Fields v. State

• Decision Date: 25 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 04-97-00068-CR,04-97-00068-CR
• Citation: 966 S.W.2d 736
• Parties: Douglas Elwood FIELDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 736

966 S.W.2d 736

Douglas Elwood FIELDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 04-97-00068-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas San Antonio.

March 25, 1998.

Michael C. Gross, San Antonio, for Appellant.

Daniel Thornberry, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, for Appellee.

Before LPEZ, STONE and GREEN, JJ.

OPINION

LPEZ, Justice.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant, Douglas Fields, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon. Evidence at trial showed that Fields, with two other men, entered a liquor store and robbed the clerk working there at gunpoint. Fields was sentenced to forty-five years in prison and fined $10,000. He appeals his verdict on four points of error, claiming that the trial court committed reversible error by (1) failing to limit the definition of "intentional" in its charge to the jury to the pertinent conduct element of the underlying offense, (2) failing to limit the definition of "knowing" to the pertinent conduct of the underlying offense, (3) refusing to allow Fields to call a rebuttal witness in the punishment phase of the trial, and (4) failing to provide a definition of "reasonable doubt" in its jury charge during the punishment phase of the trial.

THE JURY CHARGE

In points of error one and two, Fields argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to limit its definitions of "knowing" and "intentional" to the relevant conduct elements of the underlying offense. To support this contention, Fields relies on Ash v. State in which the court held that a trial judge errs "in failing to limit the definitions [in the jury charge] to the conduct element or elements of the offense to which they apply." See Ash v. State, 930 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1996, no pet.)

A conviction for robbery requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in the course of committing a theft, and with the intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, the defendant "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death." TEX. PEN.CODE § 29.02 (Vernon 1994). On the facts in Fields's case, aggravated robbery may have been committed by the commission of robbery plus one of two aggravating factors: causing bodily injury to the victim, or using or exhibiting a deadly weapon. Id. § 29.03.

In its charge to the jury, the trial court defined the requisite mental states, "intentionally" and "knowingly," tracking the statutory definitions for those terms:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to the circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result....

TEX. PEN.CODE § 6.03 (Vernon 1994). The judge applied the definitions to Fields's case as follows:

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 16 th day of May, A.D., 1994 in Bexar County, Texas, the defendant, Douglas Fields, either acting alone or together with another as a party, did intentionally or knowingly threaten or place William Tabor in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely: a firearm while the said Douglas Fields was in the course of committing theft of property ... and said acts were committed by Douglas Fields with the intent then and there to obtain or maintain control of the property, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon as charged in the indictment.

If you do not so find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will find the defendant not guilty.

(emphasis added). The defense attorney did not object to this charge. On appeal, Fields claims that the charge allowed the jury to confuse which conduct elements applied to which element of the offense, and thus egregious harm, which requires no preservation for appeal, occurred. We reject this claim.

A "conduct element" is basically that element of the offense that makes the defendant's conduct proscribable. The Texas Penal Code identifies three "conduct elements" that may be implicated in a given crime: (1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the result of the conduct; and (3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct. See TEX. PEN.CODE § 6.03 (Vernon 1994) (defining culpable mental states); Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (interpreting section 6.03 of Texas Penal Code). Texas courts require that, in the judge's charge to the jury, the "intentional" and "knowing" requirements be confined to the specific conduct element required to prove the alleged offense. Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 194.

A Texas court of appeals has held that all three conduct elements are involved in aggravated robbery offenses. See Garza v. State, 794 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd). The State must prove that the defendant caused or placed another in fear of bodily injury (a result of his conduct) and that he unlawfully appropriated property (the nature of his conduct), and the robbery itself is committed in the course of the commission of a theft (circumstances surrounding the conduct). Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, where all three conduct elements are implicated, the trial judge must still limit the definitions in the jury charge to the conduct element or elements of the offense to which they apply. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

The State contends that, because aggravated robbery includes all three conduct elements, the trial court properly submitted the complete definitions of the culpable mental states. The State misunderstands Fields's argument. Fields admits that the complete definitions were required. As we understand his argument, Fields is challenging the failure of the trial court to limit each definition to its pertinent conduct element. An appropriate jury charge, according to Fields, would state: "The following definition applies to the mental state in causing or placing another in fear of bodily injury: A person acts 'intentionally,' or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result," and so on for each conduct element. See Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 296 n. 16 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (providing example of correct jury charge when all three conduct elements are implicated).

We agree with Fields that the failure to so limit definitions of mental states constitutes error. See id; Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 492; Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195. Our next step, then, must be to determine whether this error amounts to such egregious harm that it may serve as the grounds for reversal, even though not preserved for appeal. See Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195.

For unpreserved charge error to be reversible, the error must have so harmed the defendant that he was denied a fair and impartial trial as the result of the error. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Thus, the harm must be "egregious." Id. A reviewing court must look at the entire charge to determine if the harm meets this high standard. Id. Factors to consider are the charge itself; the state of the evidence, including the contested issues; arguments of counsel; and any other relevant information. See Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Bailey v. State, 867 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (describing procedures for conducting harm analysis).

In Ash, the court of appeals found, under nearly identical circumstances as those presented here, that the application portion of the jury charge, served to limit the culpable mental states to their relevant conduct elements. See Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195. The application paragraph in Ash specifically described the manner and means of committing the robbery ("striking the complainant's head repeatedly against the pavement"), and the court held that this statement limited the definition to the results of the defendant's conduct. Id.

The court in Ash also looked at what issues were contested at trial, and found that relevant mental states were not among them. Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195. In the case before us, as well, the error charged by Fields was not at issue at trial. Fields's sole defense was mistaken identification. He claimed that the victim in the case had not initially identified him as a culprit with any certainty and that the victim's memory could not be trusted. This contention was the bulk of the defense's case and nearly consumed the defense attorney's closing argument to the jury. Mental states and to which conduct element they applied were simply not contested. It is therefore difficult to see how the trial court's error could be considered harmful, let alone egregiously so. We overrule points of error one and two.

REBUTTAL WITNESS

In his third point of error, Fields claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to allow him to call a witness to rebut a charge that Fields had committed an extraneous offense. Fields claims that this refusal violated his Sixth Amendment right to obtain witnesses in his favor. See U.S. CONST., amend. VI. We reject this claim.

During the punishment phase of trial, Witness Henderson testified for the State that, on a previous occasion, Fields had robbed him at gunpoint and chased him to an apartment, where Fields attempted to shoot the witness. After cross-examining Henderson, Fields's attorney...