevant as to whether or not those facts happened.

THE COURT: I most assuredly sustain the objection. I can't see how this has any relevance, and if it does, it's prejudicial value is far outweighed by any probative value as to some matter that happened five years before. I'm not going to allow that, no.

[DEFENSE]: Can I go ahead and offer this for the record, which is the order showing that he owes money and so forth?

THE COURT: Sure.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court's decision to exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g); Breeding v. State, 809 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, pet. ref'd).

Where the excluded evidence is sought during cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution is implicated. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1434-35 (1986). Errors of this sort are subject to a harm analysis, and must be reversed unless the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

II. CONFRONTATION, CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND RELEVANCE

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a criminal defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965). There are three main purposes of cross-examination: (1) to shed light on the credibility of the direct testimony; (2) to elicit additional facts related to those brought out on direct; and (3) in states following the "wide open" rule, to bring out additional facts that tend to illuminate any issue in the case. See KENNETH BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 29, at 38-39 (John William Strong ed., West Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1992). See also Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (characterizing the purposes of cross-examination as: to identify the witness within his community so that independent testimony may be offered regarding his reputation for veracity; to allow the jury to assess witness credibility; and to allow facts to be brought out tending to discredit the witness by showing his testimony on direct was untrue or biased). The usual standard of relevancy applies to facts sought to be elicited for the purpose of either the second or third category, but as to the function of evaluating the credibility of the evidence given on direct, the test of relevancy is not whether the answer sought will expound any of the main issues, but whether it will aid the court or jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and assessing the probative value of the direct testimony. See BROUN ET AL., supra, at 39.

Rule 104 gives the trial court considerable discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 104(a). But it "does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility." Id. 104(e).

It follows that where the purpose of cross-examination is to shed light on the weight or credibility of the testimony given on direct, the trial court's discretion is more attenuated; a defendant should be given an opportunity to bring out facts which would tend to discredit a witness by showing his testimony was untrue or biased. See id.; Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S. Ct. 218, 219 (1931). The scope of appropriate cross-examination is broad, and a defendant is entitled to pursue all avenues of cross-examination reasonably calculated to expose a motive, bias, or interest for the witness to testify. See Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 498. Indeed, cross-examination for this purpose is "always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974).

This is not to say, however, that the trial court may not limit cross-examination when a subject is exhausted, or when it is designed to annoy, harass, or humiliate, or when it might endanger the personal safety of the witness. See Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 498.

III. APPLICATION

The defensive theory was that Appellant had permission to sign...