Fields v. Hollowell & Hollowell
| Decision Date | 25 November 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 386,386 |
| Citation | 238 N.C. 614,78 S.E.2d 740 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | FIELDS et al. v. HOLLOWELL & HOLLOWELL et al. |
Earlie C. Sanderson, Wallace, for plaintiff appellant, McMillan.
Butler & Butler, Clinton, for plaintiff appellee, fields.
Is a woman who was purposely and knowingly living in unlawful cohabitation with an employee at the time of his death, a dependent of such employee within the meaning of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, chapter 97 of General Statutes? The trial court was of opinion that she was such dependent, and so ruled and adjudged. This ruling is aptly challenged by this appeal.
As used in the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, the term 'death' as a basis for a right to compensation means only death resulting from an injury, that is, an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. G.S. § 97-2(f) and (j).
The term 'compensation' means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in the Act. G.S. § 97-2(k).
Moreover, the Act provides that if death results proximately from such accident, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid to the dependents of the employee a weekly payment as specified. G.S. § 97-38.
It is significant that the Act, in respect to dependents of an employee whose death results from an injury, as so defined, specifically defines who are meant by the terms, child, grandchild, brother, sister, parent, widow and widower. G.S. § 97-2, subsections (1), (m), (n), and (o), and who are next of kin, father, mother, widow, child, brother or sister, in the event the deceased employee leaves no dependents. G.S. § 97-40. The significance of these provisions is that these persons are only those to whom the deceased employee is under legal or moral obligation to support.
The Act also provides that , and as such be entitled to receive the benefits for the full period specified. G.S. § 97-39.
The appellee, in brief filed in this Court, states that she 'does not claim compensation as the common law wife of the deceased'. Hence we are not here concerned with that subject. And so conceding the appellee necessarily does not claim that she is the widow of the deceased employee. But she contends that 'the workman who voluntarily assumes the support of any person, who looks to and relies upon him for the necessities of life, has made of that person a dependent'. Hence she contends that she comes within the purview of the term 'in all other cases', appearing in the statute G.S. § 97-39. And apparently the trial court agreed with this position. But this Court does not so interpret the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act.
The term 'in all other cases' in the connection in which it appears in the statute G.S. § 97-39, means in all cases other than those of widows, widowers, and children, claiming to be dependents of the deceased employee,--dependency shall be determined in accordance with the facts as the facts may be at the time of the accident. Manifestly, a woman living in cohabitation with a man, to whom she is not married, is not within the purview of the term 'in all other cases'.
In this connection it is appropriate to note that in the case of Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, 199 N.C. 236, 154 S.E. 66, there is this headnote 'The commonlaw wife of a deceased employee is not entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.' But a reading of the opinion, and of the record on appeal, discloses that while the Industrial Commission considered the question as to whether or not a woman living in fornication and adultery is entitled to compensation as a dependent, and ruled adversely to the claimant, the record shows that the claimant did not appeal therefrom. Hence what is said in the reported case in this respect is dictum.
Nevertheless, the opinion of the hearing commissioner, J. Dewey Dorsett, incorporated in Vol. 1 at page 277 of opinions in cases heard and determined by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, is appropriate to this appeal, and is worthy of citation. We quote in part as follows: 'The following instances, involving the rights and obligations of busband and wife, demonstrate the utter absurdity of the suggestion that Frances Wilson was the lawful wife of George Wilson, for if George Wilson were alive today...
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Dawson v. Hatfield Wire & Cable Co.
...to defeat recovery. Insurance Company of North America v. Jewel, 118 Ga.App. 599, 164 S.E.2d 846 (1968); Fields v. Hollowell & Hollowell, 238 N.C. 614, 78 S.E.2d 740 (1953); McDonald v. Kelly Coal Co., 335 Mich. 325, 55 N.W.2d 851 (1952); Day v. Day, 216 S.C. 334, 58 S.E.2d 83 (1950); Hatfi......
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Insurance Co. of North America v. Jewel, 43609
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Shealy v. Associated Transport, Inc., 238
...support the theory propounded by appellant. The phrase 'in all other cases' is construed and explained in Fields v. Hollowell and Hollowell, 238 N.C. 614, 618, 78 S.E.2d 740, 743. There it is said: 'The term \in all other cases' in the connection in which it appears in the statute G.S. § 97......