Field v. Brown

• Decision Date: 24 November 1896
• Citation: 45 N.E. 464,146 Ind. 293
• Parties: FIELD v. BROWN et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

146 Ind. 293

45 N.E. 464

FIELD

v.BROWN et al.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 24, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Lawrence county.

Action by Joseph Field against Clark Brown and others. There was a judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Joseph Giles, W. H. Talbott, Zaring & Hottel, and Harvey Morris, for appellant. Wm. Ferrell, Alspaugh & Lawler, W. P. Rogers, and Elliott & Elliott, for appellees.

HACKNEY, J.

The only question presented by the record is as to whether any of the issues joined in the lower court were triable by a jury. The suit was by the appellant, in three paragraphs of complaint. The first sought a recovery for money had and received, and was in the ordinary form; the second sought an accounting, and the recovery of the balance to be ascertained; and the third alleged fraud in certain stated settlements, sought to set aside such settlements, to obtain an accounting, and to recover the amount to be ascertained in his favor. The appellant concedes, and correctly, we have no doubt, that the second paragraph presented an issue of equitable cognizance prior to the 18th day of June, 1852. The third paragraph was of like character, and would have invoked the same jurisdiction. The first paragraph, however, tendered an issue triable at law, and not in chancery. This conclusion is conceded by the appellees. By the statute (Rev. St. 1894, § 412; Rev. St. 1881, § 409) it is provided that “issues of law and issues of fact in causes that prior to the 18th day of June, 1852, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, shall be tried by the court; issues of fact in all other causes shall be triable as the same are now triable. In case of the joinder of causes of action or defenses which, prior to said date, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, with causes of action or defenses which, prior to said date, were designated as actions at law and triable by jury,-the former shall be triable by the court, and the latter by a jury, unless waived,” etc. It is manifest, from the language of this statute, that there may properly be joined causes or defenses one of which is triable by the court and the other by a jury. So it does not follow that, because the second and third paragraphs of complaint presented causes triable only by the court, the cause presented by the first paragraph was thereby “drawn into equity,” and was triable only by the court.

The cases of Evans v. Nealis, 87 Ind. 267;Carmichael v. Adams, 91 Ind. 526; Railway Co. v. Griffin, 92 Ind. 487;Miller v. Bank, 99 Ind. 272; Lake v. Lake, Id. 339; McBride v. Stradley, 103 Ind. 465, 2 N. E. 358;Towns v. Smith, 115 Ind. 480, 16 N. E. 811; and Monnett v. Turpie, 132 Ind. 482, 32 N. E. 328,-have been cited for the appellees in support of the contention that the primary features of the case presented by the complaint, as a whole, were of equitable cognizance, and that the entire case, therefore, became subject to equitable jurisdiction. There is no doubt, from those cases and others, that, where equity takes jurisdiction of the essential features of a cause, it will determine the whole controversy, though there may be incidental questions of a legal nature. The case of Carmichael v. Adams illustrates that rule. There, in a single paragraph of complaint, the plaintiff sought to recover upon a note and to foreclose a mortgagesecuring it. It was held that the essential relief sought (the foreclosure of the mortgage) was of equitable cognizance, and that the incidental question (that of ascertaining the amount due upon the note) passed within the equitable jurisdiction. We have read carefully all of the cases cited, and none of them can be construed as holding that numerous causes of action, stated in various paragraphs of complaint, may not be severed, and those of an equitable nature tried by the court, and those of a legal character tried by a jury. If the cases could be so construed, they would certainly be in direct conflict with the statute cited. It is insisted, however, that the issues as formed upon this paragraph of complaint,-that is to say, those introduced by the answers, when considered in connection with said paragraph of complaint,-become of equitable cognizance, and triable by the court. The answers were numerous, and included answers in denial, payment, set-off, and former adjudication,-all legal defenses; and it appeared from other answers that the appellees other than Brown were bankers, and that, between February, 1887, and January, 1891, they received from the appellant and his agents, by way of deposit, large sums, aggregating more than $300,000, all of which they had paid out upon appellant's checks, and that the deposits consisted of 600 items, and the payments upon checks consisted of 800 items. As to any of the last-mentioned answers, it may well be doubted whether any one of them is more than an argumentative plea of payment, or in denial of the allegations of the first paragraph of complaint. They present no affirmative issue, and seek no affirmative relief. The statute we have quoted very plainly recognizes the right to join legal and equitable causes of action, and also to join legal and equitable defenses. This right is one of the features of our Code practice. While we have seen that legal and equitable causes may have been joined, though we should look to the answers to carry the questions arising upon the first paragraph of complaint into the class designated as equitable, we are not able to reach the conclusion that any equitable defense is pleaded in any of such answers.

The insistence of appellees' learned counsel is that the answers last mentioned disclosed that the transactions for investigation were “long accounts,” and, from their complex and multifarious character, subjected them to the jurisdiction of the chancellor. To this proposition are cited a number of decisions,-one a Wisconsin case, the decision in which is based upon section 2864 of the Revised Statutes of that state, authorizing a reference in matters involving complicated accounts. Others are New York cases, decided with reference to section 1013 of the Code of that state, authorizing the submission of such accounts to a referee. Another is Dubourg de St. Colombe v. U. S., 7 Pet. 625, where the trial judge, in an injunction suit, heard the evidence of the matters in question, and it was held that such matters should have been referred. From the nature of the suit it was of equitable cognizance, regardless of the inquiry which the court held should have been referred. Tied. Eq. Jur. § 533, is also cited, but the author there discusses the growth of the old common-law action of account render into the equitable suit for an accounting, by reason of the more satisfactory aids in the nature of discovery within the latter jurisdiction. He then shows that a suit for an accounting may be had, as an equitable remedy, where the accounts are all on one side, and there are circumstances connected with the transaction which create great complications or difficulties in the way of a settlement at law; where there are mutual accounts, and there is great difficulty of securing a satisfactory accounting; or where the monetary obligations arise between parties occupying a fiduciary relation. Bisp. Eq. § 484, is cited by appellees. It is there said: “While the jurisdiction of courts of chancery in matters of account is limited by the considerations above stated, and perhaps by others, it is, nevertheless, difficult to draw the line with absolute precision. It may, however, be affirmed that, in all cases in which an action of account would be a proper remedy at law, the jurisdiction of a court of equity is undoubted; and that this jurisdiction will extend, moreover, to all cases of mutual accounts, and also to cases in which the accounts are all on one side, but are very complicated and intricate, although such accounts would not be cognizable in the common-law action, as not existing between those parties by and against whom account render will lie. In short, the jurisdiction of the chancellor covered all cases for which account render would lie, besides many to which that action did not extend.” Some of the limitations referred to in the section quoted are stated in section 483 of that work: “It must not be supposed, however, that a court of chancery can draw to itself every transaction between individuals in which an account between the parties is to be adjusted. Its jurisdiction is limited by certain restrictions. A court of equity cannot take cognizance of every action for goods, wares, or merchandise sold and delivered, or for...