Boone v. Boone
Decision Date | 23 April 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 25283.,25283. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | Juanita BOONE, Appellant, v. Freddie BOONE, Respondent. |
Thomas M. White, of Steinberg Law Firm, of Goose Creek, for appellant.
Frank E. Grimball, Thomas B. Pritchard, and Phillip S. Ferderigos, of Barnwell, Whaley, Patterson & Helms, LLC, of Charleston, for respondent.
The question presented by this appeal is whether interspousal immunity from personal injury actions violates the public policy of South Carolina. We conclude it does.
Appellant Juanita Boone (Wife) was injured in a car accident in Georgia. At the time of the accident, Wife was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband Respondent Freddie Boone (Husband). Wife and Husband reside in South Carolina.
Wife brought this tort action against Husband in South Carolina. Concluding Georgia law which provides interspousal immunity in personal injury actions was applicable, the trial judge granted Husband's motion to dismiss. Wife appeals. We reverse.
Does Georgia law providing interspousal immunity in personal injury actions violate the public policy of South Carolina?
Interspousal immunity is a common law doctrine based on the legal fiction that husband and wife share the same identity in law, namely that of the husband. 92 A.L.R.3d 901 (1979). Accordingly, at common law, it was "both morally and conceptually objectionable to permit a tort suit between two spouses." Id. at 906.
With the passage of Married Women's Property Acts in the mid-nineteenth century, married women were given a legal estate in their own property and the capacity to sue and be sued. Under this legislation, a married woman could maintain an action against her husband for any tort against her property interest such as trespass to land or conversion. Since the legislation destroyed the "unity of persons," a husband could also maintain an action against his wife for torts to his property. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 279 (2001); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (5th ED. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. c (1979).
For a long time, however, the majority of courts held Married Women's Property Acts did not destroy interspousal immunity for personal torts. Courts adopted two inconsistent arguments in favor of continued immunity. First, they theorized suits between spouses would be fictitious and fraudulent, particularly against insurance companies. Second, they claimed interspousal suits would destroy domestic harmony. Id.; Dobbs, supra, Keeton, supra.
In the twentieth century, most courts either abrogated or provided exceptions to interspousal immunity. See Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Drickersen v. Drickersen, 546 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1976); Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 646 P.2d 878 (1982); Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 26 CaLRptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096 (Del.1993); Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1993); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979); Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 734 P.2d 1183 (1987); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky.1953); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me.1980); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976); Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Burns v. Burns, 518 So.2d 1205 (Miss. 1988); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo.1986); Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986); Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1977); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 35 N.Y.2d 587, 364 N.Y.S.2d 482, 324 N.E.2d 137 (1974); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St.3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 1022 (1914); Heino v. Harper, 306 Or. 347, 759 P.2d 253 (1988); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 (1981); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 388 A.2d 1 (1978); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn.1983); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.1987); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W.Va. 557, 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wy.1987).1 South Carolina has abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity from tort liability for personal injury. Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); see S.C.Code Ann. § 15-5-170 (1976) () .
aff'd as modified, 98 Ill.2d 128, 74 Ill.Dec. 495, 455 N.E.2d 1388 (1983) ( ); Cloud v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 440 So.2d 961 (La.App.1983) ( ).
Georgia continues to recognize the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity. See Ga.Code Ann. § 19-3-8 (1999). Under Georgia law, interspousal tort immunity bars personal injury actions between spouses, except where the traditional policy reasons for applying the doctrine are absent, i.e., where there is no marital harmony to be preserved and where there exists no possibility of collusion between the spouses. Shoemake v. Shoemake, 200 Ga.App. 182, 407 S.E.2d 134 (1991).
Although South Carolina had abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity from tort liability for personal injury thirty years before, this Court held it would apply the law of the foreign state even if it recognized interspousal immunity. Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964). If a spouse had no right of action against her spouse where the tort occurred, the action would not be enforced in South Carolina. Id.
In Algie v. Algie, 261 S.C. 103, 198 S.E.2d 529 (1973), the Court expressly declined to overrule Oshiek v. Oshiek, supra.
It is the public policy of our State to provide married persons with the same legal rights and remedies possessed by unmarried persons. See Bryant v. Smith, 187 S.C. 453, 198 S.E. 20 (1938) ( ); see also S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-615 (Supp.2000) ( ). Had the parties to this action not been married to each other, Wife could have maintained a personal injury action against Husband. We find it contrary to "natural justice," see Rauton v. Pullman Co., supra, to hold that because of their marital status, Wife is precluded from maintaining this action against Husband. Accordingly, we conclude application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity violates the public policy of South Carolina.
Moreover, the reasons given in support of interspousal immunity are simply not justified in the twenty-first century....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Individually v. Ford Motor Co.
...governing a tort action is determined by the lex loci delicti, the law of the state in which the injury occurred.” Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 546 S.E.2d 191, 193 (2001); see also Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F.Supp. 589, 594-95 (D.S.C.1981); Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F.Supp. 33, 35 (1976); A......
-
Arabi Gin Co. v. Plexus Cotton, Ltd. (In re, Joseph Walker & Co.)
...the state in which the injury occurred.” Nash v. Tindall Corp., 375 S.C. 36, 39, 650 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct.App.2007) (quoting Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 13, 546 S.E.2d 191, 193 (2001)); see alsoInfinity, 497 B.R. at 804 (“In South Carolina, the law governing an action in tort is the law of the......
-
Arabi Gin Co. v. Plexus Cotton, Ltd. (In re Joseph Walker & Co.)
...the state in which the injury occurred.” Nash v. Tindall Corp., 375 S.C. 36, 39, 650 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct.App.2007) (quoting Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 13, 546 S.E.2d 191, 193 (2001) ); see also Infinity, 497 B.R. at 804 (“In South Carolina, the law governing an action in tort is the law of t......
-
Arabi Gin Co. v. Plexus Cotton, Ltd. (In re, Joseph Walker & Co.)
...the state in which the injury occurred.” Nash v. Tindall Corp., 375 S.C. 36, 39, 650 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct.App.2007) (quoting Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 13, 546 S.E.2d 191, 193 (2001)); see also Infinity, 497 B.R. at 804 (“In South Carolina, the law governing an action in tort is the law of th......
-
The untouchables: the impact of South Carolina's new judicial selection system on the South Carolina Supreme Court, 1997-2003.
...State v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Mach., 525 S.E.2d 872 (S.C. 2000). Joiner v. Rivas, 536 S.E.2d 372 (S.C. 2000). Boone v. Boone, 546 S.E.2d 191 (S.C. Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal Lester v. Dawson, 491 S.E.2d 240 (S.C. 1997). Robinson v. State, 495 S.E.2d 433 (S.C. 1998). State v. Ken......