Navarra v. Bd. of Educ.of N.Y.

Decision Date25 March 2022
Docket NumberIndex 505731/2018
Citation2022 NY Slip Op 31098 (U)
PartiesSTEVEN NAVARRA, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and THE CITY OF NEW YORK Defendants.
CourtNew York Supreme Court
Unpublished Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

HON CONSUELO MALLAFRE MELENDEZ J. S. C.

The court's Decision and Order is based upon consideration of the following papers: CPLR 2219(a) Recitation: Motion Sequence 1, NYSCEF Numbers:12-22, 24, 27.

Plaintiff a former second-grade teacher, brought forth this negligence action against Defendants, Board of Education of the City of New York (BOE) and the City of New York, for alleged injuries caused by a student in his classroom. Defendants now move for an order dismissing Plaintiff's negligence cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and 3212. Defendant City claims the case must be dismissed against it as it is not a proper party in this action. Defendant BOE seeks summary judgment in their favor claiming, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to plead and prove that they owed him a special duty of care and that the actions complained of are protected under the governmental function immunity defense.

As a threshold matter, the Court finds that this motion was timely filed in accordance with the Governor's Executive Orders and Administrative Order AO/71 DATED March 19, 2020 and by stipulation of the parties. Additionally, the action against Defendant the City of New York is dismissed as it is well established that the City of New York and the Department of Education (DOE) are separate legal entities, and the City cannot be held liable for torts committed by the DOE and its employees (see NY Education Law §2551; Matter of Allende v. City of New York 69 A.D.3d 931, 932 [2d Dept. 2010]; Miner v. City of New York, 78 A.D.3d 669 [2d Dept. 2010]). The care, custody and control of public schools and the supervision of students entrusted in its care lies with the DOE, a distinct legal entity from the City. Here, Plaintiff cannot maintain his cause of action against Defendant City of New York as it was merely an out of possession landowner of the school building on the date of the incident. Therefore, and its motion for summary judgment is Granted and the action against the City of New York is dismissed.

Plaintiff a second-grade teacher at the time of the incident, alleges he was injured when a student became irate and pushed a desk onto his foot, causing him to sustain injuries. Plaintiff claims Defendants were negligent in failing to protect him from this student. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant BOE failed to provide adequate supervision of students, failed to remove the student who assaulted him from the class or school, and failed to provide a full-time paraprofessional or teacher's aide for the student. Plaintiff also brought forth claims for the negligent hiring, training and supervision of the school's employees.

The parties do not dispute that the alleged student assailant, S.J., was one of Plaintiff's second grade students and had an Individualized Education program (IEP) which required her to have a regularly assigned one-to-one paraprofessional from 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. At his 50-h Examination Before Trial (EBT), Plaintiff provided the following testimony: on the date of the incident, the paraprofessional left the classroom at approximately 9:30 as she was re-assigned to accompany a class on a field trip. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff approached S.J. because she was throwing clay at other students. S.J. became irate and aggressively pushed her desk causing it to turn over and fall onto Plaintiff's foot, injuring his left toe. Plaintiff also testified that due to behavioral issues, he would have S.J. sit with a school safety agent or with the principal when her assigned paraprofessional was no longer with her in the classroom.

The court notes that during questioning at his EBT Plaintiff confirmed the following: at no time did any school official or administrator assure him that S.J. would be transferred out of his class or out of school due to behavioral issues. Plaintiff never requested that S.J. be transferred. The school security agents, school principal, assistant school principal and DOE employee never promised to keep Plaintiff safe in the classroom from S.J.

During her EBT testimony, Assistant Principal Jennifer Troment acknowledged that a paraprofessional was assigned to S.J. in conjunction with her IEP. Ms. Troment explained that an IEP is "meant for the student" and will address all matters concerning the subject student's issues in terms of their education and background.

Defendant BOE argues that this action must be dismissed because it owed no special duty to Plaintiff. A school district may not be held liable for the negligent performance of its governmental function of supervising children in its charge, at least in the absence of a special duty to the person injured (see Dinardo v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.3d 872, 874 [2009]; Ferguson v. City of New York, 118 A.D.3d 849 [2d Dept. 2014]; Stinson v. Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 A.D.3d 847, 847-848 [2d Dept. 2009]; Moreno v. City of New York, 27 A.D.3d 536, 536-537 [2d Dept. 2006]). Although a school district owes a special duty to its minor students, that duty does not extend to teachers, administrators, or other adults on or off school premises (see Ferguson v. City of New York, 118 A.D.3d at 850; Stinson v. Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 A.D.3d at 847-848; Brumer v. City of New York, 132 A.D.3d 795, 796 [2d Dept 2015]).

However, "[w]ith regard to teachers, administrators, or other adults on or off school premises, a special relationship with a municipal defendant can be formed in three ways: '(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation'" (Thomas v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 124 A.D.3d 762, 763, [2d Dept. 2015] [internal citation omitted]; Brumer v. City of New York, 132 A.D.3d 795, 796 [2d Dept 2015]; see Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260 [1987]). "[T]he injured party's reliance is as critical ... as is the municipality's voluntary affirmative undertaking of a duty to act.... Indeed, at the heart of most of these 'special duty' cases is the unfairness that the courts have perceived in precluding recovery when a municipality's voluntary undertaking has lulled the injured party into a false sense of security and has thereby induced [her] either to relax [her] own vigilance or to forego other available avenues of protection" (Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255 at 261). "The assurance by the municipal defendant must be definite enough to generate justifiable reliance by the plaintiff" (Dinardo v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.3d 872 at 874; Wilson v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 167 A.D.3d 820, 821 [2d Dept 2018]).

Here Defendant BOE made a prima facie showing through admissible evidence that it did not assume a special duty to Plaintiff for which it can be held liable. Likewise, Plaintiff did not establish that he relied on any promises made to protect him or that any actions of Defendant BOE lulled him into a false sense of security. Plaintiff himself confirmed at his EBT that no school administrator, employee or security agent ever made any promises or assurances to protect him from S.J. "When the reliance element is either not present at all or, if present, is not causally related to the ultimate harm … the invocation...

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