Hull v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 13 May 1960
• Citation: 54 Cal.2d 139,5 Cal.Rptr. 1,352 P.2d 161
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 352 P.2d 161 Thomas E. HULL, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent, Geraline Hull, Real Party in Interest. L. A. 25717.

Page 1

5 Cal.Rptr. 1

54 Cal.2d 139, 352 P.2d 161

Thomas E. HULL, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent Geraline Hull, Real Party in Interest.

L. A. 25717.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 13, 1960.

Edward M. Raskin, Los Angeles, and Paul P. Selvin, Beverly Hills, for petitioner.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamoreaux, Asst. County Counsel, and Edward A. Nugent Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

Covey & Covey and Jules J. Covey, Hollywood, for real party in interest.

PETERS, Justice.

Geraline Hull secured an interlocutory decree of divorce from her husband, Thomas E. Hull. About eleven months later Geraline moved the trial court to bar the entry of the final decree if her husband should seek to have such a decree entered. Shortly thereafter, and after the required one-year period had elapsed, Thomas moved for entry of the final decree. The trial court granted Geraline's motion. Thomas petitions for a writ of mandate to compel the entry of the final, contending that he is entitled to such entry as a matter of right. With this contention we agree.

The facts are as follows: On September 3, 1958, after an uncontested hearing, Geraline secured an interlocutory decree of divorce. The decree incorporated an integrated property settlement agreement previously negotiated by the parties. This agreement provided, among other things, for the conveyance of property then in escrow (subject to an exchange agreement by virtue of which Thomas was to convey certain property owned by him and receive the particular property specified in the settlement) to Geraline, alimony, child support, vacation payments for the children, and execution by Thomas of an irrevocable will creating trust funds for Geraline and the children.

On February 13, 1959, Geraline initiated a contempt proceeding against Thomas, alleging that he had failed to convey the property to her, had failed to execute his will as agreed, and had remarried in Maxico in February and was transferring valuable property to his new 'wife.' Geraline did not appear at the hearing and no evidence was introduced. The contempt proceeding was dismissed.

In April, 1959, Geraline filed a 'Notice of Motion in re: Determination of Liability of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant for Breach of Certain Provisions of the Interlocutory locutory Judgment of Divorce * * *' In May the trial court entered its determination to the effect that Thomas had not breached the agreement. This order was subsequently vacated, and the court then ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree.

In July, 1959, Geraline commenced a civil action against Thomas and Lynn Starr (his new 'wife') to restrain Thomas from violating the decree, to restrain Lynn Starr from receiving any property belonging to Thomas, and to require Thomas to either convey the property included in the settlement or to pay to her $150,000 in cash. (The property was valued at $144,000 by the parties.) The civil action is still pending.

In August, 1959, Geraline filed a motion to prevent the entry of the final decree. She alleged the same acts of contract breach as in the previous proceedings. She admitted that Thomas did not actually have the real property to which she was entitled because the exchange contemplated had never been made, but alleged that this had occurred only because Thomas had refuesed to complete the escrow. Affidavits of her attorney and of her real estate broker were submitted to support this contention. She further alleged that certain payments for the children's vacations had not been made.

Thomas, by counter-affidavit, admitted noncompliance with the contract, but alleged: (1) That the vacation payments had not been made because the children had not taken vacations, and that he had been forced to rescue his son from Juvenile Court proceedings initiated by Geraline (she denied this); and, (2) that the escrow had not been completed because the other parties to it had disapproved of the covenants attached to his property, and not through any wilful action on his part. He moved for entry of the final decree.

After several hearings, the trial court granted Geraline's motion to bar entry of the final decree of divorce. It is this order which gives rise to the present petition for a writ of mandate to compel the court to enter the final decree.

If Thomas is entitled to entry of the final decree as a matter of right, then mandate is the proper remedy. Claudius v. Melvin, 146 Cal. 257, 79 P. 897; see also McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222, 237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110; Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250, 165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R. 1589; Stewart v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 702, 40 P.2d 529; Isakson v. Suprerior Court, 130 Cal.App. 180, 19 P,2d 840; Newell v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App. 343, 149 P. 998. Thomas contends that since there is neither fraud nor mistake involved in the present dispute, and since he cannot be punished by contempt for breach of an integrated property agreement even though his breach is found to be wilful, the trial court has no discretion to bar entry of the final decree.

It is, of course, within the discretion of the trial court to bar entry of the final decree of divorce if the moving party is in contempt of an order or process of the court relating to the divorce action. Weeks v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. 620, 203 P. 93: Pearson v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App.2d 87, 89 P.2d 162; Sullivan v. Superior Court, 72 Cal.App. 531, 237 P. 782. This power exists even though there has been no prior adjudication of contempt and none is sought (Knackstedt v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App.2d 727, 180 P.2d 375). It is equally well settled that failure to comply with the terms of a property settlement agreement is not punishable by contempt. Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 310 P.2d 634. This rule applies even though the payments in default were designated as child support if these support payments are part of the integrated property settlement (Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 328 P.2d 193). ¹ Obligations arising under such an agreement, even though the agreement is incorporated into the decree, are contractual, and contempt, of course, cannot be used to punish mere breach of contract.

In the present case the property settlement agreement is admittedly an integrated property agreement. Thus, under the rule of the cases cited above, Thomas cannot be punished by contempt even if it be assumed that the facts alleged in Geraline's affidavit are true.

The trial court, in the present case, has barred the entry of the final decree for what, at most, is a mere breach of contract. To countenance such a procedure would be violative of the public policy of this state. That policy is not to discourage final and permanent severance or marriages that have failed. It has been stated that: '* * * when a marriage has failed and the family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce will be permitted. ' (P)ublic policy does not discourage divorce where the relations between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed.' (Citing cases.)' De Burgh v. De. Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, at page 864, 250 P.2d 598, at page 601. The public interest is not enhanced by refusing people the right to legally terminate a relationship which has already been irrevocably severed in fact. The power to prevent the final dissolution of such marriages should be used only when necessary to preserve the authority of the court.

It is no longer a sufficient basis for denying an interlocutory decree that the petitioner is also found to be at 'fault' (De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra; Civ.Code, § 132). It should be equally immaterial that the moving party has been guilty of a breach of contract not constituting a contempt, or of some improper conduct not directly related to the divorce proceeding.

In De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra, this court expressed the conviction that enforced continuation of a relationship which has been destroyed could serve no useful public policy but would, instead, serve to foster adulterous associations as well as intensify 'the oppressive effect upon children and the community * * *' 39 Cal.2d at page 864, 250 P.2d at page 601.

If parties are permitted to dissolve a marriage legally when the legitimate objects of that marriage have been destroyed, they will be able to build new lives and new homes which may possess the stability and happiness the previous relationship lacked. At the very least they will not be forced into improper relationships by the very law they, and their children, are admonished to respect. That this result is of greater benefit to the public welfare than enforced continuation of a status which has been totally repudiated by the parties is obvious.

California has specified the exclusive grounds upon which legal dissolution of the marriage can be predicated (Civ.Code, § 92). But once it had been determined that such grounds exist and an interlocutory decree of divorce had been granted the courts should not bar entry of the final decree upon the expiration of the interlocutory year except for compelling reasons.

A court should have the right to deny its processes and aid to one who stands in contempt or is in contempt of its orders. One who has wilfully refused to comply with the mandate of a court cannot then compel that court to do his bidding. But it msut be remembered that even though the moving party has been adjudicated in contempt, the court is not required to bar entry of the final decree, but such action remains within the trial court's discretion. If the court determines that the public interest will be better served by finally and permanently dissolving the marital status it is entirely within its power to do so. 1 Armstrong, Family Law, 271.

If one who stands in contempt of the orders of the court...