Fentress v. Van Etta Motors

• Decision Date: 31 January 1958
• Citation: 157 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863,323 P.2d 227
• Court: California Superior Court
• Parties: 157 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863 William E. FENTRESS, Appellant, v. VAN ETTA MOTORS et al., Defendants; Ford Motor Company, Respondent. C. A. 2521. Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Francisco County, California

Page 227

323 P.2d 227

157 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863

William E. FENTRESS, Appellant, v. VAN ETTA MOTORS et al., Defendants; Ford Motor Company, Respondent.

C. A. 2521.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Francisco County, California.

Jan. 31, 1958.

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, for appellant.

Charles O. Morgan, Jr., San Francisco, for respondent.

DEVINE, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company, based on an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. The action is against Van Etta Motors, vendor of a Mercury automobile, on an alleged warranty; answer of that defendant has been filed; but it is also against Ford Motor Company for damages alleged to have been caused by negligence in the manufacture of the brakes and wheel bearings of the automobile. The damages were to the automobile itself, in an accident in which it was wrecked when the brakes failed to hold. No damage to person or to other property is alleged.

The order and judgment were made by the trial judge because of our decision in Judson Pacific Murphy, Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 127 Cal.App.2d 828, 275 P.2d 841, and appellant frankly bases his appeal on the proposition that we should overrule that earlier decision of our own court. The question may be stated simply, but it is one which has very rarely been considered. It is this: Will an action lie against the manufacturer of an article which, if negligently made, is likely to produce injury to person or property, for damages resulting from an accident caused by the negligence, where the damages are confined to destruction or harm to the article itself? In the Judson case we answered this question in the negative, on the ground that to extend the manufacturer's responsibility to include the article itself would make the manufacturer virtually a warrantor.

We have reached a conclusion different from our former holding, and we are causing this opinion to be published because the earlier one was reported.

Although the main reason for our change has been none other than an altered judgment based on further reflection, it may be mentioned that one or two cases have been brought to our attention which were not before us--and some had not then been decided--when we decided the Judson case. Also, the trend of judicial decisions seems to carry on what Justice Cardozo, in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445, 74 A.L.R. 1139, called 'the assault upon the citadel of privity.' See for example Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, in which the court, disapproving earlier decisions, held that a notary who prepared an invalid will was liable to a prospective legatee despite the absence of privity.

Shortly after the landmark case on manufacturer's liability of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696, Ann.Cas.1916C, 440, the Supreme Court of New York held, in Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App.Div. 433, 153 N.Y.S. 131, that the manufacturer's liability for negligence in an automobile brake failure case extends to damage solely to the article itself, the automobile. Unlike the MacPherson case, the Quackenbush case was not carried to the court of appeals. As authority for the proposition that the manufacturer's liability for negligence extends to damage to the article itself, the Quackenbush case stands almost alone. The decision in International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 10 Cir., 202 F.2d 52 does hold the manufacturer liable, the article itself being the sole casualty, but the manufacturer was the immediate vendor, and the cause having been stated on warranty as well as on negligence, the decision does not necessarily ground itself upon the charge of negligence. On the other hand, the Judson decision seems to be the only one denying the manufacturer's liability in this type of case.

In the Quackenbush case, it was reasoned by the court that it would be illogical to hold that a person driving a car with negligently fabricated brakes could recover from the manufacturer if he suffered personal injury, but if he had jumped from the vehicle and escaped personal injury, and the automobile was destroyed, he could not recover for the damage to the car. The accident and the negligence causing it, rather than the results of the accident were held to be the controlling factors. We accept that reasoning, and we shall add some thoughts of our own.

To accept the rule of the Quackenbush case will not make the manufacturer a warrantor to the ultimate purchaser. In the first place, negligence must be proved, in accordance with the general rule of manufacturer's negligence. Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 695, 268 P.2d 1041.

In the second place, the article, while no longer, as in the early days of the doctrine of manufacturer's liability, required to be inherently dangerous, must be of such...