Finlayson v. Crooks

• Decision Date: 30 July 1891
• Citation: 49 N.W. 398,47 Minn. 74
• Parties: FINLAYSON ET AL. v CROOKS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

47 Minn. 74

49 N.W. 398

FINLAYSON ET AL.vCROOKS.¹

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 30, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. An action to enforce a mechanic's lien under chapter 200, Laws 1889, is not a special statutory proceeding, but an ordinary civil action, proceeding according to the usual course of the law, and governed by the same rules of procedure as other similar actions, except as otherwise expressly provided in the statute itself. A mortgagee or any other party claiming an interest in the premises maybe made a party, and his rights adjudicated, whenever it might be done in an action to foreclose a mortgage.

2. When a mortgage lien intervenes, which is subsequent to some of the liens under the statute, but prior to others, the proper method of distributing the proceeds of the sale of the premises is to first set aside as applicable to the payment of statutory liens a sum equal to the amount of the liens prior to the mortgage, next out of the remainder pay the mortgage, and then apply what is left, if anything, together with what was first set aside for that purpose, ratably among all the lien claimants, without any priority among themselves. In case of a mortgage to secure future advances the mortgagee cannot, as against a subsequent lien claimant, claim the benefit of the security for optional advances made after actual notice of such lien.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; CHARLES D. KERR, Judge.

Action by David M. Finlayson and another against Abram Crooks to enforce a mechanic's lien. Motion to dismiss denied. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

James H. Foote, for appellant.

W. F. Carroll, Williams & Schoonmaker, Geo. L. Bunn, and P. M. Qvist, for respondents.

MITCHELL, J.

This action was brought to enforce a lien claimed under chapter 200, Gen. Laws 1889. Other lien claimants, the owner of the premises and several mortgagees, including appellant, Crooks, whose mortgages were alleged to be subsequent to the plaintiff's lien, were made parties defendant. The appellant, by motion to dismiss the action as to him, and by objection to the admission of any evidence affecting his rights, made the point that the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate his rights, his contention then and now being that in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien only the rights of those claiming liens under the statute can be adjudicated, and only such lien claimants can be made parties defendant. If such is the correct construction of the statute, it certainly furnishes a very inadequate and incomplete remedy; for, without an adjudication of the rights of incumbrancers and others, claiming to have acquired an interest in the premises, lien claimants would never know to a certainty what interest in the property was subject to their liens, nor purchasers at the sale what they were buying. Any such method of procedure as that contended for would be contrary to the fundamental principle and policy in all equity proceedings to do complete justice by deciding upon and settling at once the rights of all persons included in the subject of the suit, for “a court of equity, in all cases, delights to do complete justice, and not by halves.” The chief fallacy of appellant consists in assuming that an action to enforce a mechanic's lien is a special statutory proceeding, in which the express provisions of the statute are at once the source, and a definition of the extent, of the powers and jurisdiction of the court. But there is nothing in the statute requiring or even looking to any such construction. While it is true that most of its provisions have reference to lien claimants, as that is the subject of which it specially treats, yet it does not assume to prescribe any special code of practice or procedure, but leaves all such matters to be regulated by the general rules governing other actions of a similar nature. It expressly provides that a lien given by its provisions may be enforced “in the same manner as in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages upon real estate, except as otherwise herein provided.” Now, it is a very familiar rule that in foreclosure actions every person who has acquired any interest in the property subsequent to the lien of the mortgage is a proper party. In one sense they are necessary parties, because, in order to make a foreclosure complete to transfer a perfect title by the sale, it is necessary that the holder of every such interest should be brought before the court. There is nothing in the subsequent provisions of the act either prohibiting or inconsistent with a similar practice in suits to enforce liens. On the contrary, section 10 not only clearly contemplates, but in terms provides for bringing in as parties “other persons” besides “lien claimants.” The argument, that because the statute expressly provides that all lien claimants under the act shall be made parties therefore no other persons can be, proceeds upon the same erroneous theory as to the nature of the action already referred...