Fife v. Andersen-Nielsen, No. A03-1990 (MN 9/21/2004), A03-1990.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. A03-1990.,A03-1990. |
| Parties | Thomas R. Fife, et al., Appellants, v. Betty Andersen-Nielsen, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Crow Wing County, File No. C9-01-1484.
Richard A. Ohlsen, Richard A. Ohlsen, Ltd., (for appellants)
Patricia A. Aanes, Thomas C. Pearson, Erickson, Pearson & Aanes, (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Halbrooks, Judge, and Parker, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants challenge the district court's determination that respondent adversely possessed a disputed tract of land, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's findings establishing adverse possession; (2) the district court erred by dividing the disputed land into three sections for the purpose of its analysis; and (3) the district court erred in describing the land acquired by respondent through adverse possession. We affirm as modified and remand for correction of the narrative description in Finding of Fact 20.
Appellants Thomas R. Fife, Cheryl Yursi, Timothy E. Dickerson, and Bonnie D. Dickerson, and respondent Betty Andersen-Nielsen own adjoining lakefront properties on the east shore of Bay Lake, Crow Wing County. Appellants' property, which lies to the immediate north of respondent's, has been owned by members of appellants' family since 1948.
Respondent's property has been owned by members of respondent's family since 1958; respondent acquired title to the property in 1986 by transfer of title. Respondent has been a seasonal occupant of her property for approximately 45 years. Respondent's property includes a principal residence and a guest cabin constructed by respondent's predecessors-in-interest in the early 1960s. The guest cabin is located approximately 55 feet east of the lakeshore. In the area between the lake and the guest cabin, there is a shorefront woods, extending approximately six feet from the shoreline, that respondent has intentionally left in a natural state for privacy and pollution-control purposes. There is also a well-maintained area that extends east from the eastern edge of the shorefront woods to the cabin, around the cabin's northern side, and approximately 30 feet east of the cabin. The area from the eastern edge of the well-maintained area to the eastern boundary of the property is unmaintained woods.
When the guest cabin was constructed, it was believed by both parties to lie just south of the boundary separating respondent's property from appellants' and entirely within the confines of respondent's property. Respondent's family has maintained the area around the guest cabin and has used the guest cabin each summer from the date of construction to the present.
In 1993, appellants had their property surveyed and discovered that the southern boundary of their property was in fact located 17 feet south of its previously assumed location. The boundary established by the 1993 survey bisects respondent's guest cabin. The disputed property in this matter is the property between the surveyed boundary and the boundary assumed to exist prior to 1993. In 1997, respondent learned of the 1993 survey and commissioned another survey that indicated a boundary line consistent with the 1993 survey. In the course of performing the 1997 survey, the surveyor discovered a length of iron pipe — of the type historically used by surveyors to mark boundary lines — pounded into the ground at the lakeshore end of the pre-1993 assumed boundary line. Prior to 1997, respondent or her predecessors-in-interest kept up the well-maintained area and the cabin and used the cabin during the winter to store outdoor furniture.
In June 2001, appellants brought an action requesting the district court to determine the proper southern boundary line of their property; to eject respondent from their property; and for damages and attorney fees. Respondent filed a counterclaim, asserting title over the disputed property by adverse possession and asking that the boundary line between the two properties be determined by practical location.
Following a three-day trial, the district court issued an order in which, "for reference purposes," it divided the disputed property into three distinct areas: the unmaintained shorefront-woods area west of the cabin; the well-maintained area on either side and north of the cabin; and the unmaintained woods area east of the cabin. The court concluded that respondent had established title by adverse possession to the shorefront-woods area and the well-maintained area, but not to the unmaintained woods area. The court concluded that the doctrine of practical location was not applicable. The court gave a legal description of the property belonging to respondent by adverse possession. Appellants now challenge the district court's order.
To show adverse possession, the disseizor — the person making the claim for title against the legal owner — must show, by clear and convincing evidence, an actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for the requisite period of time, which in Minnesota is 15 years. Ehle v. Prosser, 293 Minn. 183, 189, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (1972); see also Minn. Stat. § 541.02 (2002). The use required to show adverse possession depends in part on the nature of the property. See Murphy v. Doyle, 37 Minn. 113, 117, 33 N.W. 220, 222 (1887). Evidence tending to establish adverse possession must be strictly construed, "without resort to any inference or presumption in favor of the disseizor, but with the indulgence of every presumption against him." Vill. of Newport v. Taylor, 225 Minn. 299, 303, 30 N.W.2d 588, 591 (1948); see also Stanard v. Urban, 453 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. App. 1990) (), review denied (Minn. June 15, 1990).
Whether the adverse-possession elements have been established is a question of fact. Wortman v. Siedow, 173 Minn. 145, 148, 216 N.W. 782, 783 (1927); see also Denman v. Gans, 607 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. App. 2000) (), review denied (Minn. June 27, 2000). The district court's findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see also Grubb v. State, 433 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 1989). But whether the findings of fact support a district court's conclusions of law and judgment is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Donovan v. Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 460, 113 N.W.2d 432, 435 (1962) (). The burden rests on the disseizor to come forward with the essential facts establishing the elements of adverse possession. Simpson v. Sheridan, 231 Minn. 118, 120, 42 N.W.2d 402, 403 (1950).
"Open" possession means "visible from the surroundings, or visible to one seeking to exercise his rights." Hickerson v. Bender, 500 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. App. 1993). Although the law does not prescribe any specific manner by which a putative disseizor must possess a disputed tract of property, the possession must give "unequivocal notice to the true owner that some one is in possession in hostility to his title." Skala v. Lindbeck, 171 Minn. 410, 413, 214 N.W. 271, 272 (1927). Here, respondent testified that she intentionally left the shorefront woods in a natural state in order to comply with both a Department of Natural Resources directive that the shoreline remain unaltered and a Bay Lake Property Owners Association policy that lakeshore property owners maintain a natural barrier — such as shrubs or trees — between maintained lawns and the lake in order to reduce the effluence of fertilizer pollutants into the lake. Respondent also testified that she left the shorefront woods unmaintained to block the sight lines and sunlight from the lake.
Based on this testimony, the district court found that respondent's possession of the shorefront woods was actual and open. We agree. Appellants contend that respondent's failure to maintain the shorefront woods precluded actual and open possession, citing to the holding in Nash v. Mahan, 377 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. App. 1985), that "[o]ne who leaves land in a wild and natural state cannot acquire title by adverse possession." Although there is merit to appellants' argument that a failure to maintain property is inconsistent with open and actual possession, we conclude that under the facts of this case, respondent's affirmative and intentional act of leaving the shorefront woods unmaintained for the specific purposes of shielding the cabin from view and controlling pollution constituted actual possession. We do not believe that an individual's affirmative choice to leave land in its natural state per se precludes actual possession when, as here, the choice is motivated by a desire to further the land's intended purpose and to comply with land-use policies. In contrast, respondent's failure to maintain the woods to the east of the cabin reflected no affirmative act on her part and was therefore inconsistent with actual possession, as the district court properly concluded.
Appellants contend that respondent's possession of the disputed property was not hostile because the parties enjoyed civil relations prior to the boundary dispute. But hostility in the context of adverse possession does not imply...
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