Field v. Goldberg
| Decision Date | 19 December 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 702004,702004 |
| Citation | 42 Conn.Supp. 306,618 A.2d 80 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Gregory M. FIELD v. Louis S. GOLDBERG, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles * . -New Britain, at Hartford |
Gregory M. Field, pro se.
Kathryn A. Mobley, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom was Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., for defendants.
The plaintiff appeals the decision of the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) suspending his motor vehicle operator's license for ninety days pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b. The appeal is brought pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. The court rules in favor of the plaintiff.
The police arrested the plaintiff on February 18, 1991, on the charge of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. At that time, the plaintiff submitted to two chemical (intoximeter) tests, which indicated that his blood alcohol level exceeded the per se limit of 0.10 percent. Pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b(c), the police, acting on behalf of the commissioner, suspended the plaintiff's license. The plaintiff thereafter requested a hearing in accordance with § 14-227b(d), (f) and (g). Section 14-227b(f) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for ... operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) ... did such person submit to test or analysis and the results of such test or analysis indicated that at the time of the alleged offense the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person was ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight; and (4) was such person operating the motor vehicle." If, after the hearing, the hearing officer finds any one of these issues in the negative, the commissioner must reinstate the license. In the present case, the hearing officer found all of the issues in the affirmative and affirmed the suspension of the plaintiff's license.
The court finds that the commissioner's decision adversely affected a specific personal and legal interest of the plaintiff, his right to operate a motor vehicle, and concludes, therefore, that he is aggrieved by that decision within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-183(a).
The essential facts of the present case, as revealed by the record, are undisputed. Although the police officer who stopped and arrested the plaintiff did not testify at the hearing, his report was admitted into evidence. The report states, "I was told by a motorist that the above vehicle was zig zagging all over the road and I spotted the vehicle and I stopped it." In another section, the report states that the informant described the vehicle as a "red hearse." The report goes on to relate that the officer smelled alcohol on the plaintiff's breath after he stopped him and that the plaintiff failed the usual field sobriety tests. He was then placed under arrest.
Subsequent to the commissioner's decision on the license suspension but prior to oral argument to the court on this appeal, the plaintiff appeared before the court at geographical area No. 16 on the criminal charge of violating General Statutes § 14-227a. That court, Shaughnessy, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to suppress all evidence obtained incidental to the arrest. The basis of the court's decision was that the investigatory stop by the police violated the plaintiff's rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.
In his brief and oral argument to the court on this appeal, the plaintiff advances three principal arguments as the bases of his appeal. First, he contends that the police lacked sufficient cause or reason to stop him prior to arresting him and, therefore, the commissioner's findings and conclusions on the issues of probable cause and arrest were erroneous.
Secondly, he claims that the evidence obtained by the police after he was stopped does not support the commissioner's finding of probable cause for the arrest. Third, in the alternative, he argues that Judge Shaughnessy's decision in the criminal case is conclusive on the issues of probable cause and lawful arrest in this administrative appeal under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The report of the arresting officer, which was admitted into evidence at the administrative hearing, is the only evidence in the record concerning the circumstances under which the police initially stopped the plaintiff. As previously indicated, the report states that the police officer received a tip from an anonymous source who said he saw a vehicle described as a "red hearse" zigzagging "all over the road." There was no indication as to when or where the informant saw the vehicle, nor does the report indicate who was driving the vehicle when it was allegedly zigzagging or even give a description of the driver. There is no indication that the police officer observed the vehicle zigzagging or otherwise being operated abnormally. There are no other facts reported that indicate that the police observed any criminal or even suspicious behavior on the part of the plaintiff.
An investigatory stop, such as the police performed in the present case, is a seizure within the meaning of the federal and Connecticut constitutions. State v. Scully, 195 Conn. 668, 674, 490 A.2d 984 (1985). Where the initial stop of a motor vehicle is illegal, evidence obtained as a result of that stop may be suppressed in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 673-74, 490 A.2d 984; see State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385, 402, 521 A.2d 555 (1987). A police officer need not have probable cause, however, to stop a motor vehicle. State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 185, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). Relying on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-28, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and subsequent United States Supreme Court cases, the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Lamme, supra, 216 Conn. at 184, 579 A.2d 484, held that a brief investigatory detention is proper, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a "reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." "What constitutes a reasonable and articulable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances." State v. Anderson, 24 Conn.App. 438, 441, 589 A.2d 372, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 903, 593 A.2d 130 (1991). An anonymous informant's tip can give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion when the police are able to corroborate the details of the tip. Id., 24 Conn.App. at 443, 589 A.2d 372.
In the present case, the commissioner's decision does not indicate whether the hearing officer made any findings or conclusions concerning the legality of the initial stop of the plaintiff by the police. The hearing officer did find that there was probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest, but the record clearly shows that all of the facts relied on in support of that finding were developed by the police after they stopped the plaintiff. The court has carefully examined the whole record and concludes that the police did not have the requisite legal basis for stopping the plaintiff prior to arresting him.
In the present case, the anonymous tip contained nothing to identify the plaintiff, no allegation of a specific crime, and no information as to time or place of observation by the informant. Although the tip described the vehicle that the plaintiff was driving when stopped, that was the only detail that the police could corroborate. Significantly, the police observed neither any abnormal operation as reported by the informant nor any other suspicious behavior. In this regard, the report merely states that "I spotted the motor vehicle on Federal St. the vehicle headed East on New Britain Ave. and I stopped the motor vehicle."
Analysis of the relevant case law supports the court's conclusion that the police were not authorized to make the initial investigative stop of the plaintiff under the circumstances of the present case. In State v. Scully, supra, 195 Conn. at 674, 490 A.2d 984, the court emphasized that an investigative stop must be based on "some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity" and "[b]ased upon the whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in the original.) Id., at 675, 490 A.2d 984. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In the present case, the "whole picture" that the police had consisted of the informant's tip of erratic driving coupled with their own brief observation of the vehicle being operated normally. Clearly this whole picture did not amount to an "objective manifestation" that the person they saw driving the vehicle was then, or was about to be, engaged in erratic driving or in other wrongdoing. As previously indicated, the police report does not indicate where the informant saw the vehicle or how much time had elapsed before he notified the police. The tip did not describe the driver. The information the police had, therefore, did not even provide "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person" (the plaintiff) of driving the vehicle erratically at some time prior to their observation.
Other cases have enlarged the rule in Scully to accommodate special or more urgent...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fishbein v. Kozlowski
...vigilant in protecting the constitutional rights of our citizens. III Judge Maloney in his well reasoned opinion in Field v. Goldberg, 42 Conn. Sup. 306, 618 A.2d 80 (1991), explicated the reasoning and the legislative history that clearly supports the requirement that an officer must have ......