Files v. State

• Decision Date: 30 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-1080,89-1080
• Citation: 586 So.2d 352
• Parties: Wayne FILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 586 So.2d 352, 16 Fla. L. Week. D2301
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 352

586 So.2d 352

Wayne FILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 89-1080.

586 So.2d 352, 16 Fla. L. Week. D2301

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Aug. 30, 1991.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Lawrence M. Korn, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Wayne Mitchell, Certified Legal Intern, Bradley R. Bischoff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

We deny the state's motion for rehearing, filed June 10, 1991, to strike the certified question in this case. However, the original majority and dissenting opinions are withdrawn and the following opinions are substituted therefor:

MINER, Judge.

Wayne Files appeals his convictions on three counts of dealing in stolen property, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the jury panel following the state's allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike the jury panel. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's convictions.

During the course of voir dire examination, the prosecutor excused two black prospective jurors. Defense counsel objected to the state's use of peremptory challenges on these prospective jurors suggesting that they were racially motivated. The court then inquired as to the state's reasons for the exercise of these challenges. The prosecutor responded that although his information sheet indicated that the first black prospective juror challenged had been convicted of DUI, that juror had failed to respond when he asked if any prospective juror had been convicted of any offense. His articulated reasons for striking the other prospective juror were that she was divorced, had five children, was unemployed and that he preferred jurors who worked or had other visible means of support. After the state's response, defense counsel, calling the stated reasons "superfluous," moved to strike the jury panel. The trial court denied the motion. A jury was seated and sworn and appellant's trial commenced. He was found guilty as charged, adjudicated and sentenced. This appeal then ensued.

In Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 230, 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990), the Florida Supreme Court observed:

Within the limitations imposed by State v. Neil, [457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1990) ] the trial judge necessarily is vested with broad discretion in determining whether peremptory challenges are racially intended. State v. Slappy [522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988) ]. Only one who is present at the trial can discern the nuances of the spoken word and the demeanor of those involved. Given the circumstances ... we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that the defense had failed to make a prima facie showing that there was a strong likelihood that the jurors were challenged because of their race.

* * * * * *

In trying to achieve the delicate balance between eliminating racial prejudice and the right to exercise peremptory challenges, we must necessarily rely on the inherent fairness and color blindness of our trial judges who are on the scene and who themselves get a "feel" for what is going on in the jury selection process.

See also Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA), review dismissed, 574 So.2d 141 (Fla.1990).

In Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991), the court noted:

Reed vests significant discretion in the trial court on Neil issues by requiring appellate courts to show deference to the trial court's conclusions. Specifically, Reed states that the appellate courts must "rely on the inherent fairness and color blindness of our trial judges who are on the scene and who themselves get a 'feel' for what is going on in the jury selection process." However, Reed rested on the assumption that, in the context of that case, some sort of Neil inquiry must have been made in the first instance.

Id. at 1302 (citations omitted).

Case law indicates that appellate review of trial court rulings concerning the alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges seems to depend upon how the trial court responded to the initial objection. In cases like Reynolds, where the trial court chooses not to conduct a Neil inquiry, the reviewing court is presented with no conclusion to which deference can be shown, and the case may well be reversed. But where a trial court, exercising its broad discretion in considering whether a party has established the required "strong likelihood," asks the noncomplaining party to explain its peremptory challenges and determines that those explanations are reasonable, race-neutral and non-pretextual, its findings are entitled to great deference.

The "abuse of discretion" standard has found application in both civil and criminal contexts. Justice Overton explained in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1202-03 (Fla.1980), that a reviewing court must give great deference to findings of fact in family law matters:

Judicial discretion is defined as:

The power exercised by courts to determine questions to which no strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court.

1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia 804 (8th ed. 1914). Our trial judges are granted this discretionary power because it is impossible to establish strict rules of law for every conceivable situation which could arise in the course of a domestic relation proceeding. The trial judge can ordinarily best determine what is appropriate and just because only he can personally observe the participants and events of the trial.

We cite with favor the following statement of the test for review of a judge's discretionary power:

Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.

Delno v. Market Street Railway Company, 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.1942).

In reviewing a true discretionary act, the appellate court must fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and should apply the "reasonableness" test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed only when his decision fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness.

The widely recognized Canakaris standard was applied in Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247 (Fla.1990), wherein the trial judge struck a motion for postconviction relief on the ground that the attorney signing the motion was not admitted to practice law in Florida prior to ruling on counsel's motion to admit him pro hac vice. The court held that a denial of the latter motion would have been an abuse of discretion because nothing appeared of record which cast doubt on the standing of the attorney from another jurisdiction, and that striking the rule 3.850 motion prior to a ruling on the motion pro hac vice violated the appellant's due process rights.

Just as the Neil inquiry is designed to ferret out impermissible bias in voir dire selection, the Richardson ¹ inquiry is designed to expose procedural prejudice occasioned by a party's discovery violation. In Lucas v. State, 376 So.2d 1149 (Fla.1979), the court held that it is within the "broad discretion" of the trial judge, after an adequate inquiry, to determine whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a discovery violation. ² In Parce v. Bryd, 533 So.2d 812 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), review denied, 542 So.2d 988 (Fla.1989), the court applied the Canakaris standard in holding that the trial court improperly granted mistrial for an alleged Richardson violation.

The Canakaris standard was also applied in determining the propriety of a departure sentence in Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079 (Fla.1987): ³

Inquiring into whether the trial court abused its discretion necessarily turns on the specific facts presented in each case. If, based upon the entire set of circumstances presented, the reviewing court finds the sentence so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, this will likely evidence an abuse of discretion. Reviewing courts which have held that they possess the power to review a sentence on these grounds have articulated a variety of phrases which, in fact, comport to the abuse of discretion standard adopted by this Court in Canakaris.

Id. at 1085 (citations omitted).

The abuse of discretion standard has been applied in Slappy and in other Florida cases reviewing Neil inquiries. ⁴ Federal courts likewise apply a "great deference" standard of review, under which a trial court's findings in determining whether peremptory challenges were exercised in a discriminatory manner will not be disturbed unless "clearly erroneous." ⁵ Several states have followed the federal standard. ⁶ Based upon the foregoing analysis we hold that the abuse of discretion standard, as discussed in Canakaris, is the appropriate standard by which an appellate court should review lower court Neil inquiries into the " 'Slappworth yness' " ⁷ of proffered explanations for peremptory challenges. Here, the judge implicitly concluded that the prosecutor's explanations were race-neutral, reasonable and non-pretextual by denying the defendant's motion to strike the jury panel. This court must therefore determine whether the trial...