Finkenbiner v. Dowd

Decision Date23 October 1952
Docket NumberNo. 28809,28809
Citation108 N.E.2d 261,231 Ind. 416
PartiesFINKENBINER v. DOWD.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

H. K. Cuthbertson, Sr., H. K. Cuthbertson, Jr., Cuthbertson & Cuthberston, Peru, for appellant, Walter J. Bixler, Peru, of counsel.

J. Emmett McManamon, Atty. Gen., John Ready O'Connor, William T. McClain, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellee.

BOBBITT, Judge.

This action arises out of the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by appellant in the LaPorte Circuit Court seeking release from the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals at Michigan City.

On July 8, 1939, appellant was charged by affidavit in the Wabash Circuit Court with commission of a felony, namely: 'Committing Bodily Injury upon a Police Officer.' He was, on said date, apprehended and confined in the Wabash County Jail, and on the same day the Judge of the Wabash Circuit Court caused to be entered a memorandum suggesting that there were reasonable grounds for believing that appellant was insane. Subsequently the court appointed two physicians to examine appellant and, after proper hearing, he was found not to have comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense and was thereupon committed to the Indiana Colony for Criminal Insane by the Wabash Circuit Court until such time as he was restored to sanity. (His disability removed.)

Appellant was, pursuant to said order, subsequently confined to said institution.

In April, 1950, the Warden of the Indiana State Prison notified the Judge of the Wabash Circuit Court that appellant had been restored to sanity, whereupon the sheriff of Wabash County was ordered to return appellant for further proceedings in the criminal action which was there pending against him. Said action was again set for trial on June 15, 1950, at which time the prosecuting attorney of Wabash County filed in writing his allegation that appellant, (the defendant) 'had not sufficient comprehension to understand the nature of said proceeding against him and to formulate a defense thereto.' Whereupon said cause was continued and, on November 22, 1950, a hearing was again held on the question of sanity of appellant, and the court again found that he did not have comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense and, upon said finding, entered an order recommitting appellant to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals 'until such time as he is able to comprehend the nature of the charge and make a defense thereto.' Pursuant to said order appellant was again confined in the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals.

On February 27, 1951, appellant filed in the LaPorte Circuit Court his petition for writ of habeas corpus, to which a motion to quash was filed and sustained.

The only error here assigned is the sustaining of appellee's motion to quash.

We shall first consider the nature of appellant's petition 1 for writ of habeas corpus.

It is apparent on the face of said petition that appellant seeks from the LaPorte Circuit Court an order to set aside the order of the Wabash Circuit Court which resulted in his second commitment to the Hospital for Insane Criminals. This court will take judicial notice of the fact that the Wabash Circuit Court and the LaPorte Circuit Court are courts of concurrent jurisdiction.

Appellant's said petition further shows on its face that the Wabash Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person (appellant), and had the power to render the particular judgment which it rendered, and that after proper hearing appellant was committed to the Indiana Colony for the Criminal Insane under the provisions of § 6 of ch. 298, of the Acts of 1913, p. 775, § 9-1706, Burns' 1942 Replacement, 'until such time as he is able to comprehend the nature of the charge and make a defense thereto.' (Tr. p. 5).

The law is well settled in Indiana that one Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus setting aside an order of commitment issued by another such court which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person, and the power to render the particular judgment. Witte v. Dowd, 1951, 230 Ind. 485, 102 N.E.2d 630. See also: Wood v. Dowd, Warden, 1943, 221 Ind. 702, 51 N.E.2d 356; Ingersoll v. Kunkel, Warden, 1936, 210 Ind. 482, 4 N.E.2d 183; State ex rel. Kunkel v. Laporte Circuit Court, 1936, 209 Ind. 682, 200 N.E. 614; Goodman v. Daly, Warden, 1929, 201 Ind. 332, 165 N.E. 906; Stephenson v. Daly, 1928, 200 Ind. 196, 158 N.E. 289.

While a writ of habeas corpus is a writ of liberty, if it appears that the detention complained of is by virtue of a proper process of court, the writ will not be granted unless the proceedings or judgment supporting the process is absolutely void. State ex rel. McManamon v. Blackford Cir. Ct., 1950, 229 Ind. 3, 95 N.E.2d 556; State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, Warden, 1946, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N.E.2d 25.

We are mindful of the fact that the cases above cited involved commitments based upon convictions and final judgments in criminal prosecutions. However, appellant's commitment to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals under said § 9-1706, Burns' 1942 Replacement, supra, is based upon a finding of the Wabash Circuit Court in a criminal proceeding, hence the rules announced in the decisions above cited apply with equal force to the facts in the case at bar.

Appellant's petition shows on its face that he is being held by virtue of a proper order of the Wabash Circuit Court and there is no showing that the proceedings or the order supporting the commitment was void. The Wabash Circuit Court had jurisdiction to enter the order and issue the commitment which returned appellant to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals and it follows that the LaPorte Circuit Court has no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to set aside the order of commitment issued herein by the Wabash Circuit Court.

Second: Appellant contends that his constitutional rights have been violated and denied by his second commitment to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals. If, as appellant contends, his constitutional rights have been invaded or denied his remedy under the facts in the case at bar must be found in the court in which the judgment, upon which said commitment was issued, was rendered, or in this court on appeal. Section 9-1706a, Burns' 1942 Replacement, Acts 1951, ch. 238, § 2, p. 682; State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, Warden, 1946, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N.E.2d 25, supra; Dowd, Warden v. Anderson, 1942, 220 Ind. 6, 40 N.E.2d 658; In the Matter of William T. Underwood, 1875, 30 Mich. 502.

Third: Appellant also alleges in his petition that he 'is now sane and has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the charge against him and formulate a defense thereto' and relies upon § 22-1223, Burns' 1950 Replacement, Acts 1927, ch. 69, § 23, p. 179, for his right to apply to the LaPorte Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus by which he attempts to establish his sanity, and that he has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the charge pending against him in Wabash County.

The title to said ch. 69 of the Acts of 1927, is as follows: 'An Act concerning insanity inquests, the procedure in adjudging persons insane, the commitment of insane persons to hospitals for insane, their care pending admission, their discharge therefrom, the apprehension and return of insane patients and prohibiting the kidnapping or aiding the escape of insane persons.' It is clear from a consideration of the title of said act, together with its entire provisions, that it applies only to those persons who, as a result of an insanity inquest, held in the manner provided in said act, are committed to any hospital for insane as an insane person, and does not apply to persons who may be committed to an institution for the criminal insane under the provisions of ch. 298, of the Acts of 1913, supra.

Section 9-1706, supra, under which appellant was committed to the State Hospital for the Insane by the Wabash Circuit Court is a part of our criminal statutes and provides a specific method for committing a person charged with crime, who 'has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense,' to the Indiana Colony for the Criminal Insane, (to the division for maximum Security of the Dr. Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital--Acts 1951, ch. 238, § 2, p. 682, § 9-1706a, Burns' 1951 Supp.) until such time as the person shall have become sane, (his disability removed).

Said § 9-1706, supra, provides, in part, as follows: 'Whenever the defendant shall become sane, the superintendent of the insane hospital shall certify the fact to the proper court, who shall enter an order on his record directing the sheriff to return the defendant, or the court may enter such order in the first instance whenever he shall be sufficiently advised of the defendant's restoration to sanity.' (Our italics.)

This furnishes appellant an adequate remedy for his alleged wrong and it is sufficient to supply the necessary elements of due process. McKee v. Hasler, 1951, 229 Ind. 437, 464, 98 N.E.2d 657.

Under this provision appellant is not dependent upon the action of the superintendent of the institution in which he is confined for a reexamination of his sanity but may, by petition, advise the court from which he was committed of his restoration to sanity, and the court, upon being sufficiently advised thereof, shall enter an order directing the sheriff to return the defendant to the county from which he was committed for the purpose of being placed upon trial for the criminal offense pending against him. This section affords appellant his 'day in court' and specifically provides a method by which he may be released from the custody of the superintendent of the institution in which he is confined. Under this section he may, by way of petition, allege his restoration to sanity and, after proper hearing, the court...

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  • Wallace v. State, 583S190
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 6, 1985
    ...but retains jurisdiction to reconsider the matter at any time. Marx v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 455, 141 N.E.2d 126; Finkenbiner v. Dowd (1952), 231 Ind. 416, 108 N.E.2d 261, reh. denied. The trial of a defendant can be deferred because of a determination of his mental inability to stand tria......
  • State ex rel. Van Orden v. Floyd Circuit Court
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 9, 1980
    ...legal questions. We do not find this procedure to be a "civil case" which was triable to a jury at common law. See Finkenbiner v. Dowd, (1952) 231 Ind. 416, 108 N.E.2d 261. The respondent court did not lose or exceed its jurisdiction in refusing to grant relator a jury trial on the issue of......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1970
    ...continuing jurisdiction thereafter to again determine the issue of the defendant's mental capacity to stand trial. Finkenbiner v. Dowd (1952), 231 Ind. 416, 108 N.E.2d 261. In that decision the Court stated as 'The Wabash Circuit Court has the sole jurisdiction under the provisions of said ......
  • Tahash v. Clements
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1955
    ...writ will not be granted unless the proceedings or judgment supporting the process is absolutely void. * * *' Finkenbiner v. Dowd, 1952, 231 Ind. 416, 422, 423, 108 N.E.2d 261, 265. 'If the corrected record will show on its face that the judgment under which relatrix is being held is void, ......
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