Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York v. Waterman

• Decision Date: 12 May 1896
• Citation: 44 N.E. 283,161 Ill. 632
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK v. WATERMAN.

161 Ill. 632

44 N.E. 283

FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK

v.WATERMAN.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 12, 1896.

Appeal from appellate court, Second district.

Action on an accident insurance policy by John D. Waterman, as administrator of James B. Marshall, deceased, against the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York. There was a judgment for plaintiff, which was affirmed by the appellate court (59 Ill. App. 297), and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Garver & Fisher and W. G. Challis, for appellant.

Frost & McEvoy, for appellee.

BAKER, J.

The accident insurance policy in suit in this cause was issued by the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York on June 14, 1891, to James B. Marshall, the intestate of appellee, insuring him in the sum of $5,000 against death through external, violent, and accidental means for the term of 12 months ending June 14, 1892. The policy also made provision for a weekly indemnity in case of bodily injury through like means, but not causing death. The policy was afterwards renewed for an additional term of one year from June 14, 1892. The intestate was asphyxiated by illuminating gas in the Northwestern Hotel at Aurora, Ill., on the night of December 5, 1892. He was found dead in bed on the morning of December 6th, and the room was filled with gas. At the trial there was evidence tending to prove that the gas fixtures in the room were defective; and there was also evidence tending to prove that the deceased was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and that his death was attributable to such intoxication. The case was tried before the court without a jury, and a number of written propositions were submitted to it by appellant to be held as law in the decision of the case, but they were all refused, and exceptions taken. The findings and judgment were for the plaintiff below, and that judgment was affirmed in the appellate court.

The principal defenses relied on by appellant are based upon provisions in the policy, which read as follows. ‘This insurance does not cover disappearances, nor war risk, nor voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger; nor injuries, fatal or otherwise, resulting from poison or anything accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed, or inhaled; nor injuries, fatal or otherwise, received while, or in consequence of having been under the influence of, or affected by, nor resulting, directly or indirectly, from intoxicants, anaesthetics, narcotics,sunstroke, freezing, vertigo, sleepwalking, fits, herenia, or any disease or bodily infirmity.’ One ground of defense is that, since the policy expressly states that the insurance does not cover injuries resulting from poison or anything accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed, or inhaled, and the deceased came to his death by means of the illuminating gas which he inhaled while asleep, therefore, according to the true intent and meaning of the contract, appellant is not liable to the administrator for the sum of $5,000 stipulated to be paid in case of the death of his intestate as the result of external, violent, and accidental means. In Insurance Co. v. Dunlap, 160 Ill. 642, 43 N. E. 765, this court held that drinking carbolic acid by mistake for peppermint is not within a clause of an accident insurance exempting the company from liability for injuries or death from ‘taking poison,’ as such words mean the voluntary intentional taking of poison, and do not include cases of accidental poisoning by mistake, but to included injuries or death from voluntarily taking poison without any suicidal intent. And this court in its opinion referred with approval to the decision of the court of appeals of New York in Paul v. Insurance Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347, and said: ‘We think the rule established by the court of appeals of New York one better calculated to carry out the true intention of the parties when the contract of insurance was entered into, and one, too, more nearly in harmony with the current of authority bearing on the question.’ In the Paul Case, thus referred to, the policy provided that the insurance should not extend to any death or disability which may have been caused by the taking of poison, contact with poisonous substances, or inhaling of gases, and it appeared that the insured was found dead in bed in his room at an hotel, and that the gas had in some way been turned on, and his death caused by breathing the atmosphere of the room filled with gas; and it was held that the death was not caused by ‘the inhaling of gas' within the meaning of the policy, and that those words applied only to a voluntary and intelligent action on the part of the insured, such as in medical or surgical treatment, for dental work, or with a suicidal...