Ferrara v. Esquire Bank

• Decision Date: 16 August 2017
• Docket Number: 2016-06706. Index No. 4883/15.
• Citation: 153 A.D.3d 671,61 N.Y.S.3d 73
• Parties: J. Mark FERRARA, respondent, v. ESQUIRE BANK, et al., appellants, et al., defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

153 A.D.3d 671
61 N.Y.S.3d 73

J. Mark FERRARA, respondent,
v.
ESQUIRE BANK, et al., appellants, et al., defendant.

2016-06706. Index No. 4883/15.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Aug. 16, 2017.

61 N.Y.S.3d 74

Moses & Singer LLP, New York, NY (Jason Canales and Megan H. Daneshrad of counsel), for appellants.

Gerald V. Dandeneau, P.C., Melville, NY, for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the defendants Esquire Bank, Andrew Sagliocca, and Eric

Bader appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pastoressa, J.), dated May 20, 2016, as denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant Esquire Bank (hereinafter Esquire) from September 18, 2014, until his employment was terminated on December 31, 2014. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, Esquire and its principals, the defendants Andrew Sagliocca and Eric Bader (hereinafter collectively the defendants), inter alia, to recover damages for defamation. The plaintiff's defamation cause of action was based on communications made by Sagliocca and Bader concerning the reasons for the termination of the plaintiff's employment to representatives of nonparty Adams Consulting Group, LLC/ACG Resources (hereinafter ACG), the recruiting firm that had placed the plaintiff with Esquire.

The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against

61 N.Y.S.3d 75

them. They argued, among other things, that the allegedly defamatory statements were subject to a qualified common-interest privilege, and that the plaintiff had failed to allege that the defendants acted with malice. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the defendants' motion, concluding that the defendants had failed to establish that the common-interest privilege applied to the subject communications. The defendants appeal. We affirm the order insofar as appealed...