Finlinson v. Millard Cnty.

• Decision Date: 22 April 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:16-cv-1009-TC
• Citation: 455 F.Supp.3d 1232
• Parties: George FINLINSON, Plaintiff, v. MILLARD COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

455 F.Supp.3d 1232

George FINLINSON, Plaintiff,

v.MILLARD COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-1009-TC

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.

Signed April 22, 2020

Justin T. Toth, Whitney Hulet Krogue, Ray Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, UT, David O. Leavitt, The Leavitt Firm PC, Orem, UT, for Plaintiff.

R. Blake Hamilton, Ashley M. Gregson, Ryan M. Stephens, Durham Jones & Pinegar PC, Jasmine A. Fierro-Maciel, US District Court, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendants Millard County, Robert Dekker, Morris Burton, Michael Blad, Clark Thomas.

R. Blake Hamilton, Ashley M. Gregson, Durham Jones & Pinegar PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant Millard County Sheriff's Office.

R. Blake Hamilton, Ashley M. Gregson, Durham Jones & Pinegar PC, Jasmine A. Fierro-Maciel, US District Court, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant Steve Mitchell.

Frank D. Mylar, Mylar Law PC, R. Blake Hamilton, Durham Jones & Pinegar PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant Utah County.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION

TENA CAMPBELL, U.S. District Court Judge

Plaintiff George Finlinson filed this lawsuit in 2014 against Millard County and several of its police officers (the "Millard County Defendants") for shooting and tasing him during a standoff that culminated in his arrest. Mr. Finlinson also named Utah County as a defendant, alleging that he was mistreated in the Utah County Jail while he was waiting for trial.¹ The complaint asserts that Utah County violated Mr. Finlinson's civil rights under both the federal and Utah constitutions.

On October 29, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary judgment brought by the Millard County Defendants. In the same order, the court denied with prejudice Utah County's motion for summary judgment of Mr. Finlinson's federal claim and denied without prejudice its motion for summary judgment of Mr. Finlinson's state claim. See Finlinson v. Millard Cty., Case No. 2:16-cv-01009-TC, 2018 WL 5438436 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 2018).

Utah County has now filed a second motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 190.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is complex and was detailed at length in the court's previous summary judgment order. See Finlinson, 2018 WL 5438436 at *1-12. The court repeats here only those facts that are essential to resolving Utah County's second motion for summary judgment.

Mr. Finlinson suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Due to concerns that he was becoming a danger to himself and others, Mr. Finlinson's family worked with the Central Utah Counseling Center to arrange for him to be civilly committed so that he could obtain mental health treatment. Id. at *1-2.

On July 29, 2014, the Central Utah Counseling Center contacted the Millard County Sheriff's Department and asked that the police detain Mr. Finlinson and transport him to a hospital. The police officers attempted to seize Mr. Finlinson after pulling him over while he was driving, but the situation quickly escalated into a slow-speed car chase, followed by a standoff in which Mr. Finlinson attempted to ram the officers with his truck. Near the end of the encounter, the police shot and tased Mr. Finlinson repeatedly.² Id. at *3-6.

Mr. Finlinson received medical care for his gunshot wounds at Utah Valley Regional Hospital. Id. at *6. He was also administered a shot of the antipsychotic drug Haldol and was prescribed an additional dose of Haldol every four weeks. Id. After he was released from the hospital, Mr. Finlinson was charged with two counts of attempted aggravated murder of police officers, ten counts of aggravated assault against police officers, assault by a prisoner, failure to stop or respond to command of police, and interference with arresting officer.³ He was booked into the Utah County Jail (the "Jail") pending trial. Id.

Upon being taken to the Jail, Mr. Finlinson was placed in administrative segregation and on suicide watch. The suicide watch lasted for about six weeks. He remained in administrative segregation for approximately eight months—the full duration of his stay in the Jail—after which he was released to the Utah State Hospital. Id. at *7-8. An intake deputy made the initial decision to place Mr. Finlinson on suicide watch, while the decision to keep him on suicide watch for six weeks was made by Monte Memmott, a licensed clinical mental health counselor with whom the Jail had contracted. Id. at *8. Lieutenant Nancy Killian, who oversaw housing policies at the Jail, made the decision to keep Mr. Finlinson in administrative segregation. Id. at *6.

While on suicide watch, Mr. Finlinson was unable to wear regular clothes and was not permitted to wear glasses, even though he had impaired vision. Being placed in administrative segregation meant he was mostly isolated from other prisoners in a single cell (though he "could theoretically talk to other segregated inmates who were housed there" by calling out from his cell). Id. at *7 -10. He was also permitted only a single visit from his family over the course of eight months. Id. at *10.

Additionally, the Jail failed to administer Mr. Finlinson's prescribed Haldol shots at the appropriate intervals. Because he was not properly medicated, the state court determined in December 2014 that he was not competent to stand trial. Id. at *12. In January, the same court ordered that he be released to the Utah State Hospital so that he could "receive treatment to be restored to mental competency." Id. at *12. Because of the length of the waiting list, Mr. Finlinson was not transferred to the hospital until April 14, 2015. Id.

THE PREVIOUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

Mr. Finlinson brought a claim against Utah County for violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits individuals to obtain monetary damages or equitable relief if their federal constitutional rights have been violated. Specifically, Mr. Finlinson alleged that Utah County violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it placed him on suicide watch and in administrative segregation for no legitimate reason and when it wrongfully failed to administer his antipsychotic medication.⁴ On February 16, 2018, Utah County moved for summary judgment of this claim. (ECF No. 93.)

In order to hold a municipality like Utah County liable under § 1983, Mr. Finlinson must show that the individuals who actually made the decisions regarding the conditions of his incarceration—in this case, Lieutenant Killian and Mr. Memmott—not only violated Mr. Finlinson's constitutional rights, but did so "pursuant to official municipal policy." Finlinson, 2018 WL 5438436 at *24 (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ). The court concluded that triable issues of fact existed regarding this issue and denied this portion of the motion with prejudice. See generally Finlinson, 2018 WL 5438436 at *28-34.

Mr. Finlinson also brought a claim against Utah County based on its alleged violation of article I, section 9 of the Utah constitution, which states, in relevant part, that "[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah County moved for summary judgment of this claim as well.

To prevail at trial, Mr. Finlinson must ultimately show, among other things, that he "suffered a flagrant violation of his constitutional right to be free from unnecessary rigor." Finlinson, 2018 WL 5438436 at *34 (quoting Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. Sch. Dist., 16 P.3d 533, 538-39 (Utah 2000) (internal quotations omitted)). The court concluded, in its prior order, that both parties had failed to sufficiently address two issues that were essential to adjudicating this element of the claim.

First, the Utah Supreme Court had previously noted that it would "leave for another day the question of whether money damages may be recovered by persons in custody who may have been subjected to unnecessary rigor but who have not sustained physical injuries." Id. at *35 (quoting Dexter v. Bosko, 184 P.3d 592, 599 (Utah 2008) ). Neither Utah County nor Mr. Finlinson explained how this court should interpret this precedent, given the fact that Mr. Finlinson's injuries were primarily nonphysical.

Second, as noted, Mr. Finlinson's injuries were actually caused by Lieutenant Killian and Mr. Memmott. Although Utah County's motion addressed at length the standard for holding a municipality liable under federal law, neither party briefed what type of showing was necessary to hold Utah County liable for its employees’ actions under the Utah constitution.

In light of the insufficient briefing, the court denied this portion of Utah County's motion without prejudice. Utah County then filed its Amended Second Motion for Summary Judgment, which seeks to revisit both the § 1983 claim and the unnecessary rigor claim. (ECF No. 190.)⁵

LEGAL STANDARD

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is ‘material’ if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented." Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted).

"If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Talley v. Time, Inc., 923 F.3d 878, 893-94 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). Should the nonmovant bear the burden of persuasion at trial, "[t]hese facts must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case." Id. (quoting Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016) ).

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