Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Garcia, 78-1091
Decision Date | 06 March 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 78-1091,78-1091 |
Citation | 368 So.2d 1313 |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Parties | FIDELITY & CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Elsa GARCIA, a minor through her parent and natural guardian, Heraoldo Garcia, Appellees. |
Corlett, Merritt, Killian & Sikes and Gerald E. Rosser, Miami, for appellant.
Stabinski, Funt, Levine & Vega, Miami, for appellees.
Before HAVERFIELD, C. J., and PEARSON and KEHOE, JJ.
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York was the plaintiff in an action for declaratory judgment. It sought a declaration concerning the coverage for its insured, Elsa Garcia, who was injured in an automobile-pedestrian accident. This appeal is from a final summary judgment finding that coverage was afforded to the injured minor claimant.
The facts appear without conflict by stipulation of the parties, and are set forth by the court in the judgment:
The relevant policy terms involved in this case are contained in the "Definitions" portion of the insurance policy and are set forth below:
Only one Florida case has been cited for our guidance. In Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Collier, 334 So.2d 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), Collier was driving his automobile home from work and one of the tires became flat. During the time he was changing the tire, his car was truck by another automobile which caused his car to strike and injure him. At the time Collier was injured, he was standing outside his car, with it jacked up, removing the spare tire from it. This court held that Collier was "occupying" his car within the meaning of his policy with Industrial Fire. The decision relied for support upon the holdings of a list of cases from other jurisdictions. These decisions are not very helpful to us because they are concerned primarily with a determination of whether a particular insured is "occuping" an automobile. A common element in the cases cited is "physical contact" with the automobile, which the courts have considered as important in determining whether one is "occupying" the automobile.
It is clear from the cases cited by the parties here that other jurisdictions have not been able to define a test or a definite limit for the term "alighting from," which is the term here in issue. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 513 (1951), and in particular A.L.R.2d Later Case Service updating this annotation. While the term is simple and has a good dictionary definition, 1 the application of the definition to the facts of the cases arising from its use in insurance policies shows that it may be ambiguous in a given situation. Cf. Wolf v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 2 Ill.App.2d 124, 118 N.E.2d 777 (1954), cited with approval in Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Collier, 334 So.2d 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). We, therefore, recognize the rule that the policy term must be given a liberal interpretation for the insured. See Stuyvesant Insurance Company v. Butler, 314 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla.1975), and cases cited thereat.
Under such an interpretation, we must reject the physical contact test. It is unreasonable to hold that a person has completed the process of "alighting from" when that person has one foot on the ground and has released contact with the car. See Nickerson v. Citizens Mutual Insurance Company, 393 Mich. 324, 224 N.W.2d 896, 899 (1975); and cf. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company v. Broyles, 230 Miss. 45, 92 So.2d 252 (1957).
On the other hand, there must be a limit to the activity that can be said to be a part of "alighting from." Cf. Rice v. Allstate...
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