Fielder & Turley v. Adams Exp. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 April 1911 |
| Citation | 71 S.E. 99,69 W.Va. 138 |
| Parties | FIELDER & TURLEY v. ADAMS EXP. CO. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted June 10, 1910.
Syllabus by the Court.
That a certificate of error appended to a petition for a writ of error antedates the allowance of a bill of exception in the transcript is immaterial, and constitutes no ground for dismissal of the writ.
The judge of the intermediate court of Kanawha county has authority to settle and sign a bill of exception and make it a part of the record within 30 days after the adjournment of the term at which the judgment was rendered.
On a writ of error from the circuit court of Kanawha county to a judgment of the intermediate court of that county, the former court, on reversing the judgment of the latter, should render final judgment in the case, if it is fully made up and susceptible of such disposition.
In seeking the legislative intent, words in a statute may be referred to their proper connections, and each given proper force in its place.
The interstate commerce act, passed by Congress and approved June 29, 1906 (Acts June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 [U.S Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1149]), does not inhibit an interstate carrier from limiting the amount of its liability for loss, damage, or injury to property entrusted to it for shipment by an agreement with the shipper as to the value thereof, entered into in good faith, or procured by misrepresentation on the part of the shipper as to the value thereof.
If in such case two or more articles be shipped under an aggregate valuation thereof agreed upon or procured as aforesaid, and part of them be delivered and the balance lost, the shipper can recover only a portion of the agreed value, determinable by the ratio of the aggregate value of the property to the amount stipulated in the agreement as such value.
Error from Circuit Court, Kanawha County.
Action by Fielder & Turley against the Adams Express Company. Judgment for plaintiff before a justice was affirmed by the intermediate court, but reversed on error by the circuit court, and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed, and judgment entered.
Payne & Payne and J. F. Bouchelle, for plaintiff in error.
Simms Enslow, Fitzpatrick & Baker, for defendant in error.
Fielder & Turley brought this action against the Adams Express Company, in a justice's court, to recover the value of certain goods shipped to them over said company's line from New York and lost. In that court they recovered a judgment for $111.30. The defendant took an appeal to the intermediate court of Kanawha county. There a jury was dispensed with, and the case submitted to the court on a statement of facts agreed to, and a judgment was rendered for $114.55, with damages according to law. To this judgment the circuit court of Kanawha county awarded a writ of error, on which it was reversed and the case remanded to the intermediate court for further proceedings and final determination. Complaining of this, Fielder & Turley procured a writ of error from this court to the judgment of the circuit court, on which lack of a sufficient bill of exceptions, want of a certificate of error as required by section 8 of chapter 135 of the Code of 1906, failure to apply for the writ in proper time or manner, lack of a writ of error from the circuit court or order therefor, the remand of the case to the intermediate court, and reversal by that court are assigned as grounds of error. These assignments were made on an incomplete transcript. A supplemental record shows the issuance of a writ of error and supersedeas by the circuit court and acceptance of service thereof, as well as an order awarding the same. This sufficiently disposes of some of the arguments found in the brief.
The bill of exceptions, embodying the agreement as to the facts was signed and certified in the vacation of the intermediate court, and an order entered in vacation purporting to make the same a part of the record. Alleged want of authority in the judge of the intermediate court to allow the bill of exception after the adjournment of the term, under the provisions contained in section 9 of chapter 131 of the Code, is one argument against the validity of the bill of exception. This contention is answered in the negative by express terms of section 4 of chapter 25 of the Acts of 1907, which created said court and defined its powers. It gives the judge of that court the same powers in vacation as are now or may hereafter be conferred upon the judge of the circuit court of Kanawha county in respect to all cases, matters, and proceedings within the jurisdiction of said intermediate court.
On the petition for a writ of error presented to the circuit court, there is a certificate of an attorney stating that in his opinion there was error in the judgment of the intermediate court. This certificate was dated May 21, 1909. The bill of exception was signed by the judge on May 29, 1909. As the petition was certified before the bill of exception was signed or made a part of the record, it is contended that the certificate is void, and the petition therefore insufficient. We see no force in this contention. The date is wholly immaterial. The petition could be prepared and dated in anticipation of what it was known the record would be, when made up.
The circuit court erred in refusing to retain and finally decide the case, and in remanding it to the intermediate court. As it was fully made up and could not be in any respect changed, since the facts had been agreed, there was no reason for remanding it, and we think final judgment should have been rendered. Though section 21 of chapter 25 of the Acts of 1907 says "the circuit court may retain the case for trial or remand the same back to the said intermediate court to be further proceeded in and finally determined," these general terms must be so construed as to make them operate reasonably and justly. It must be assumed the Legislature did not intend a useless and detrimental proceeding. After an appellate court has ascertained what judgment should have been rendered in a case fully made up, a remand for judgment involves both delay and risk of additional error as well as double work. Hence it is an idle, useless, and injurious proceeding, which the Legislature cannot be deemed to have intended, if the clause quoted can perform some other substantial purpose or function. While some effect must be allowed to all words in a statute, or other writing, if possible (State v. Harden, 62 W.Va. 313, 58 S.E. 715, 60 S.E. 394), it is not always necessary nor proper to allow them effect to the full extent of the letter thereof (Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley, 67 S.E. 634). It is improper to do so, if such construction leads to an absurd or unjust result. Hasson v. Chester, 67 S.E. 731; B. & L. Ass'n v. Sohn, 54 W.Va. 101, 46 S.E. 222. Words may be referred to their proper connections, giving each in its place its proper force, in seeking the legislative intent. B. & L. Ass'n v. Sohn, cited. Reversals take place in two well-known general classes of cases, one in which new jury trials must take place, or additional evidence be heard, or further orders made to carry the judgment or decree into effect, and one in which none of these things are necessary. In the former class the cases are remanded, under general appellate law, and, in the latter, finally disposed of in the appellate court. The classification and usual mode of disposition were, we must assume, known to the Legislature, and it has dealt with both in very general terms. Power to remand in both involves idle, useless, and practically absurd action or procedure. Hence we may well say, "reddendo singula singulis," under the rule declared in B. & L. Ass'n v. Sohn, the power to remand is applicable to the former class and the power of retention to the latter. Whether the act confers power to retain all cases we do not say, that question not being involved, but we are clearly of the opinion that the circuit court must act finally in complete cases, requiring nothing other than the rendition and entry of judgment.
We come now to the vital questions in the case, the validity and application of a clause in the bill of lading, purporting to limit the liability of the express company to $50. This clause says the company shall not be liable in any event for more than $50, the amount stated therein as the value of the property shipped. It is one of the regular forms furnished by the company to its patrons in which such valuation is printed, together with the notice that there shall be no greater liability unless a greater value is stated in the bill. It bears a stamp saying, "Value asked and not given." It was the practice of the company to leave a book of these bills with the shippers, and send its agent to receive the packages and put this stamp upon the bills unless a greater value was declared. At least such was the fact in this case. Under the general law, unless changed by the interstate commerce act, a limitation of liability to the extent of the value...
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