Felton v. Hulser, WD

• Decision Date: 28 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 957 S.W.2d 394
• Parties: Jason Travis FELTON and Mary K. Felton, Appellants, v. Jerry HULSER, Respondent. 53515.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 394

957 S.W.2d 394

Jason Travis FELTON and Mary K. Felton, Appellants, v. Jerry HULSER, Respondent.

No. WD 53515.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

Oct. 28, 1997.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Dec. 23, 1997.

Application for Transfer Denied

Jan. 27, 1998.

Ron L. Findley, St. Joseph, for Appellants.

Keith W. Ferguson, St. Joseph, for Respondent.

Before EDWIN H. SMITH, P.J., and ULRICH, C.J., and ELLIS, J.

EDWIN H. SMITH, Presiding Judge.

Jason T. Felton and his mother, Mary K. Felton, appeal from the circuit court's judgment awarding him $2,000 in damages on his claim for personal injuries and awarding her $445 in damages on her claim for property damage to her motor vehicle.

Appellants assert two points on appeal. In their first point, they claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow them to read to the jury respondent's Rule 59.01 admissions. In their second point, they claim that the trial court erred in overruling their objection to respondent's alleged violation of the trial court's order in limine.

We reverse and remand.

Facts

On June 6, 1994, Jason T. Felton, appellant, and Jerry Hulser, respondent, were involved in an automobile collision on Twenty-Second and Duncan Streets in St. Joseph, Missouri. At the time of the accident, Mr. Felton was driving a 1985 Ford Tempo owned by his mother, Mary K. Felton. Mr. Felton was stopped at the intersection to make a left turn when respondent's car collided with the rear of Mr. Felton's car. Mr. Felton did not realize that he had sustained any injuries until after he had left the accident scene.

The following day, Mr. Felton went to Dr. Larry J. Lovejoy, a chiropractor, who told him that he suffered from a cervical strain/sprain to the muscles and soft tissues. At trial, Dr. Lovejoy testified that the motor vehicle accident produced these injuries and would result in limitations on Mr. Felton's occupation and recreational activities for the rest of his life. After filing suit, appellants served respondent with a request for admissions, which contained thirty-one (31) separate requests covering a variety of facts related to respondent's liability and appellants' damages. During appellants' case-in-chief, their trial counsel requested leave to read the requests for admissions. Respondent objected to appellants' request. The trial court ruled that the respondent's pretrial admissions could be used only to impeach him if he testified inconsistently with his admissions.

At trial, appellants filed a motion in limine asking that respondent's counsel be instructed "to refrain from making any mention or interrogation, directly or indirectly ... [t]hat [Mr. Felton's] physicians and [Mr. Felton's] counsel have, have had or will have common patients/client[s] other than [Mr. Felton]...." The trial court, in ruling that respondent could not question Dr. Lovejoy regarding his prior testimony for other plaintiffs, including plaintiffs that appellants' counsel represented, found that these issues may be relevant to show bias or prejudice of Dr. Lovejoy, but the potential prejudice of such testimony far outweighed any probative value. During trial, respondent's counsel asked whether Dr. Lovejoy had ever dealt with appellants' counsel before. He responded that he had. Appellants' counsel requested permission to approach the bench, which was denied. He later informed the court of his objection concerning this question in that it violated the motion in limine.

The jury returned a verdict for Mr. Felton on his personal injury claim in the amount of $2,500 and for Ms. Felton for $500 on her claim for property damage. The jury assessed 20% fault against Mr. Felton and 80% fault against respondent. After reducing the verdicts for the appellants by the 20% fault assessed to Mr. Felton, the circuit court entered judgment for Mr. Felton in the amount of $2,000 and for Ms. Felton in the amount of $445.

This appeal follows.

I.

In their first point, appellants claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow them to read to the jury the respondent's admissions made pursuant to Rule 59.01. Appellants contend that they had the right to read respondent's admissions under the rule, and that the trial court lacked any valid basis for denying their request. Appellants further contend that the improper denial of their request prejudiced them by requiring them to introduce evidence regarding facts already admitted to by the respondent, and forcing them to use a different and less effective mechanism, live testimony, to present the evidence in their case. Respondent argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in that it only forbade appellants' counsel from reading the admissions to the jury at the specific time requested, but did not preclude the reading of the admissions at some future time. Moreover, respondent argues that even if the trial court did err in denying appellants' request to read respondent's admissions, they were not prejudiced by the error.

Rule 59.01, governing admissions, does not specifically address their reading to the jury, nor can we find any case law that addresses this precise issue. In what appears to be a case of first impression in this state, the issue we must decide is whether a party has the right to read to the jury a party-opponent's Rule 59.01 admissions, not otherwise subject to valid objection.

Decisions of a trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence are given substantial deference on appeal and will only be disturbed upon a finding that the trial court has abused its discretion. King v. Copp Trucking, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo.App.1993) (citations omitted). Thus, our review here is for an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of Missouri has described our review of a ruling for an abuse of discretion as follows: "Judicial discretion is abused when a trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration...." Id. Rulings made within the trial court's discretion are presumed correct and the appellants have the burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Id.

Rule 59.01 governs the "Request for and Effect of Admissions." There is no dispute that the admissions of respondent in question here were properly obtained by the appellants under the rule. The sole dispute centers around whether appellants had a right to read respondent's admissions to the jury when they requested. Although, as stated, supra, the rule does not provide for when an admission under the rule may be read to the jury, it does provide the purpose and effect of admissions.

Rule 59.01(c), in pertinent part, states that "[a]ny matter admitted under this [rule] is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." "A request for admissions, as authorized by Rule 59.01(a), is designed to remove an issue from trial or to determine which pleaded matters present genuine issues for trial." N.R. v. A.D., 655 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Mo.App.1983) (citing Linde v. Kilbourne, 543 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.App.1976)). The purpose of the rule " '... is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.' " N.R., 655 S.W.2d at 735 (analogy between Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 36 and Rule 59.01) (citations omitted). To serve this function, the rule accords conclusiveness to admissions so that a party may rely on the fact that the admission binds the party addressed, unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. N.R., 655 S.W.2d at 735; Killian Const. Co. v. Tri-City Const. Co., 693 S.W.2d 819, 827 (Mo.App.1985) (citations omitted). A party need not produce any further proof regarding facts admitted. Killian Const. Co., 693 S.W.2d at 827.

Because Rule 59.01 does not specifically address the issue in question here, it must be interpreted for its intent. The same principles of construction are used in interpreting statutes and rules. Woolridge v. Woolridge, 915 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Mo.App.1996) (citations omitted). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent from the language used and to give effect to that intent if possible. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). When interpreting a rule, the court should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the rule as written. Sloan v. Director of Revenue, 900 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Mo.App.1995).

Since, as discussed, supra, the purpose of admissions is to narrow the range of issues for trial and relieve a party from producing any further proof regarding those facts, Rule 59.01 logically contemplates that the jury will be made aware of party admissions by introducing them into evidence in some fashion. "Rule 59.01 intends to allow admissions of all disputed issues, whether evidentiary or elements of the burden of proof; that all propositions not in genuine dispute--whether a matter of application of fact to law or opinion--should be admitted." Linde, 543 S.W.2d at 546. Where, as here, an issue has not been removed from the jury's determination by stipulation, the only way to make the jury aware of admissions is to read them. This is consistent with the logic used in Rule 57.07, concerning the use of admissions by party-opponents made in depositions.

Rule 57.07(a)(2) states that the deposition of a party "may be used by an adverse party for any purpose." "A statement made in a deposition relevant to the issues may be admitted against the deponent as admissions against interest ... even though he is present in court and able to testify, or has testified." Parker v. Bruner, 686 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo.App.1984). Thus, just as in the case of depositions, we conclude that a party has the right to...