Fields v. State
| Decision Date | 15 September 1999 |
| Citation | 1 S.W.3d 687 |
| Parties | (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) DOUGLAS ELWOOD FIELDS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS NO. 792-98 |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
En Banc
O P I N I O N
Appellant was charged with and convicted of aggravated robbery. During the punishment phase, the State presented evidence that appellant had committed a previous robbery which had never been prosecuted. In its charge at the punishment phase, the trial court instructed the jury that any extraneous evidence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before it could be considered by the jury as a factor affecting punishment. The charge did not include a definition of the term "reasonable doubt," although that term had been defined for the jury at guilt-innocence. Appellant did not object to this omission or request that the judge submit a definition to the jury again.
On appeal, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in failing to provide a definition of "reasonable doubt" in the jury charge at punishment. A majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals agreed. Based on our decision in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and the dictates of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 37.07, 3(a)1 and (b),2 it held that a trial court is required to define reasonable doubt to the jury during the punishment phase when the state has relied on evidence of extraneous offenses. Fields v. State, 966 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1998). Therefore, it found that the trial court in the instant case erred when it failed to define reasonable doubt in the court's charge to the jury. Id. at 741-742. It found this error to be harmful, reversed the conviction and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 742. Justice Green dissented. Id. at 742-743 (Green, J., dissenting).
The District Attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney both filed petitions for discretionary review. We granted the District Attorney's petition on the following grounds: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a trial court must sua sponte submit a definition of reasonable doubt as to proof of extraneous misconduct at the punishment phase of trial; (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that failure to define reasonable doubt as to proof of extraneous misconduct at the punishment phase is constitutional error subject to harm analysis under TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). We granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's petition for discretionary review on the following grounds: (1) does a defendant who does not request an instruction on the definition of "reasonable doubt" at punishment waive any error on appeal? (2) must a trial court instruct the jury on the definition of "reasonable doubt" at punishment even in the absence of a request for such an instruction? (3) is a failure to instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt at punishment constitutional error subject to a harm analysis under TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a)?
The definition of reasonable doubt set out in Geesa applies specifically to the guilt-innocence phase of a trial; although "the rules are not of constitutional dimension per se . . . [they] serve to implement the constitutional requirement that a criminal conviction cannot stand 'except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 163 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed.2d 368 (1970)). The reasonable-doubt standard of art. 37.07 is neither constitutionally required nor based on a constitutional mandate.3 At the punishment phase, the defendant has already been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense charged. For purposes of assessing punishment, the prosecution may offer evidence of any extraneous crime or bad act that is shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, either to have been (1) an act committed by the defendant or (2) an act for which he could be held criminally responsible. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07,...
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