Figueroa v. Ercole

• Decision Date: 27 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10 Civ. 3262.,10 Civ. 3262.
• Parties: Frank FIGUEROA, Petitioner, v. Robert ERCOLE, Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

800 F.Supp.2d 559

Frank FIGUEROA, Petitioner,

v.Robert ERCOLE, Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent.

No. 10 Civ. 3262.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 27, 2011.

Frank Figueroa, Elmira, NY, pro se.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Pro se petitioner Frank Figueroa (“Figueroa”), currently incarcerated at New York State's Elmira Correctional Facility, commenced this action against respondent Robert Ercole, superintendent of New York's Green Haven Correctional Facility (the “Respondent”), where Figueroa was previously incarcerated, seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”). Figueroa alleges that, for a variety of reasons, his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during the course of his trial. For the reasons discussed below, Figueroa's Petition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND ¹

A. FACTS

On November 26, 2001, Figueroa and Demetrius Brown (“Brown”) drove to 304 East 178th Street in Bronx, New York. The two men exited the car and approached Cecil Pressley (“Pressley”) and Jennifer Lopez (“Lopez”), who were standing on the steps in front of the building. Pressley and Brown were drug dealers who operated in different territories. Lopez sold drugs for both Brown and Pressley in their respective areas. Pressley, who expected an altercation told Lopez to run, and she did. After a brief verbal altercation between Brown and Pressley, Figueroa fired a gun twice at Pressley, hitting him in the abdomen and grazing his leg. The second bullet ricocheted, and grazed Lopez's leg as she ran away. After the shooting, Figueroa and Brown walked back to their car and drove from the scene. Lopez returned to Pressley, who was lying on the steps bleeding. Pressley asked Lopez to tell his wife that he loved her.

Shortly thereafter, New York City Police Department officers Benjamin Gottlieb (“Gottlieb”) and Lawrence Block arrived on the scene along with an ambulance and emergency medical technicians (the “EMTs”). Gottlieb accompanied Pressley in the ambulance to St. Barnabus Hospital in the Bronx as the EMTs worked to stabilize Pressley's condition. During the ride, Pressley's breathing returned to normal and he appeared lucid. At that time, Gottlieb asked Pressley if he knew who was responsible for the shooting. Pressley replied: “I don't know who did this to me. I don't know nothing.” (Resp. Decl. at 3.) The ambulance arrived at the hospital and Pressley was brought into an operating room. Pressley died from the bullet wounds a few hours later.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Figueroa was subsequently charged with: (1) murder in the second degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 125.25(1); (2) manslaughter in the first degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 125.20(1); and (3) criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 265.03(2). He was tried in New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County (the “Trial Court”).

At trial, Figueroa was represented by David Blackstone (“Blackstone”), who moved to enter as a dying declaration Pressley's statement in the ambulance. The Trial Court denied the motion, finding that Figueroa did not establish that Pressley believed he was going to die at the time he made the statement. The Trial Court reasoned that most of Pressley's wounds were internal, that he could not have known their severity, that the external wound would have appeared small in size, and Pressley's breathing had returned to normal at the time of the statement. Therefore, the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration.

Blackstone also moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the conduct of a court officer (the “Court Officer”) interfered with the trial's integrity in three ways. First, the Court Officer brought Lopez off the stand and to the back of the court at a break during her first day testifying. While the jury was not present, the Court Officer called Lopez a “bitch” and told her “we will see what happens here.” (Petition at 13.) Second, a friend of Lopez reported to the prosecutor that he overheard the Court Officer tell Figueroa's family that he advised Brown not to appear in court that day and that Brown “was always packing.” ( Id.) Finally, when the Court Officer attempted to escort Lopez off the witness stand after her second day testifying, she shouted that she would not accompany him because of the previous day's events. This also occurred while the jury was not present.

In response to Blackstone's motion for a mistrial, the Trial Court conducted an individual voir dire for each jury member to determine whether they were affected by the Court Officer's behavior. The Trial Court determined that no juror was aware of the Court Officer's conduct and concluded that the integrity of the trial had not been compromised. Later in the trial, Blackstone again moved for a mistrial after explaining that he could not obtain sufficient information to determine whether the Court Officer's conduct had interfered with the trial's integrity. Blackstone explained that his attempts to investigate the Court Officer's relationship with Brown had been stymied because the Court Officer had been reassigned to another courtroom and could not now be identified. The prosecution conceded that the Court Officer's behavior affected Lopez, but asserted that it did not influence the jury. The Trial Court denied the second motion for a mistrial.

On August 2, 2004, Figueroa was acquitted of murder in the second degree but convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

Figueroa appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department (“Appellate Division”), which unanimously affirmed his convictions on February 13, 2007. Figueroa I, 830 N.Y.S.2d at 81. The Appellate Division rejected two of Figueroa's claims as unpreserved: (1) that the Trial Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when it did not admit Pressley's statement as a dying declaration; and (2) that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when Blackstone failed to introduce Pressley's statement as an excited utterance. The Appellate Division also held that the Trial Court properly rejected Figueroa's motions for a mistrial, finding that the Court Officer's behavior did not have a prejudicial effect on the trial. Subsequently, Figueroa was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”). See Figueroa II, 838 N.Y.S.2d 487, 869 N.E.2d at 663.

Following an unsuccessful motion to vacate the judgment, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10(1), Figueroa timely filed the instant Petition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. LEGAL STANDARD FOR HABEAS RELIEF

As a starting point, the Court notes that Figueroa is a pro se litigant. Accordingly, his submission must be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir.1993) ( quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980)). The Court must construe Figueroa's submissions “liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted). A pro se litigant, however, is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Boddie v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 285 F.Supp.2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y.2003) ( quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983)).

1. Exhaustion

A petitioner in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state trial court is entitled to federal habeas relief only if he has exhausted all available state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c). A claim has been exhausted if it was fairly presented in state courts, thereby giving the state the “opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged violations of federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) ( quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). A petitioner need not have cited “book and verse on the federal constitution” in his claim in state court for the claim to have been exhausted. Picard, 404 U.S. at 278, 92 S.Ct. 509. Instead, a petitioner may have fairly presented his claim to state courts through

(a) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution, and (d) allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation.

Daye v. Att'y Gen. of the State of N.Y., 696 F.2d 186, 194 (2d Cir.1982).

2. Independent and Adequate State Grounds

A federal court's authority to review a habeas petition also depends on whether the state court adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits or on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). A claim resolved on independent and adequate state procedural grounds is generally not subject to habeas review. See id.

A claim resolved in state court on the merits, however, may be subject to habeas review. A state court resolves a claim on the merits when it reduces its disposition to a final judgment with res judicata effect on substantive rather than procedural grounds. See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311–12 (2d Cir.2001); see also Castillo v. Walsh, 443 F.Supp.2d 557, 562 (S.D.N.Y.2006).

3. Substantive Grounds for Federal Habeas Relief

Federal habeas review of state court decisions is governed by the standard set forth in the Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–55 (“AEDPA”). AEDPA provides that

[a] district court shall entertain an ...