Filipowicz v. S. S. Kresge Co.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1937
• Docket Number: No. 121.,121.
• Citation: 281 Mich. 90,274 N.W. 721
• Parties: FILIPOWICZ v. S. S. KRESGE CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

281 Mich. 90

274 N.W. 721

FILIPOWICZ

v.S. S. KRESGE CO.

No. 121.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 1, 1937.

Action by Ida Filipowicz against the S. S. Kresge Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Reversed and cause remanded for entry of judgment for defendant.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Edward J. Jeffries, Judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except BUTZEL, J.

Lawson & Giles, of Detroit (William B. Giles, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellant.

Freedman & Drexelius, of Detroit (Harold Helper, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellee.

BUSHNELL, Justice.

While descending a public stairway between 9 and 10 a .m. in going from the second to the first floor of one of defendant's stores, plaintiff slipped and fell. She was taken to a first aid room, given some medicine and her fractured wrist was bandaged by a physician who was called after the accident.

After receiving treatment, plaintiff left the store and when she got out on the street discovered that her dress, underskirt, and stockings were all greasy and black. She stated on direct examination that she had slipped on some grease and later upon being questioned by the trial judge she said the stairway step felt as though it was slippery.

At the close of plaintiff's testimony, defendant moved for a directed verdict upon the theory that plaintiff had failed to show the existence of a dangerous or defective condition caused by defendant's negligence or that it knew or should have known of such condition, and that plaintiff was guilty of negligence in failing to pay attention to her own surroundings. This motion was denied by the trial judge, who stated, ‘There is some evidence here that there was grease on that stairway. * * * It could not have been on there without the knowledge of the defendant or its employees. * * * I am placing the burden upon the defendant here because it is such a place, with such travel there, and such conditions, that they must have known or should have known of it, at least. * * * This woman was confused. She was the only one there; she had no friends; she was in the hands of the enemy; and the result is, she fell down.'

Defendant produced its second floor manager who saw plaintiff fall, helped her up, and immediately examined the stairway which he said was free from grease. The stairway is 64 inches wide, the treads 12 inches deep, and it has 7-inch risers. While no other people were on the stairway at the time, from nine to ten thousand people use it daily. This witness claimed plaintiff said: ‘I tripped and fell.’ He described the fall as a thud, followed by a roll.

The employee in charge of the main floor of defendant's store said he heard a commotion, came immediately to the mezzanine landing, saw plaintiff on her knees and assisted her to rise. He ‘asked her if she knew how she fell and she said she didn't know.’ He also claimed to have examined the steps and did not see anything, ‘there was no black grease,’ but he did not examine plaintiff's clothes.

A maid testified: ‘I circulate around and pick up refuse and sweep up if there is anything to sweep. I get around to these steps from the second floor to the mezzanine about every fifteen or twenty minutes. If I see anything on the stairs or floor, I immediately sweep it up with the broom and dust pan that I carry. The porter washes the stairs every night.'

Defendant renewed its motion for a directed verdict at the close of the proofs, decision on the motion was reserved, and the case was submitted to the jury, who rendered a verdict for $500. Defendant's motions for judgment non obstante veredicto and for a new trial were later denied.

Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment claiming that the testimony did not raise a question of defendant's negligence and that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; that plaintiff's inattention to her surroundings was contributory negligence. Appellant also says the court erred in charging the jury as follows: ‘You have a right to assume, under the testimony, if anything occurred that rendered the stairs dangerous, under normal conditions, it would almost immediately have been notice to the defendant that something was wrong.'

Defendant also claims error in the denial of its request to strike plaintiff's statement in relating a conversation with some unidentified, and therefore unauthorized, person. The testimony in question was:

‘Well, she talk to me and she say she was very sorry I fell down in their store, and she said they supposed to clean up the steps half an hour before I came to the store.'

‘The...