Laguerre v. Maurice

• Decision Date: 23 December 2020
• Docket Number: 2018–11567,Index No. 518431/2017
• Citation: 192 A.D.3d 44,138 N.Y.S.3d 123
• Parties: Pierre Delor LAGUERRE, respondent, v. Pastor Jean Renald MAURICE, et al., appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

192 A.D.3d 44

138 N.Y.S.3d 123

Pierre Delor LAGUERRE, respondent,

v.Pastor Jean Renald MAURICE, et al., appellants.

2018–11567

Index No. 518431/2017

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—September 22, 2020

December 23, 2020

Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York, N.Y. (John Sandercock and Steven B. Prystowsky of counsel), for appellants.

Maurice Dean Williams, Bronx, NY, for respondent.

CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION & ORDER

ROMAN, J.

In this action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation per se, the plaintiff alleges that he was defamed by the pastor of the defendant church when the pastor told members of the congregation that the plaintiff was a homosexual who viewed gay pornography on the church's computer. The Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action alleging defamation per se. On this appeal by the defendants, we consider, inter alia, whether resolution of the issues raised would necessarily involve an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine or practice in violation of the First Amendment, and whether the false imputation that a person is a homosexual constitutes defamation per se. For the reasons that follow, we answer both of these questions in the negative.

The plaintiff is a former elder in the Gethsemane SDA Church (hereinafter the church). The defendant Pastor Jean Renald Maurice is the pastor in charge of the church, which allegedly is operated by the defendant The Greater New York Corporation of Seventh Day Adventist. In September 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation per se. As set forth in the complaint, Pastor Maurice stated before approximately 300 members of the church that "the [p]laintiff was a homosexual," and that "the [p]laintiff disrespected the church by viewing gay pornography on the church's computer." The complaint alleged that these statements constituted defamation per se, inasmuch as they falsely portrayed the plaintiff "as a homosexual man with no self-control who uses the church's computer to view gay porn." The complaint further alleged that Pastor Maurice used these statements to influence the church to vote to relieve the plaintiff of his responsibilities at the church and to terminate his membership.

The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims (see CPLR 3211[a][2] ), and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211[a][7] ). Specifically, the defendants contended that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because adjudication of the plaintiff's claims would require the court to impermissibly inquire into ecclesiastical proceedings, discipline, and church doctrine. In addition, the defendants argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation per se, since falsely ascribing homosexuality to a person no longer constituted defamation per se, and the plaintiff had failed to allege that he sustained any special damages. The defendants further argued, among other things, that the allegedly defamatory statements, which allegedly were made at a church membership meeting, were protected by a common-interest privilege.

In opposition to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction, as the court could decide the dispute based solely upon the application of neutral principles of law. The plaintiff also argued, among other things, that he had adequately stated a cause of action to recover damages for defamation per se, and that the Appellate Division, Second Department had held that the false imputation of homosexuality was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation.

As relevant here, the Supreme Court denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action alleging defamation per se. The court determined that the First Amendment was not implicated, as the dispute could be resolved with reference to neutral principles of secular law. Additionally, the court determined that the plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim to recover damages for defamation per se. The defendants appeal.

"The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs" ( Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 9 N.Y.3d 282, 286, 849 N.Y.S.2d 463, 879 N.E.2d 1282 ; see First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Am., 62 N.Y.2d 110, 116, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86, 464 N.E.2d 454 ; Eltingville Lutheran Church v. Rimbo, 174 A.D.3d 856, 857, 108 N.Y.S.3d 39 ). However, "[c]ivil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as" they "can be ‘decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of ... law, without reference to any religious principle’ " (Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 9 N.Y.3d at 286, 849 N.Y.S.2d 463, 879 N.E.2d 1282, quoting Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 115, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, 446 N.E.2d 136 ).

In the present case, the defendants maintain that the plaintiff's defamation per se claim is not justiciable in a civil court because adjudication of the claim would require the court to impermissibly inquire into internal church governance.

However, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the instant dispute may be determined by application of neutral principles of law. The allegedly defamatory remarks at issue, i.e., that the plaintiff is a homosexual who viewed gay pornography on the church's computer, may be evaluated without reference to religious principles (see Sieger v. Union of Orthodox Rabbis of U.S. & Can., 1 A.D.3d 180, 182, 767 N.Y.S.2d 78 ; Berger v. Temple Beth–El of Great Neck, 303 A.D.2d 346, 348, 756 N.Y.S.2d 94 ). The defendants point out that the church manual provides that "[f]ornication," which includes "homosexual activity," and the use of "pornographic material" are reasons for which members may be subject to discipline. However, the plaintiff does not challenge his expulsion from the church, or request reinstatement as a church elder. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, resolution of the issues raised would not involve an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine or practice (cf. Drake v. Moulton Mem. Baptist Church of Newburgh, 93 A.D.3d 685, 686, 940 N.Y.S.2d 281 ).

Accordingly, contrary to the defendants' contention, they were not entitled to dismissal of the defamation per se cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We also reject the defendants' contention that they were entitled to dismissal of the defamation per se cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) based on the common-interest qualified privilege. In assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 21 N.Y.3d 324, 334, 970 N.Y.S.2d 733, 992 N.E.2d 1076 ; Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ; Murphy v. Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 155 A.D.3d 637, 638, 64 N.Y.S.3d 237 ). If the court considers evidentiary material, and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the criterion then becomes "whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, again dismissal should not eventuate" ( Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17 ; see Sokol v. Leader, 74 A.D.3d 1180, 1181–1182, 904 N.Y.S.2d 153 ).

Generally, a cause of action predicated on allegedly defamatory statements is subject to dismissal, inter alia, where the statements are protected by a qualified privilege (see Gottlieb v. Wynne, 159 A.D.3d 799, 800, 74 N.Y.S.3d 46 ). The qualified privilege defense extends to a communication made by one person to another upon a subject in which both have an interest (see Stillman v. Ford, 22 N.Y.2d 48, 53, 290 N.Y.S.2d 893, 238 N.E.2d 304 ; Ferrara v. Bank, 153 A.D.3d 671, 673, 61 N.Y.S.3d 73 ; Kamchi v. Weissman, 125 A.D.3d 142, 158, 1 N.Y.S.3d 169 ). "This qualified privilege has been applied to communications carried out ‘in furtherance of a common interest of a religious organization’ " ( Kamchi v. Weissman, 125 A.D.3d at 158, 1 N.Y.S.3d 169, quoting Berger v. Temple Beth–El of Great Neck, 41 A.D.3d 626, 627, 839 N.Y.S.2d 504 ). However, "the common-interest privilege can be overcome by a showing of malice" ( Colantonio v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 115 A.D.3d 902, 903, 982 N.Y.S.2d 563 ; see Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 437, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857, 605 N.E.2d 344 ). "To establish the malice necessary to defeat the privilege, the plaintiff may show either common-law malice, i.e., spite or ill will, or may show actual malice, i.e., knowledge of falsehood of the statement or reckless disregard for the truth" ( Diorio v. Ossining Union Free School Dist., 96 A.D.3d 710, 712, 946 N.Y.S.2d 195 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kamchi v. Weissman, 125 A.D.3d at 158, 1 N.Y.S.3d 169 ).

Here, to the extent...