Ferguson v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 18 June 2014
• Citation: 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04464,988 N.Y.S.2d 207,118 A.D.3d 849
• Parties: Arlene FERGUSON, appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

118 A.D.3d 849

988 N.Y.S.2d 207

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04464

Arlene FERGUSON, appellant,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

June 18, 2014.

Arlene Ferguson, Kew Gardens, N.Y., appellant, pro se.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Elizabeth I. Freedman of counsel), for respondents.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ash, J.), dated April 18, 2012, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In 2008, while employed by the New York City Department of Education (hereinafter the Department) as a school social worker, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when two kindergarten students collided with her in a school hallway. The plaintiff commenced this action against the Department and the City of New York, alleging negligent supervision. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.

A school district may not be held liable for the negligent performance of its governmental function of supervising children in its charge, at least in the absence of a special duty to the person injured ( see Dinardo v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.3d 872, 874, 893 N.Y.S.2d 818, 921 N.E.2d 585;Kochanski v. City of New York, 76 A.D.3d 1050, 1052, 908 N.Y.S.2d 260;Stinson v. Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 A.D.3d 847, 847–848, 877 N.Y.S.2d 400;Goga v. Binghamton City School Dist., 302 A.D.2d 650, 651, 754 N.Y.S.2d 739). Under the doctrine that a school district acts in loco parentis with respect to its minor students, a school district owes a “special duty” to the students themselves ( Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 560, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d 849;see Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263;Stinson v. Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 A.D.3d at 847–848, 877 N.Y.S.2d 400;cf. Williams v. Weatherstone, –––N.Y.3d ––––, ––––, ––– N.Y.S.2d ––––, ––– N.E.3d –––– 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 03425, *13 [2014] ). Accordingly, a school district may be held liable to a student when it breaches that duty, so long as all other necessary elements of a negligence cause of action are established ( see Braunstein v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 104 A.D.3d 893, 894, 962 N.Y.S.2d 340). The special duty owed to the students themselves does not, however, extend, as a general matter, to teachers, administrators, and other adults on or off of school premises ( see Stinson v. Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 A.D.3d at 847–848, 877 N.Y.S.2d 400;Goga v. Binghamton City School Dist., 302 A.D.2d at 650–651, 754 N.Y.S.2d 739;Sampson v. Board of Educ. Of City of N.Y., 255 A.D.2d 434, 435, 680 N.Y.S.2d 594;cf. Kochanski v. City of New York, 76 A.D.3d 1050, 908 N.Y.S.2d 260).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they did not owe the plaintiff a special duty ( see Stinson v. Roosevelt U.F.S. D., 61 A.D.3d at 847–848, 877 N.Y.S.2d 400). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable...