Finlay v. Eastern Racing Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1941
• Parties: FINLAY v. EASTERN RACING ASS'N, Inc.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

308 Mass. 20

30 N.E.2d 859

FINLAY

v.EASTERN RACING ASS'N, Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 3, 1941.

Bill in equity by Olivia Finlay against Eastern Racing Association, Inc., to recover an award or dividend in the pool deposited with defendant conducting horse races, wherein intervening petitions were filed. From orders and findings and from a final decree, plaintiff appeals.

Appeals from orders and findings dismissed, and decree affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Marcus Morton, Judge.

Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, LUMMUS, QUA, and DOLAN, JJ.

H. Wise and F. J. Linehan, Jr., both of Boston, for plaintiff.

H. W. Corbett, of Boston, for defendant.

QUA, Justice.

The original plaintiff, in her bill in equity brought in behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleges in substance that she purchased and holds a ‘daily double’ ticket, entitling her to a winning award or dividend in the pool deposited with the defendant by patrons wagering upon the ‘daily double’ at the horse races conducted by the defendant at its track known as ‘Suffolk Downs' on July 18, 1935; that the defendant refuses to pay such award or dividend to the plaintiff and to other holders of winning tickets; that the defendant is a stakeholder, custodian, and depository and is in a fiduciary relationship towards the plaintiff and other purchasers of tickets; and that by its refusal to pay it has violated its fiduciary obligations. The prayers are for an accounting, for the determination of the amount of the fund or pool with which the defendant is chargeable and of the awards or dividends to which the plaintiff and others similarly situated are entitled, that payment thereof be ordered, and for other incidental relief.

Several persons have filed intervening petitions as parties plaintiff. No question has been raised as to the propriety of an equity suit in a case of this kind or as to the propriety of allowing ticket holders other than the original plaintiff to intervene. The original plaintiff and the intervenors are hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs.

The case was heard upon agreed facts supplemented by evidence. Among the facts agreed were these: The defendant was licensed under the provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 128A, inserted by St.1934, c. 374, § 3, to conduct horse racing meetings and to conduct and supervise ‘the parimutuel or certificate system of wagering on the speed or ability of horses.’ C. 128A, § 5. At the races on July 18, 1935, the plaintiffs and various other patrons wagered that in the ‘daily double’ the horse ‘Argoan’ would win the first race and the horse ‘Ste. Louise’ the third race. In fact ‘Ste. Louise’ did win the third race, and no issue is raised concerning that race. But in the first race a horse named ‘Masked Gal’ crossed the finish line first and was ‘officially’ declared the winner. ‘Argoan’ crossed the finish line second and was ‘officially’ declared second. The decision as to the winner was made by the ‘placing judges' and ‘confirmed by the Stewards,’ whereupon ‘the number of the winner was flashed in electric lights on a board in view of the public and a red light also flashed on the board under the word ‘result’.' Upon the result of the third race being declared ‘official,’ the defendant immediately began payment of the entire ‘daily double’ pool, less the deductions permitted by law, to patrons wagering that ‘Masked Gal’ and ‘Ste. Louise’ would win their respective races. On the evening of the same day ‘a protest was made’ (but not, so far as appears, by any of the plaintiffs or by any ticket holder) that “Masked Gal' had not been eligible to enter said first race by reason of the fact that said horse had won three races, and that, therefore, its entry did not comply with the conditions of the race in so far as said conditions provided that said race was for non-winners of more than two races.' On July 19 ‘the Stewards * * * found that the allegations of the protest were correct, and took away the purse money which had been awarded ‘Masked Gal’ as the winner, and awarded said purse money to ‘Argoan’, which had finished second.' The purse money is not part of the pool formed by the wagers of patrons, but is provided by the licensee (the defendant) and only the owners of competing horses participate in its distribution. There ‘is no way to determine how much persons wagering that ‘Argoan’ would win the first race would be entitled to if ‘Masked Gal’ had not been in the race.' One hundred and thirty ‘daily double’ tickets were sold ‘on the combination of ‘Masked Gal’ and ‘Ste. Louise’,' and two hundred and four ‘on the combination of ‘Argoan’ and ‘Ste. Louise’.' If the ‘daily double’ pool had been distributed to patrons who bet on the combination of ‘Argoan’ and ‘Ste. Louise’ instead of to those who bet on the combination of ‘Masked Gal’ and ‘Ste. Louise,’ each holder of a $2 winning ticket would have received $87.20.

A copy of the ‘Official Program’ introduced as an exhibit contains, under the heading ‘First Half of Daily Double First Race’ and over the list of horses entered, several lines mostly in small type, apparently descriptive of the terms upon which the race was to be run. These lines begin ‘For Two-Year Olds. Non-winners of More Than Two Races.’

The question to be decided is whether it was the defendant's duty to distribute the ‘daily double’ pool to the purchasers of wagering tickets on the basis that ‘Masked Gal’ won the first race, as had been ‘officially’ declared by the ‘placing judges,’ ‘confirmed by the Stewards,’ and ‘flashed on * * * [the] board’ after the race and before the defendant began to distribute the pool, or on the basis that ‘Argoan,’ which actually came in second, won the first race because on the next day, after distribution of the pool, the ‘Stewards' upheld a protest against the eligibility of ‘Masked Gal’ on the ground that the race was for horses which had not previously won more than two races and that ‘Masked Gal’ had won more that two races, and so awarded the purse money to ‘Argoan.’

It may be well to preface our discussion with a few words as to what we conceive the function of the court to be in a case of this kind. It is common knowledge that at formal horse races there are persons in attendance who are charged with the duty of determining which horses are the winners under the terms and conditions under which a race is being conducted, much as at football or baseball games or other public contests persons are provided to act as referees or umpires. Purchasers of race tickets must be held to know this and to consent to be bound by the judgment of those regularly charged with the duty of decision. At least in cases where as here there is no charge of bad faith, it cannot ordinarily be the duty of a court either to determine the eligibility of entries or to decide which horse won a race. There is nothing in the statute itself to suggest that the Legislature intended to impose upon courts any duty of decision in these matters. On the other hand, since the statute has expressly made wagering legal at racing meetings held in accordance with its provisions, we find it difficult to discover any good reason why the law should refuse a remedy for the recovery of the ‘award or dividend’ due under section 5 to those who have been determined by the duly constituted authorities of the race to be the ‘winning patrons.’ No argument has been made against the existence of a remedy. In Feeney v. Eastern Racing Association, Inc., 303 Mass. 602, 22 N.E.2d 259, a winning patron was allowed to recover in an action of contract against the ‘association.’ In the present case the plaintiffs have brought a bill in equity on the theory that the defendant became a ‘custodian’ or ‘depository’ under section 5, and no objection has been made to the form of procedure on the ground that it is in equity instead of at law. Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231, 237,33 Am.Dec. 733;Dearth v. Hide & Leather National Bank, 100 Mass. 540, 543;Reynolds v. Grow, 265 Mass. 578, 580, 581, 164 N.E. 650;Jones v. Jones, 297 Mass. 198, 202, 7 N.E.2d 1015. Under the circumstances we think that the Superior Court rightly proceeded to a decision of the case upon the merits whether the relation of the defendant to winning patrons was that of a trustee or of a debtor. What the relation was we need not determine in this case. But the issue to be decided by the court is not whether ‘Argoan’ or ‘Masked Gal’ really won the first race. The issue to be decided is whether the plaintiffs have proved that the duly constituted officials at the race whose duty it was to judge the race have made a decision as a result of which the plaintiffs became ‘winning patrons,’ entitled to share in the distribution of the fund contributed by those who bought tickets for the ‘daily double,’ and this in turn depends upon whether the plaintiffs' standing is to be deemed fixed by the decision made by the ‘placing judges' and ‘confirmed by the Stewards' immediately after the race, upon which decision the ‘pay-off’ to ticket holders...