Finocchi v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.

• Decision Date: 16 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 61650,61650
• Citation: 85 Ohio App.3d 572,620 N.E.2d 872
• Parties: , 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098 FINOCCHI et al., Appellants, v. GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellee. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 572

85 Ohio App.3d 572

620 N.E.2d 872, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098

FINOCCHI et al., Appellants, v. GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellee. ^*

No. 61650.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Decided Feb. 16, 1993.

Gaines & Stern Co., L.P.A., David Roloff and Paul P. Psota, Cleveland, for appellants

Duvin, Cahn & Barnard, Lee J. Hutton and Jon M. Dileno, Cleveland, for appellee.

KRUPANSKY, Judge.

This cause of action was commenced by filing a complaint in the common pleas court on March 31, 1989. The appeal sub judice stems from an order of the trial court dated March 18, 1991 granting summary judgment against plaintiffs-appellants, eight union transit employees, in favor of their employer, defendant-appellee Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority ("GCRTA").

GCRTA acquired substantially all the assets of the city of Shaker Heights Rapid Transit System and continued thereafter to operate the rail transit system with its existing union employees as a going concern. Plaintiffs remained members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Division 923 (the "BLE") until they individually by signing a written document disaffiliated themselves from the BLE approximately one year following the transfer. GCRTA and the city of Shaker Heights accomplished the transfer by executing a "Mass Transit System Transfer Agreement" dated September 5, 1975 (the "Transfer Agreement") whereby GCRTA assumed certain obligations to the existing union transit employees consistent with federal and state law.

The Transfer Agreement Schedule G-3 "Protection of Rights of Employees" (the "Protection of Rights Schedule") enumerated eight specific benefits, terms and conditions of employment, including the following, viz.: certain meal allowances, sick leave benefits, anniversary day and floating Saturday, vacation benefits, cost of living escalators, seniority rights and Social Security coverage. However, the introduction to the Schedule G-3 "Protection of Rights of Employees" specifically stated as follows:

"This agreement shall apply irrespective of any representation by a collective bargaining agent and shall in no way restrict the rights of any collective bargaining agent."

The terms of the labor agreement between the BLE and city of Shaker Heights were due to expire on December 31, 1976. On September 3, 1976, prior to the scheduled expiration date, BLE and GCRTA executed a "Standardization Agreement" to make the wages, benefits and terms and conditions of employment uniform for all GCRTA union employees system-wide and to consolidate all employees into one master collective bargaining unit represented exclusively by the larger Amalgamated Transit Union Division 268, AFL-CIO (the "ATU"). Section 1 of the Standardization Agreement provided that effective September 5, 1976 the existing BLE bargaining unit was dissolved and the employees from the BLE were consolidated with the ATU bargaining unit and the existing Rules of the city of Shaker Heights Department of Transportation providing different benefits "shall be null and void." Section 4 of the Standardization Agreement recited that the terms had been approved and ratified by the BLE union Section 2 of the Standardization Agreement comprehensively specified that effective September 5, 1976 plaintiffs' wages, benefits, terms and conditions of employment were governed exclusively by the existing collective bargaining agreement between the GCRTA and ATU with only six exceptions with which compliance has been made. Plaintiffs have remained members of the ATU since that date and the GCRTA and ATU have subsequently entered into a series of four three-year collective bargaining agreements governing plaintiffs' wages, benefits, terms and conditions of employment. There is no dispute that GCRTA has complied with all provisions, including the six exceptions as stated above in the Standardization Agreement and all four subsequent collective bargaining agreements related to the terms, conditions and benefits of employment.

members and all eight plaintiffs executed and signed a written document indicating their approval and disaffiliating themselves from the BLE.

Plaintiffs commenced this litigation by filing a "Verified Complaint with Request for Preliminary Injunction" in the trial court March 31, 1989 alleging that GCRTA breached the 1975 Transfer Agreement Protection of Rights Schedule and violated state law. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendant from consolidating its rail operations and combining seniority lists for all union employees pursuant to the 1988 collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint requesting compensatory damages for various other alleged breaches by GCRTA by failing to provide meal allowances, sick leave benefits, anniversary day and floating Saturday, vacation benefits, cost of living adjustments, Social Security benefits allegedly due them as third-party beneficiaries under the 1975 Transfer Agreement Protection of Rights Schedule.

Defendant GCRTA filed answers denying the substantive allegations of plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint. The parties thereafter filed various factual stipulations, agreed exhibits and respective cross-motions for summary judgment on October 5, 1990. Each party subsequently filed a brief in opposition to its opponents' motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant in entries journalized March 18, 1991.

Plaintiffs' timely appeal raising five assignments of error which are not separately briefed or argued in compliance with App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7). As a result, this court shall address all five assignments of error collectively. Plaintiffs' five assignments of error follow:

"I. The trial court erred in determining that the transfer agreement between the city of Shaker Heights and the RTA did not oblige the RTA to preserve and continue the rights, privileges and benefits afforded appellants when they worked for Shaker Heights.

"II. The trial court erred in determining that Ohio Revised Code, Section 306.35(X) does not require the RTA to preserve and continue the rights, privileges and benefits afforded appellants when they worked for Shaker Heights.

"III. The trial court erred in determining that the RTA preserved and continued the rights, privileges and benefits afforded appellants when they worked for Shaker Heights.

"IV. The trial court erred in determining that the standardization agreement between the BLE and RTA and subsequent collective bargaining agreements between the ATU and RTA lawfully discontinued rights, privileges and benefits afforded appellants while employed by Shaker Heights.

"V. The trial court erred in determining that the RTA lawfully modified its transfer agreement obligations after the appellants started working for the RTA."

Plaintiffs' five assignments of error lack merit.

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erroneously denied their motion for summary judgment and improperly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant GCRTA since the 1975 Transfer Agreement Protection of Rights Schedule and R.C. 306.35(X) perpetuate various substantive terms of their employment prior to being employed by GCRTA which must be continued in perpetuity without adverse modification.

However, plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence defendant GCRTA breached any obligation to them related to the benefits, terms and conditions of their employment. The sole dispute between the parties relates to the change in benefits referred to in the Transfer Agreement following the execution of the Standardization Agreement and, as noted above, the parties agree GCRTA complied with all provisions of the Standardization Agreement and subsequent collective bargaining agreements. (Factual Stipulations at Paragraphs 8 and 9.) The stipulated facts and exhibits demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact and GCRTA is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56 as a matter of law.

As noted above, GCRTA acquired the former Shaker Rapid Transit System with grants from the United States Department of Transportation under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 ("UMTA"), Section 1601 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code. Plaintiffs argue the United States Supreme Court has recognized in this context that Congress enacted UMTA Section 13(c) ¹ based upon a concern Federal courts construing UMTA Section 13(c) recognize that it does not perpetuate the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements existing prior to an acquisition by a public employer, but merely protects the collective bargaining process. Amalgamated Transit Union Internatl., AFL-CIO v. Donovan (C.A.D.C.1985), 767 F.2d 939; Local Div. 589 v. Commw. of Mass. (C.A.1, 1981), 666 F.2d 618, 634-635. In other words, UMTA Section 13(c) merely preserves existing rights and maintains the status quo following an acquisition before a subsequent collective bargaining agreement is adopted and does not create any new rights or enhance any prior rights under pretransfer labor agreements. See Div. 580, Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO v. Cent. New York Regional Transp. Auth. (C.A.2, 1977), 556 F.2d 659.

                for [620 N.E.2d 876] the collective bargaining rights of transit employees following the acquisition of transit operations with federal funds since many states did not recognize such rights in the context of public employers exempt from federal collective bargaining law.  Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC (1982), 457 U.S. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2202, 72 L.Ed.2d 639.   However, this statute does not imply a federal cause of action and agreements made pursuant to this provision are governed by state contract law principles.  Id.;  Santini v. RTA (Dec. 31, 1986), Cuyahoga App.  No. 51509, unreported, at 7, 1986 WL 552
                

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