Fields v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 27 June 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 38191,38191,2 |
| Citation | 102 Ga.App. 117,115 S.E.2d 877 |
| Parties | John B. FIELDS v. Nellie G. JACKSON |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The verdict rendered by the jury does not appear from the record to have been the result of bias or prejudice on the part of the jruy, and was not so large as to warrant, from that fact alone, the conclusion that it was so motivated.
(a) The affidavit of a juror made subsequently to the rendition of the verdict may not be received to impeach the verdict.
2. Under the particular facts of this case, it was not error to admit evidence of a witness as to the necessity of her burning the headlights on her automobile after she had left the scene of the collision, where one of the issues was the condition of visibility existing at the time of the collision, which occurred at 7:10 a.m. on January 27, 1959, which was prior to sunrise, and at a time when in the natural course of events the light would have been increasing.
3. (a) Testimony that a traffic control device existed at a designated place on a public highway, and that such sign or device was disregarded, is admissible and is prima facie evidence of a violation of law without proof of the authority under which such sign was erected. Such evidence accordingly is sufficient to establish that the person doing the act complained of was guilty of negligence per se.
(b) A city ordinance may not be proved by parol testimony.
(c) Where, however, the city clerk was allowed to testify after referring to the city ordinance book that the speed limit at the place in question was 25 miles per hour, the admission of such parol testimony, though error, does not require a reversal of the case where other evidence of the speed limit at that time and place as shown by a sign posting a 25 mile per hour limit was properly before the jury, since the effect of the inadmissible evidence was the same as that of other evidence which was properly admitted.
4. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting counsel for the plaintiff to repeatedly examine her as to the nature and extent of her injuries and pain and suffering.
5. The court will take judicial notice of the time of sunrise and sunset, and it is unnecessary to introduce evidence of such fact. However, evidence in the form of an almanac or other writing may be introduced in evidence, for the purpose of refreshing the minds of the court and jury, and unless such evidence be shown to have been incorrect, or inaccurate, its admission will not constitute harmful or reversible error.
6. The instruction complained of in special ground 9 of the motion was not harmful or reversible error for any reason assigned.
7. The charge of the court relating to concurring negligence of joint and several tortfeasors contains no reversible error. The evidence did not demand a verdict for the plaintiff.
Mrs. Nellie G. Jackson brought suit for damages in the Superior Court of Bulloch County against John B. Fields. Her petition in substance alleged that on the 27th day of January, 1959, at approximately 7:10 a. m. she was riding as a passenger in an automobile owned by her husband, Doughty Jackson, and at the time being operated by him in an easterly direction along the U. S. Highway 80 in the City of Portal, Georgia; that said automobile was being operated at a speed of about 20 miles per hour, and that at that time and place the visibility was extremely poor, due to fog and mist, the hour being prior to sunrise; that when the automobile reached the point approximately 150 feet west of the intersection of said highway and Grady Street, the driver began to indicate his intention of making a left turn by operating the signal lamp on said automobile, which signal continued to operate until the collision complained of; that as the vehicle approached the intersection, the driver reduced the speed of the automobile to 10 miles per hour and that at that time he observed the defendant's vehicle approaching from the east and still a distance of some 400 to 500 feet away from said intersection; that the defendant's vehicle had but one headlamp burning and the plaintiff and her husband mistook the defendant's vehicle for a tractor; that her husband began to negotiate a turn into Grady Street, when the vehicle owned and operated by the defendant entered the intersection at a speed in excess of 50 miles an hour and collided with the right-hand side of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding; that said collision inflicted enumerated personal injuries on the plaintiff which necessitated her hospitalization for a period of 10 days and continued medical care thereafter for an indeterminate length of time and caused the plaintiff to lose four weeks from her employment. The defendant was alleged to have been guilty of negligence in operating his automobile at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions and in excess of the lawful and posted speed limits; in proceeding through the intersection without reducing his speed; in failing to yield the right-of-way to the driver of the vehicle in which she was riding after the driver had given an appropriate signal indicating his intention to turn and in operating his vehicle with only one headlamp burning, in violation of Code, §§ 68-1702 and 68-1704. The defendant filed an answer in which he denied liability and in which he contended that the visibility at the time of the collision was good; that it was daylight and the driver of one automobile could see another automobile several hundred yards away, and that the plaintiff's injuries were due solely and entirely to the negligence of her husband in operating his automobile. On the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $17,744, on which judgment was entered. The defendant made a motion for a new trial on the usual general grounds, which he amended by the addition of 13 special grounds. The trial court overruled that motion and the exception here is to that judgment. So much of the evidence as is necessary to a clear understanding of the rulings made will be stated in the opinion.
Price, Spivey & Carlton, Swainsboro, Cohen Anderson, Statesboro, for plaintiff in error.
Johnston & Ussery, Statesboro, for defendant in error.
1. The first two special grounds of the motion for a new trial make the contention that the verdict rendered by the jury in the case in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $17,744 is grossly excessive and manifests a bias or prejudice on the part of the jury in its consideration of the case because the plaintiff's special damages under the evidence amounted to only $488, which special damages were due solely to time lost by the plaintiff from her employment, and because said award was grossly excessive in that the plaintiff's pain and suffering were limited to facial and breast injuries, not involving any unusual degree of pain.
In special ground 13, the contention is made that this award was excessive and manifests bias and prejudice on the part of the jury because it is contended that the jury took into consideration the fact that the defendant was insured by the Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, represented by the 'Co-op,' or Farmers Cooperative in Statesboro. In connection with this ground, plaintiff made an affidavit by which he sought to show that one of the jurors made a statement subsequent to the rendition of the verdict that 'the jury would not have rendered a verdict like that if it had not for the fact that they hated the Co-op so much.'
The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff was a married woman, 27 years of age; that prior to the accident and the injuries sued for she had what might generally be regarded as attractive facial features, and that she was otherwise in generally good health; that as a result of the collision between the automobile in which she was riding and which her husband was driving and the automobile of the defendant, she suffered a moderate degree of shock which was reaction to the accident; that she had many severe bruises about the face, head and neck, fractures, or breaks of the flow of the left orbit (cheek bone), and of the left arch going back to join the skull; that there was some depression in the flow of the orbit; that there was a compound fracture, or break, of the ridge of the upper jaw bone with complete loss of two upper front teeth with a third tooth broken off at the gum line, said teeth having been knocked out by a forceful blow of some sort; that there was a severe hemorrhage with accumulation of blood in the tissues about the nose and both eyes, giving her the appearance of 'having been kicked in the face by a mule'; severe bruises and contusions with hemorrhage or bleeding into the tissues of the right breast with the later formation of a large pocket of blood in the breast tissue which had to be opened by incision and the excess blood drained off; that there were multiple bruises over the body and extremities; and that the plaintiff suffered an apparent slight or moderate displacement of the nose to the left, which was permanent in character, or could be corrected only by the subsequent application of plastic surgery. The plaintiff testified in detail as to the manner and ways in which she suffered as a result of the physical injuries, and as to her shame and embarrassment resulting from the disfigurement of her face.
'Damages are given as compensation for the injury done, * * *.' Code, § 105-2001. 'The question of damages being one for the jury, the court should not interfere, unless the damages are either so small or so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias.' Code, § 105-2015. As an element, of pain and suffering, a plaintiff may recover for mental pain and suffering and for shame and mortification as the result of disfigurement or...
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