Fiedeer v. Fiedeer

• Decision Date: 12 May 1914
• Docket Number: 3284.
• Citation: 140 P. 1022,42 Okla. 124
• Parties: FIEDEER v. FIEDEER.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

140 P. 1022

42 Okla. 124

FIEDEER v. FIEDEER.

No. 3284.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

May 12, 1914

Syllabus by the Court.

It is the policy of our Constitution and statutes to open the doors of the courts of justice to every person without distinction or discrimination for redress of wrongs and reparation for injuries; and, under our Constitution and statutes, a married woman may maintain an action for injuries to either her natural or statutory rights the same as though she were a feme sole, including an action against a former husband for a tort maliciously inflicted during coverture.

In an action by a wife against a former husband for injuries received from a gunshot wound maliciously inflicted by the husband during coverture, the fact that such wounds were inflicted in such manner during coverture constitutes no defense to the action.

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 2. Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; George W. Clark, Judge.

Action by Mattie R. Fiedeer against John Fiedeer. From a judgment for plaintiff sustaining a demurrer to certain paragraphs of defendant's answer, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Reardon and Hereford, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Charles H. Garnett, Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

HARRISON C.

This action was begun in the district court of Oklahoma county by Mattie Fiedeer against John Fiedeer for damages resulting from personal injuries, upon a petition which in part is as follows: "That on, to wit, the 28th day of February 1911, at Oklahoma City in said county, the defendant unlawfully, violently, maliciously, and feloniously did assault the plaintiff with a shotgun loaded with powder and buckshot, and did therewith shoot the plaintiff upon the top and side of her head, and did thereby inflict dangerous and painful wounds and injuries upon the plaintiff, by reason of which plaintiff suffered great bodily and mental pain and anguish, and became and was and still is sick, injured, and disabled from working, and will continue to suffer pain and to be disabled from working for the remainder of her life all to her damage in the sum of $4,800, and further, by reason of which, the plaintiff was compelled to and did expend a large sum of money for nursing, medicine, and medical treatment in endeavoring to be healed and cured of the said wounds and injuries, to wit, the sum of $200, to her further damage in the sum of $200." She also claimed punitive damages on account of humiliation and mental suffering in the sum of $5,000.

The defendant answered as follows:

"(1) Comes now the defendant and denies each and every allegation in plaintiff's petition.

(2) And the defendant, further answering, says that on the 28th day of February, 1911, the said plaintiff and defendant were legally married, bearing toward one another the relation of husband and wife under the laws of the state of Oklahoma, and during such marriage relation, existing as aforesaid, no action of damages will lie for the personal torts committed upon the other spouse during the marriage relation.

(3) And defendant, further answering, says that on the 12th day of May, 1911, a decree of divorce was granted in the district court of Oklahoma county, which operated as a dissolution of the marriage contract as to both, and said cause is still pending, the time for appeal not having expired; but defendant further alleges that, even if the plaintiff claims she is divorced from the defendant, she can receive nothing in damages, as under the law dissolution of marriage does not permit the plaintiff to sue defendant for a tort committed upon the plaintiff during coverture"--concluding with a prayer.

Plaintiff demurred to the second and third paragraphs of the answer for the reason that they failed to state a defense to plaintiff's cause of action. The court sustained the demurrer. Defendant refused to plead further, stood upon his answer, and appealed to this court upon the one proposition that an action by neither husband nor wife will lie against the other for a tort committed during coverture. This brings us to a question which, especially under modern jurisprudence, has been the occasion of much profound reasoning and of an equal amount of sophistry. Many carefully reasoned, though we cannot say well reasoned, cases are cited in support of plaintiff in error's contention. From an examination of the authorities cited, they appear to us as in a great measure controlled by the common-law rule under which the entity of the wife was completely lost in the husband. But modern Legislatures, though vainly, it seems, have by plain, explicit, and unambiguous language attempted to break away from the common-law rule and to put the courts out of hearing of the still lingering echoes of barbaric days. The ground upon which the stronger of the more modern decisions have denied one's spouse the right to maintain an action for tort against the other during coverture have been in the main, based upon public policy, reasoning that to maintain such an action would tend to invade the holy sanctity of the home and shatter the sacred relations between husband and wife, and that therefore, for public policy's sake, such actions should not be maintained; and yet those very decisions, in support of their philosophy, hold that the civil courts are open to parties seeking divorce and alimony and that the criminal courts are open for the prosecution of either husband or wife for assault and battery, cudgelings, or for shooting each other with shotguns. We fail to feel the force of such philosophy. We fail to comprehend wherein public policy sustains a greater injury by allowing a wife compensation for being disabled for life by the brutal assault of a man with whom she has been unfortunately linked for life than it would be to allow her to go into a criminal court and prosecute him and send him to the penitentiary for such assault.

Nor are we able to perceive wherein the sensitive nerves of society are worse jarred by such a proceeding than it would be to allow the parties to go into a divorce court and lay bare every act of their marriage relation in order to obtain alimony. But, aside from the philosophy on the one side or the other, it appears to us that the plain English language of our Constitution and statutes should enable us to determine what the rights of a married woman are intended to be in such cases. Section 6, art. 2, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, provides: "The...