Finnegan v. Finnegan
Decision Date | 04 May 1954 |
Citation | 269 P.2d 873,42 Cal.2d 762 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | FINNEGAN v. FINNEGAN. L. A. 22394. |
Jerry Giesler and Harold C. Holland, Beverly Hills, for appellant.
A. A. Goldstone, Los Angeles, for respondent.
In 1943 plaintiff secured a decree of separate maintenance awarding her all of the community property and $100 per month for the support of the minor son of the parties. On defendant's appeal the decree was affirmed as to these provisions but reversed insofar as it ordered a sale of certain property by a receiver. Finnegan v. Finnegan, 64 Cal.App.2d 109, 148 P.2d 37. Thereafter the parties entered into a property settlement agreement, which by stipulation was adopted as the basis for a final judgment of separate maintenance. The stipulation provided that The judgment provided that plaintiff was entitled to live separate and apart from defendant, approved the property settlement agreement, and provided that in conformity with its terms 'defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to said plaintiff the sums for alimony and support of herself and minor son as provided in Paragraph Five of said Agreement, said payments to be at the rate of Two Hundred Seventy Dollars ($270.00) per month commencing August 5th 1944, until said monthly sums are reduced as provided in said Agreement. * * *' The agreement, which was attached to the judgment and incorporated therein in its entirety by reference, recited that the parties were living separate and apart and that they had agreed 'upon a mutual property settlement pertaining to all the property of every kind, nature and description, belonging to them, or either of them, and to be a complete and final settlement of their mutual rights and claims of every kind and nature whatsoever. * * *' The agreement then listed the property in which one or both of the parties asserted an interest and made detailed provisions for its division. Paragraph five provided for the payment of $270 per month for alimony and support for plaintiff and the minor son of the parties. These payments were to be reduced to $170 per month when the son either died, married, become of age, or became self-supporting, and were to terminate on the death or remarriage of plaintiff. It was also provided that if defendant sold certain patents, plaintiff should receive half of the amount realized, and if she received $25,000 from this source, the $170 per month alimony should terminate. If she received less than $25,000, the payments should be reduced pro tanto. Paragraph 13 provided that 'The property received by each of the parties hereto, respectively, and the agreements herein contained are received and made by each of the parties hereto in full of all claims and rights of every kind, nature and description, which either party hereto may have or claim to have against the other now or hereafter, including any rights or relief with respect to property or maintenance which (plaintiff) might obtain in said action D-224,875, and in full for all claims and rights which either party hereto would have upon the estate of the other, and is in lieu of all rights which the law would give the other as husband or wife, or as a surviving husband or wife. * * *' The agreement also contained a waiver by plaintiff of court costs and attorney fees, and provided that after-acquired property should be the separate property of the party acquiring it. In 1950 plaintiff petitioned the court for an increase in the amount of the monthly payments for the support of herself and the minor son. The court awarded an additional $75 per month for the support of the son but denied any increase for plaintiff's support on the ground that the provision for monthly payments was an inseparable part of the property settlement agreement. Plaintiff appealed and secured an order for costs and attorney fees on appeal, and defendant appealed from the latter order.
If the provision for monthly payments pursuant to the terms of the property settlement agreement had been entered by the court in a divorce action, it is clear that it could not now be modified. Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 40, 265 P.2d 873, 876;...
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