Ferguson v. Caldwell
Decision Date | 04 March 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 29347,29347 |
Parties | Billy Homer FERGUSON v. E. B. CALDWELL. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Walter H. Wingfield, Atlanta, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., David L. G. King, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
This is habeas corpus appeal from Tattnall Superior Court presenting two major issues for decision: (1) whether certain evidence used in appellant's 1962 trial and conviction for murder in Douglas Superior Court was obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure; and (2), whether appellant was indicted by a grand jury and convicted by a petit jury from which blacks had been systematically excluded. The trial court decided adversely to appellant on both issues and we affirm its judgment.
This case has proceeded through a long journey of trials and appeals. The trial court's order traces the history of those various proceedings and we incorporate this part of it for background reference to the present appeal.
'Petitioner was tried for first degree murder by the Superior Court of Douglas County, Georgia on September 23-24, 1958, which resulted in a verdict of guilty without a recommendation of mercy. The judgment was affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court in Ferguson v. State, 215 Ga. 117, 109 S.E.2d 44 (1959). The United States Supreme Court reversed in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961), on the ground that the trial court committed error in prohibiting Ferguson's counsel from questioning him in order to elicit his unsworn statement.
'Petitioner was tried again in the Superior Court of Douglas County on September 2-4, 1961. He was again convicted without recommendation of mercy and, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed for reasons unrelated to present petition. Ferguson v. State, 218 Ga. 173, 126 S.E.2d 798 (1962).
'Petitioner was again tried on September 24-26, 1962, for first degree murder on original indictment and was found guilty without a recommendation of mercy, and petitioner was sentenced to death by electrocution. This conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Ferguson v. State, 219 Ga. 33, 131 S.E.2d 538, and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Ferguson v. Georgia, 375 U.S. 913, 84 S.Ct. 210, 11 L.Ed.2d 152 (1963).
'On April 1, 1964, petitioner filed an extraordinary motion for new trial in the Superior Court of Douglas County on the ground that counsel had discovered new evidence material to the case. The Superior Court, after hearing, denied the motion on April 17, 1964. On appeal, the denial was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Georgia. Ferguson v. State, 220 Ga. 364, 138 S.E.2d 881 (1964). The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Ferguson v. Georgia, 381 U.S. 905, 85 S.Ct. 1451, 14 L.Ed.2d 286 (1965).
'Pursuant to this decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia entered an order dated May 11, 1973, requiring Ferguson to file an application for writ of habeas corpus in the Georgia courts alleging that he had been deprived of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by reason of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury which indicted him and the petit jury which convicted him.
Appellant's brief recites that 'in May, 1974, he was placed on parole by order of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.' This presents the threshold question of whether this appeal is moot. The habeas corpus complaint filed in the trial court alleges only an illegal detention and imprisonment, and appellant has now been freed from this physical restraint. Nevertheless, we take judicial notice that appellant is still subject to restrictions and limitations on his freedom as he is legally confined by the terms of his parole. A violation of the terms of the parole by appellant would result in the revocation of his parole with reconfinement ensuing therefrom. If the constitutional issues raised in this proceeding are determined favorably to appellant, he is entitled to have his conviction set aside. Consequently, his cause cannot be considered moot simply because he is now on parole. Morgan v. Kiff, 230 Ga. 277, 196 S.E.2d 445 (1973).
We move on to consider appellant's first enumerated error, that there was an illegal search and seizure which invalidates his 1962 conviction for murder.
The record of appellant's trial shows that the investigating officers made two warrantless searches of his rented room. The evidence also shows that after arrest and during interrogation, appellant gave his consent to a search of his residence to prove his innocence. This search apparently took place between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m. on the day of the arrest. There was no evidence presented at appellant's trial as a result of that search.
The transcript discloses that another search of appellant's residence took place later that same day between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m. In this second search, a billfold and pistol were discovered above the ceiling (through a trap door) of the closet in appellant's room. These were both later identified as belonging to the homicide victim, Luke Brown. This evidence was taken to the jail where appellant was being interrogated and, after being confronted with it, he made an oral confession which was later reduced to writing and signed by appellant. This evidence and the two confessions were admitted at trial and are the bases of this enumeration of error.
Appellant argues that the uncontroverted evidence clearly establishes that the investigating officers did not have his consent to...
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