Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiani S. P.A. v. Yuzwa, 3D16–1015

Citation241 So.3d 938
Decision Date07 March 2018
Docket NumberNo. 3D16–1015,3D16–1015
Parties FINCANTIERI–CANTIERI NAVALI ITALIANI S.P.A., Appellant, v. Anthony YUZWA, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

Fowler White Burnett, P.A. and Allan R. Kelley and Helaine S. Goodner ; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP and Martin D. Katz, pro hac vice (Los Angeles, CA), for appellant.

Loughren, Doyle & Reising, P.A. and Richard B. Doyle, Jr. (Ft. Lauderdale); Banning LLP and William L. Banning, pro hac vice (Rancho Santa Fe, CA), for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and SALTER, JJ.

SUAREZ, J.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over an Italian shipbuilder based on injuries a Canadian citizen sustained on a cruise ship built in Italy, and owned by a Washington corporation, while the ship was in international waters in the Pacific Ocean. The trial court determined that it had both general and specific personal jurisdiction. We reverse because the foreign shipbuilder's contacts with Florida are not so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in this State nor is there an adequate connection between Florida and the underlying claims.

BACKGROUND

Fincantieri–Cantieri Navali Italiani S.p.A. ("Fincantieri"), Appellant/Defendant below, is an Italian shipbuilding company. Anthony Yuzwa ("Yuzwa"), Appellee/Plaintiff below, is a Canadian citizen who was injured while working as a performer aboard a Fincantieri-built cruise ship—the MS Oosterdam. Fincantieri built the Oosterdam in Italy pursuant to a contract, signed in London and governed by English law, with HAL Antillen N.V. ("HAL"), a Netherlands Antilles corporation and subsidiary of the Miami-based Carnival Corporation ("Carnival"). The Oosterdam is owned by Holland America Line, a Carnival subsidiary headquartered in Seattle, Washington.

On February 14, 2011, Yuzwa, who worked aboard the Oosterdam as a professional dancer, was injured during a rehearsal when a stage lift crushed his foot. This occurred while the ship was off the coast of Mexico in the Pacific Ocean, having embarked from its home port in San Diego, California the day before. Yuzwa sued Fincantieri, and other defendants, in both California and Florida. However, following jurisdictional discovery in California, Yuzwa dismissed Fincantieri from that case, maintaining the instant action in Florida against Fincantieri and one other defendant (Harbour Marine Systems, Inc.).1

Yuzwa's operative Complaint asserts claims for negligence, strict products liability, and breach of express and implied warranty. Fincantieri moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens2 and attached sworn proof contesting Yuzwa's jurisdictional allegations. Yuzwa filed an opposition with supporting declarations, the deposition of a senior Fincantieri executive, and various other exhibits. Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Fincantieri's motion to dismiss. This timely appeal follows.

ANALYSIS

We review the trial court's order denying Fincantieri's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. See, e.g., Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla. 2002). Our jurisdictional analysis is governed by Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989), which requires both a statutory and constitutional inquiry to determine whether Florida courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, the plaintiff must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute: section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2017). Id. at 502. Second, the nonresident defendant must have sufficient "minimum contacts" to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Id.; see also World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.").

Unlike long-arm statutes in other states, Florida's statutory requirements are not coextensive with federal due process requirements. See Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that Florida's long-arm statute "bestows broad jurisdiction" whereas "United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause ... imposes a more restrictive requirement."); cf Modern Principles of Personal Jurisdiction, 4A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1069 (4th ed.) ("[B]ecause a majority of states (and Puerto Rico) have enacted jurisdictional statutes that either have expressly incorporated the due process standard or have been interpreted to extend to the limits of due process, this analysis frequently is collapsed by the federal court into a one-step inquiry: does the assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfy the requirements of due process?").

A key component of the Venetian Salami analysis is its allocation of the burden of proof. Initially, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading sufficient jurisdictional facts to fall within the long-arm statute. Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502. "If the allegations in the complaint sufficiently establish long-arm jurisdiction, then the burden shifts to the defendant to contest the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, or to claim that the federal minimum contacts requirement is not met, by way of affidavit or other similar sworn proof.[3 ]" Belz Investco Ltd. P'ship v. Groupo Immobiliano Cababie, S.A., 721 So.2d 787, 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citing Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502 ; Field v. Koufas, 701 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ). "If properly contested, the burden then returns to the plaintiff to refute the evidence submitted by the defendant, also by affidavit or similar sworn proof." Id. If the parties' sworn proof is in conflict, "the trial court must conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute." Id. 4

Both the long-arm statute and federal due process distinguish between two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. General jurisdiction is based purely on a defendant's contacts with the forum state, regardless of where the cause of action arises. In order for a state to exercise such extensive jurisdiction, a defendant's contacts must be sufficiently "substantial and not isolated" and "continuous and systematic." See § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) ("Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation." (footnote omitted) ). Specific jurisdiction does not require the same level of contacts; instead, jurisdiction is based on the cause of action arising out of a defendant's certain minimum contacts with the state. See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868 ("When a controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction."). Because the trial court incorrectly found that Fincantieri was subject to both general and specific jurisdiction, we address each category in turn.

General Jurisdiction

Florida's long-arm statute provides a basis for asserting general personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(2) :

(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.

The trial court determined that Fincantieri was subject to general jurisdiction based on the following contacts with Florida: (1) Fincantieri's long-standing "partnership" with Carnival, spanning over 25 years; (2) numerous contracts with Carnival, resulting in the construction of around 60 cruise ships and amounting to 90% of the cruise ships built under Fincantieri's Merchant Ships Business Unit; (3) over 25 billion dollars in revenue for building ships for Carnival; (4) a Florida office and Area Manager to solicit cruise ship business and serve Florida clients; and (5) frequent meetings and communications with Carnival related to the building of cruise ships.

It is undisputed that Fincantieri has a substantial business relationship with Carnival; however, we conclude that some of the trial court's findings are overstated. For instance, the trial court found that there was a "partnership" between Carnival and Fincantieri based on the deposition testimony of a Fincantieri representative who referred to the relationship with Carnival as "more of a partnership[.]" But there is no evidence in the record that Carnival and Fincantieri have ever formed a legal partnership. See 8B Fla. Jur. 2d Business Relationships § 541 ("A partnership is only established when both parties contribute to the capital or labor of the business, have a mutuality of interest in both profits and losses, and agree to share in the assets and liabilities of the business."). And although Fincantieri has a single employee in Florida—the "Area Manager"—the sworn proof below conclusively shows that he simply serves as a liaison, directing any ship owner inquiries to the correct person or office in Italy. Finally, testimony from Fincantieri's Senior Executive Vice President of the Merchant Ships Business Unit establishes that meetings with Carnival are "very, very usually done in Italy" because that is where Fincantieri has all its organization, structure, technical development, and shipyards.

Notwithstanding ...

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