Fenske Bros., Inc. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union of North America, Local No. 18

• Decision Date: 11 December 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22470.,22470.
• Parties: FENSKE BROS., Inc., et al. v. UPHOLSTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 18 et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

358 Ill. 239

193 N.E. 112

FENSKE BROS., Inc., et al.

v.UPHOLSTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 18 et al.

No. 22470.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1934.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 11, 1934.

Suit by Fenske Bros., Inc., and others against the Upholsterers' International Union of North America, Local No. 18, and others. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

DE YOUNG, J., dissenting.Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Denis E. Sullivan, judge.

Thomas D. Nash, Michael J. Ahern, and Martin J. McNally, all of Chicago, for appellants.

Jacobson, Merrick, Nierman & Silbert, of Chicago (Lewis F. Jacobson and David Silbert, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

Fyffe & Clarke and Otto A. Jaburek, all of Chicago, amici curiae.

JONES, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the superior court of Cook county granting an injunction in a labor controversy. Fenske Bros., Inc., and eleven other corporations engaged in the business of manufacturing furniture in the city of Chicago, filed a bill for an injunction against the Upholsterers' International Union of North America, Locals Nos. 18 and 112, and certain persons as officers, agents, and members of the union and as individuals, together with unknown defendants. An answer to the bill was filed. By stipulation the bill, with its exhibits and the answer, was considered as evidence. The cause was heard upon the pleadings and exhibits, and the decree appealed from was entered in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

The controversy centers about the provisions of section 1 of ‘An Act relating to disputes concerning terms and conditions of employment,’ approved June 19, 1925 (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 48, § 2a, Cahill's Stat. 1933, c. 22, par 58, p. 229), commonly known as the Anti-Injunction Law. That section provides: ‘No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of this State, or by a judge or the judges thereof in any case involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, enjoining or restraining any person or persons, either singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from peaceably and without threats or intimidation recommending, advising, or persuading others so to do; or from peaceably and without threats or intimidation being upon any public street, or thoroughfare or highway for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information, or to peaceably and without threats or intimidation persuade any person or persons to work or to abstain from working, or to employ or to peaceably and without threats or intimidation cease to employ any party to a labor dispute, or to recommend, advise, or persuade others so to do.’

The bill alleges that no dispute existed concerning terms and conditions of employment, but that defendants demanded that complainants operate their business upon a ‘closed shop basis' and sign an agreement to employ none but members of the local union; that the demand was accompanied by a statement that a refusal would result in a strike carried on in a manner that would force complainants to sign the agreement or cease business; that, upon complainants' refusal to execute such agreement, defendants called strikes in each of complainants' plants, and thenceforth carried on a system of picketing, accompanied by threats, intimidation, vile epithets, bodily assaults, and injuries to property, detailed in the bill and supported by affidavits attached as exhibits; that defendants for their justification pretend to rely upon the Anti-Injunction Law, and that said law is unconstitutional for the reasons set forth in the bill, which will be hereinafter discussed. Attached to the bill are ten petitions signed by numerous employees of complainants asking protection from picketing, and stating that they do not wish to be solicited to join any union or other organization. The prayer of the bill is for an order restraining defendants from interfering in any manner with the business of complainants, and, in varying phraseology, from requesting, soliciting, inducing, or compelling any employee to leave, or any prospective employee not to enter, the employment of complainants, and from picketing the premises of complainants, the homes of employees, or the way to and from work.

The answer alleges a dispute as to wages, terms, and conditions of employment, and that the strike was called only to compel complainants to accede to the demands of defendants. It admits substantially all the other material allegations of the bill except with respect to the acts of violence charged. As to these, it admits that such acts of violence were committed by union members and sympathizers, but alleges that they acted upon their own initiative and not otherwise, and denies that defendants rely upon the Anti-Injunction Law in justification of such acts. It admits peaceable picketing of the several plants of complainants, and alleges that defendants in so doing rely upon the Anti-Injunction Law, and denies that said law is unconstitutional. It admits that an injunction should be granted to restrain unlawful acts against complainants, but alleges that defendants should not be restrained from doing any of the things specified in section 1 of the Anti-Injunction Law, and that the order should so provide.

The decree finds that a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment exists between those of defendant's who were formerly employees of complainants or some of them. It restrains defendants from in any manner interfering with the business of complainants or their agents or employees in its operation; from maintaining pickets; from watching or spying upon complainants' places of business and their employees; from assaulting or intimidating employees or addressing them with opprobrious names; from congregating about, patrolling or gathering in groups at or near the places of business of complainants; from entering such places; from following employees; from instituting or maintaining any boycott against complainants; from carrying signs or placards announcing the strike and stating that complainants are not employing union labor; and from sending circulars to their customers. The decree finds that the provisions suggested in the answer should not be incorporated therein, for the reason that the Anti-Injunction Law is unconstitutional, and in detail enjoins the doing of any of the things against which the act forbids the granting of an injunction.

The errors assigned are that the court erred in holding the Anti-Injunction Law unconstitutional and in enjoining the performance of any of the things sanctioned by section 1 of the act. Appellees suggest that appellants have waived the assignments of error by admitting that acts of violence were committed, and that the law, if construed to apply to such acts, would be unconstitutional. They further suggest that the question of the constitutionality of the statute is immaterial, because a court of review will not concern itself with reasons given in a decree if the ultimate decision is correct and sustained by the record. That proposition correctly states a general principle of law, but it does not apply in this case. The validity of the act was specifically challenged by the bill. The relief prayed embraces, not only the restraint of violence, threats, and intimidation, but also the requesting or soliciting of employees to quit work and of others not to enter the employment of complainants. The decree is responsive to both the challenge and the prayer of the bill. The alleged invalidity of the statute is the only reason assigned by the chancellor for enjoining peaceful acts and persuasion. The admissions of appellants furnish no sufficient reason for holding the statute unconstitutional, and do not operate as a waiver of the errors assigned.

Appellees contend that the Anti-Injunction Law is unconstitutional as contravening the due process and equal rights clauses of the Federal Constitution (Amend. 14) and the following provisions of the Constitution of this state: The due process clause; section 19 of article 2, which provides that every person ought to find a certain remedy for all injuriesand wrong suffered; article 3, which divides the powers of government into three departments and prohibits the exercise of the powers of one department by any other department; section 12 of article 6, which provides that circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity; section 22 of article 4, which prohibits the passage of local or special laws and the granting of special privileges and immunities; and section 13 of article 4, which provides that no act shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. No question arises on this record as to the effect of picketing accompanied by acts of violence, and it is conceded that picketing so accompanied is unlawful.

The statute does not in express terms declare the acts lawful which may not be restrained by injunctive process, but it is apparent from the context of the act that the legislative intent was to permit them to be done, otherwise it would follow that the Legislature attempted to authorize the doing of acts which it recognized were unlawful. Such a construction of the statute leads to an absurd consequence and is to be avoided. Statutes are to be interpreted according to their intent and meaning. Condon v. City of Chicago, 249 Ill. 596, 94 N. E. 976;Canal Com'rs v. Sanitary District, 184 Ill. 597, 56 N. E. 953. Our conclusion is that the Legislature intended to legalize the acts mentioned in the statute. People v. City of Chicago, 152 Ill. 546, 38 N. E. 744.

It is claimed that this court is committed to the doctrine that peaceable picketing and peaceable persuasion are unlawful. O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill....