Ferrell v. Keel

• Decision Date: 15 April 1912
• Citation: 146 S.W. 494,103 Ark. 96
• Parties: FERRELL v. KEEL
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

146 S.W. 494

103 Ark. 96

FERRELL v. KEEL

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 15, 1912

Appeal from Jackson Chancery Court; George T. Humphries, Chancellor.

John W. and Jos. M. Stayton, and McCaleb & Reeder' for appellants.

Morris M. Cohn and Stuckey & Stuckey, for appellees.

OPINION

PER CURIAM

In case No. 2046, Ferrell v. Keel, which has been argued and submitted, one of the principal points of controversy relates to the question of the validity or invalidity of an act of the General Assembly of 1911, its validity being assailed on the ground that the enacting clause does not conform to the constitutional requirement. The form of the enacting clause is "Be It Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas." The form prescribed by the last amendment to the Constitution, known as the Initiative and Referendum Amendment, is "Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Arkansas;" and the question in this case is whether or not this requirement applies to bills which originate in the General Assembly as well as those initiated by the people.

Since the submission of the case, the attention of the judges has been called, for the first time, to the fact that the general appropriation bill, enacted by the last Legislature, covering appropriations for the expenses of the executive and judicial departments, including the salaries of the judges, bears the enacting clause, "Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Arkansas," and a majority of the judges have reached the conclusion that this attitude of the case disqualifies them from sitting in judgment, for the reason that the decision of the point in this case necessarily results in the decision of the question of the validity of the appropriation bill. The Constitution of this State provides:

"No judge or justice shall preside in the trial of any cause in the event of which he may be interested, or where either of the parties shall be connected with him by consanguinity or affinity within such degree as may be prescribed by law; or in which he may have been of counsel or have presided in any inferior court." Art. 7, § 20.

It is thus seen, from the statement of the case, that, if the judges sit in judgment on this case, they will necessarily decide whether or not their salaries for the current year can be paid, or whether they must wait until the General Assembly shall pass another appropriation bill. The amount of their salaries is fixed by the Constitution, and is not dependent upon that statute, but the payment of the same is dependent upon the will of the Legislature in appropriating funds for that purpose; and unless there is a valid appropriation bill, the salaries can not legally be paid.

The judges of this court are not parties to the suit, nor are they, strictly and technically speaking, interested in the result of this particular litigation, but they are as much interested in the result as if they were directly deciding the question whether or not their salaries for the current year are to be paid; for, as before stated, that necessarily results from the decision of this case. In Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S.W. 143, we said:

"While the Constitution speaks of a 'party' to the cause, we are of the opinion that, both upon sound reason and according to the weight of authority, the word should not be construed in a technical and restricted sense to mean a party to the record, but it should be held to mean any one who is pecuniarily interested directly in the result of the suit although not a party to the record and not necessarily bound by the judgment. Any other construction totally disregards the spirit and defeats the purpose of the constitutional...