Fike v. State

• Decision Date: 29 November 1983
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 71
• Citation: 447 So.2d 850
• Parties: Stephen Jerome FIKE v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 850

447 So.2d 850

Stephen Jerome FIKE v. STATE of Alabama.

6 Div. 71.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 29, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1984.

Certiorari Denied March 23, 1984

Alabama Supreme Court 83-418.

Gordon L. Ladner, Bessemer and George W. Andrews, III, Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and Carol Jean Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

TYSON, Judge.

Stephen Jerome Fike was indicted for the intentional killing of one, Patricia Ann Culp, in violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. The jury found the appellant "guilty of murder as charged in the indictment." Following a habitual offender hearing, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in the penitentiary.

On February 2, 1982, the body of Patricia Ann Culp was found lying in a culvert, in approximately six inches of water, alongside Interstate 59 in Tuscaloosa County. The body seemed to have sustained some type of injury to the head and a cut on the left wrist.

Dr. Henry Santina performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased. In his opinion, the cause of death was due to a fracture on the right side of the skull, which most likely resulted from a blunt instrument.

According to the appellant's statement, he went to Sammy's Go-Go Lounge in Birmingham around midnight on January 29, 1982. One of the dancers he knew introduced him to the deceased who was also a dancer. The appellant and the deceased then made arrangements for a date after she got off work.

Sometime around 2:00 a.m., January 30, 1982, the two drove in the deceased's red Mustang to the Highway Host Motel in Bessemer and registered as Mr. and Mrs. Stephen Culp. The two then had sex, he paid her $50 and they left. The last time the appellant saw the deceased was when she dropped him off at Banks Lounge at approximately 6:00 a.m. At 2:10 p.m. the appellant caught a plane to Atlanta.

The facts the appellant gave are somewhat different than those the police uncovered. The manager of the Highway Host Motel testified that the deceased and the appellant arrived in the early morning hours of January 30 at the motel in a red car. They registered and went to Room 330. The next morning the housekeeper discovered that one of the beds in Room 330 had been stripped and all the linens, bedspread, and blanket were missing from the room. Traces of blood were found in various areas of the motel room, including on the mattress.

Several witnesses testified as to seeing the appellant at the Omelette Shop near the Birmingham Airport on January 30 at approximately 10:00 a.m. The appellant was seen driving a red Mustang and asked one of the witnesses to look at it because he stated he had just purchased it. The witness said the car the appellant was driving was similar to the one identified as belonging to the deceased.

Later that morning, the appellant bought some new shoes. He then went to the Ramada Inn near the airport around 1:00 p.m. He was seen changing clothes in the men's room at this time.

The appellant then gave a bag to the Ramada Inn desk clerk. The bag contained some shoes and keys. Next, the appellant asked the driver of the Ramada Inn van to take him to the Omelette Shop to get some cigarettes, which he did. Then the driver dropped him at the airport.

Later that day, one of the security officers for the Ramada Inn noticed a red Mustang with a broken window. When he looked inside the car, he found a tote bag which contained a sheer nightgown, panties, make-up and a pill bottle with the name Patricia Culp on it.

The police then processed the red Mustang for evidence. Photographs of Patricia Culp were found in the glove compartment. Blood was found in the trunk of the car. A tire tool with hair fibers on it was also recovered in the trunk. The hair fibers on the tire tool could have been from the head of the deceased. Hair fibers found in the car were similar to those of the appellant's hair.

Authorities in Decatur, Georgia picked up the appellant as being a fugitive from the State of Alabama after learning of the warrant for his arrest. The authorities transferred the appellant back to Birmingham. The shirt the appellant was wearing when he was picked up in Atlanta (Decatur) had blood of the same type as deceased's on it.

The most damaging testimony at trial was that of appellant's cousin, Virginia Bryant. She visited the appellant on February 8, 1982 at the Bessemer jail.

The appellant told her that, after he and the deceased had sex, he went to take a shower. When he came out of the bathroom, the deceased was going out the door with his money so he swung her down. She told him not to come any closer or she would slit her wrist, which she did. The appellant began hitting her and he thought he had killed her after he hit her with a board. He wrapped the deceased in a sheet and put her in the trunk of her car. As he was driving, he heard her kicking in the trunk so he stopped, dumped her on the ground and hit her on the head with the tire tool to make sure she was dead. The appellant then drove to Birmingham, washed the car, went to the Omelette Shop and took a flight to Atlanta.

When Bryant stated she did not believe the appellant's story, he changed it. He stated as he was getting out of the shower, a man came in the room and beat up both of them. The man then put the girl in the trunk and him in the back seat. The appellant lost consciousness and when he awoke, no one was in the car except himself.

I

On the night of February 5, 1982, Sergeants Fred House and Max James of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department went to pick up the appellant where he was being held in custody by authorities in DeKalb County, Georgia. Once they took custody of the appellant, the "Miranda Warnings" and waiver of rights were read to him, which he signed. At this point, the appellant stated that he did not want to make a statement and would only talk to Lieutenant Haynes of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department or Nolan Shivers of the Birmingham Police Department. No further questions were asked of the appellant and the officers and the appellant returned to Jefferson County.

When the three arrived at the Sheriff's Department, early on the morning of February 6, 1982, they were met outside by several members of the news media who attempted to ask the appellant some questions. One of the newsmen asked the appellant, "Will you plea?", to which he replied, "No comment." The reporter then asked, "Do you feel you are being held wrongly?" and the appellant stated, "No comment without an attorney first." (R. 285).

At approximately 1:00 a.m., Lieutenant Haynes and Sergeant James questioned the appellant about the murder of Patricia Ann Culp. The appellant invoked his right to remain silent and he requested an attorney.

However, the interrogation of the appellant did not stop at this point, and a statement was obtained from the appellant. The State never attempted to introduce this statement. Had they done so, it would have been inadmissible because the rule set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that once an accused requests counsel, all interrogation must cease, was clearly violated.

The appellant was then transported to the Bessemer jail by Sergeant House. After House had transferred custody of the appellant to the warden, around 3:00 a.m., the appellant asked House to wait because he wanted to talk to him. House told the appellant to get some sleep and to call him that afternoon if he still wanted to talk. The appellant said that he wanted to make an appointment now and House agreed to talk to him that afternoon.

At approximately 2:30 p.m., House went back to the jail to talk to the appellant pursuant to his request. House re-read the appellant his Miranda warnings and the appellant gave him a statement. House testified that at the time he obtained the statement from the appellant, he was not aware that the appellant had told the newsmen that he wanted an attorney or that he had requested one when he was being interrogated by James and Haynes.

After hearing the above facts, the trial judge determined the appellant's statement had been voluntarily made and allowed its admission into evidence.

I (A)

The appellant claims that the statement should not have been admitted because he invoked his right to counsel and did not thereafter waive that right.

Clearly, the burden is on the State to establish that the appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

"It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)."

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court stated that:

[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. (Emphasis added).

As stated earlier, House was not aware that the appellant had invoked his right to counsel when he obtained the statement from the appellant. The appellant,...