Field v. Thornell

• Decision Date: 25 May 1898
• Citation: 106 Iowa 7,75 N.W. 685
• Parties: FIELD v. THORNELL, JUDGE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

106 Iowa 7

75 N.W. 685

FIELD

v.THORNELL, JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 25, 1898.

Certiorari to Hon. A. B. Thornell, judge of the Eighteenth judicial district of Iowa.

On June 8, 1896, the county attorney filed an information accusing the petitioner of contempt of court, in that he published in the Mills County Tribune a false and scurrilous article concerning the trial of the state of Iowa against William De Ford, entitled “A Put-Up Job,” and willfully and corruptly, and with the malicious intent of influencing the jury in said cause, and thereby preventing the decent and orderly administration of justice, handed a copy of said paper to each of two jurors in said cause. The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. There was a hearing on the following day, when he was found guilty, and a fine of $30 imposed. Petition dismissed.P. P. Kelley and O. R. Patrick, for petitioner.

LADD, J.

The case of the state against William De Ford, accused of the crime of incest, was on trial in the district court of Mills county. Nearly all the evidence had been introduced, and the court had adjourned until the following morning. Two of the jurors, William Van Doren and James Galbraith, went to the petitioner's place of business; and he handed each of them a copy of the Mills County Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in that community, and of which he was publisher. Galbraith was a subscriber, but Van Doren was not. This paper contained an article headed “A Put-Up Job,” concerning the trial in which the arrest of the defendant, the apparent conclusiveness of the evidence, and the public indignation are referred to. It then proceeds: “But it wasn't long before there came a reaction. Curious facts and unaccountable incidents came to mind, that began to throw a shadow of doubt on the whole transaction, and very many good people became convinced that the whole thing was a farce and a put-up job. As this wore on, this conviction became stronger; and, when the case came up for trial, the majority of the sensible, thinking people of the locality where the reputed crime occurred took very little stock in the story as told by the parties chiefly interested.” The names of the jurors are then given, the talk of the county attorney belittled, and that of the attorney for the defense pronounced “one of the most notable speeches we ever heard in the court room.” One witness is said to be conceded a jail bird by the county attorney, and to belong to the penitentiary. It continues: “After the opening statements to the jury, the first witness for the state was called, it being the fellow Hobbes. His testimony was about what might be expected, coming, as it did, from one of the four men in the deal. Mrs. Harmer was then put on the stand, and told, of course, the story that she had been expected to tell. She told just what her husband wanted her to tell, and admitted (?) that everything had happened just as her husband said it did. Poor, silly thing! Everybody felt sorry for her, and there was not a few that felt she ought to be in the insane asylum instead of on the witness stand. At the conclusion of the woman's testimony, the case was adjourned until yesterday, when it was again resumed. ‘Doc’ Lemonds, Alec McCrary, and Frank Harmer were put on the stand when the trial was resumed, and told their little story fairly well; but, as might be expected, on cross-examination they contradicted and tangled themselves up in bad shape. The defense began its testimony yesterday afternoon, and the evidence is being heard to-day. It is expected that the case will go to the jury to-night or in the morning. Of course, there is no telling what the jury's verdict will be, as juries are an uncertain quantity sometimes; but there is no doubt in our mind what it ought to be, nor do we think there is any doubt in the mind of every intelligent man who has familiarized himself with the facts in the case.” The petitioner had been in attendance at court during the trial, knew the jurors, and was much interested in the case. He wrote the article naming them on the day he delivered the papers. His explanation is that he published the article as a matter of news, and did not think at the time of the case, or that Galbraith and Van Doren were jurors. The article was read by these jurors, and Galbraith gave his paper to another juror, and Van Doren read a part of the article aloud in the jury room when deliberating on their verdict.

1. The petitioner first insists that the particular offense of which he was adjudged guilty is not included in the terms of the statute. We think it comes within the purview of subdivision of section 4460 of the Code which provides for the punishment of “contemptuous or insolent behavior toward such court while engaged in the discharge of a judicial duty which may tend to impair the respect due to its authority.” Coke once said: “We shall never know the true reason of the interpretation of the statutes if we know not the law before the making of them.” The power to punish for contempt is recognized as inherent in all courts, and essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the due administration of justice. The exercise of such power may be traced as far back in antiquity as the trial by jury; and it has been well said that the experience of ages has demonstrated its compatibility with civil liberty and the purest ends of justice. “It is a trust given to the courts, not for themselves, but for the people, whose laws they enforce and whose authority they exercise.” Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331. Unless the court may protect itself in the fulfillment of its important and responsible duties for the public good, it becomes latent and contemptible. To deprive it of that power would be equivalent to ending its useful existence. If it may not repel and punish those who impede, obstruct, or embarrass the administration of the law, then no litigant may rely with any assurance upon the ability of the court to assure him a fair and impartial trial. Of what value is the right of trial by jury or of cross-examination of witnesses if the result be controlled by inimical influences, against which there is no opportunity to contend? The language of the statute does not require us to adopt a construction which will cripple the administration of justice, and deprive parties and the state of the hearing of causes unmolested by extrinsic influences, whether within or without the actual presence of the court. That maliciously attempting to influence a juror in reaching his verdict, or in any way attempting to prevent the decent and orderly administration of justice, as charged in this case, is contemptuous behavior towards the court, tending to impair the respect due to its authority, is not questioned, nor could it be in the light of the authorities. But it is asserted that the words “while engaged in the discharge of a judicial duty” limit such behavior to the time the court is actually in session, and to acts committed in its presence. If so, then during the intermissions of court, while the trial is in progress, the jurors may be approached by friend or foe of the litigant parties, witnesses, and officers denounced or intimidated, and the judge threatened or insulted with impunity. We shall not inquire whether the legislature may thus deprive the judiciary of powers necessary to enable it to perform the duties conferred by the constitution, because such an intention will not be imputed to that body. If the statute may be said to be subject to two constructions, that in harmony with the dictates of sound public policy will always be preferred to one inimical to the public good. The court...