Finr v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 08 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2D05-2393.,2D05-2393.
• Citation: 943 So.2d 976
• Parties: FLORIDA INSTITUTE FOR NEUROLOGIC REHABILITATION, INC., Appellant, v. Una MARSHALL and Russell Lieux, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Michael Lieux, deceased, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

943 So.2d 976

FLORIDA INSTITUTE FOR NEUROLOGIC REHABILITATION, INC., Appellant, v. Una MARSHALL and Russell Lieux, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Michael Lieux, deceased, Appellees.

No. 2D05-2393.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

December 8, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sylvia H. Walbolt, Robert E. Biasotti, and Christopher J. Kaiser of Carlton Fields, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.

Shea Moxon of Swope, Rodante P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.

CANADY, Judge.

The Florida Institute for Neurologic Rehabilitation, Inc. (FINR) appeals a judgment in a wrongful death case arising from the death of Michael Lieux (Lieux), who was a resident of FINR's facility in Hardee County for the long-term care of brain-injured individuals. Lieux's death occurred shortly after he was subdued and held in a prone position on the floor by FINR's employees who used a physical restraint technique called "therapeutic containment." In the wrongful death action brought by Lieux's parents, the appellees, Una Marshall and Russell Lieux, as co-personal representatives of their son's estate, the jury awarded damages of $2.5 million to each of Lieux's parents for their past mental pain and suffering sustained as a result of their son's death.¹ The jury rejected the parents' claim for punitive damages.

FINR raises several issues concerning evidentiary rulings of the trial court as grounds for reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial. First, FINR argues that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider evidence of the medical examiner's opinion that the manner of Lieux's death was homicide. Second, FINR argues that once the medical examiner's opinion that the death was a homicide had been admitted, the trial court erred in excluding testimony by law enforcement officials that Lieux's death was not a homicide. Third, FINR contends the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiffs to present certain evidence of FINR's alleged negligence at other times. Fourth, FINR contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain medical records regarding Lieux from other facilities where Lieux had been a resident.

In considering the issues raised by FINR, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. "Rulings on evidentiary matters generally are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would view the matter as the trial court did." Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 852 n. 51 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted). The trial court's exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence "must be viewed in the context of the entire trial." Jimenez v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 458 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

To prevail in its appeal, FINR must not only establish that the trial court abused its discretion but also show that the trial court's error was harmful. An appellate court may "set aside or reverse a judgment, or grant a new trial on the basis of [improperly] admitted or excluded evidence" only "when a substantial right of the party [appealing] is adversely affected." § 90.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). In order for an appealing party to be successful in a challenge to a judgment based on "the improper admission or rejection of evidence," the appellate court must conclude "after an examination of the entire case . . . that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2006). In a civil case, an error is reversible—that is, harmful error—where "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed." Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

We conclude that FINR has failed to establish that the trial court committed any error which requires reversal of the judgment. Without further comment, we reject FINR's third point—concerning evidence of negligence at other times—and its fourth point—concerning medical records from other facilities—as grounds for reversal. For the reasons we explain below, we conclude with respect to FINR's first and second points that the trial court did not abuse its discretion either in allowing the introduction of evidence of the medical examiner's opinion concerning the manner of death or in excluding evidence of the opinion of law enforcement officials.

1. The Medical Examiner's Opinion that the Manner of Death was Homicide

Prior to trial, FINR filed a motion in limine seeking the exclusion of evidence concerning the medical examiner's opinion that the manner of Lieux's death was homicide. The trial court denied the motion.

At trial, evidence concerning the medical examiner's opinion was presented by way of the medical examiner's testimony and the introduction of the amended death certificate. The evidence concerning the medical examiner's opinion related not only to the manner of death but also to the cause of death.² No objection was made by FINR with respect to the evidence concerning the cause of death. According to both the amended death certificate and the medical examiner's testimony, the manner of Lieux's death was "[h]omicide" and the cause of his death was "[p]ositional asphyxia." In describing how the injury occurred, the amended death certificate stated: "Inappropriate restraining techniques."

FINR argued in its motion in limine—as it does on appeal—that the opinion evidence concerning the manner of death fell within the scope of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that "[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, [or] misleading the jury." FINR cites Spradley v. State, 442 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), for the proposition that "when a defense of accidental death is asserted, a medical examiner's testimony that the death was a `homicide' deprives the defendant of a fair trial." FINR further contends that "when the Polk County Medical Examiner testified that Lieux's death was a `homicide,' the case was essentially over." FINR's position on this issue is based on its assertion that "`[h]omicide' is a highly charged word that is commonly understood to mean that a crime has been committed." Thus, according to FINR, the admission of the evidence of the medical examiner's opinion that the manner of Lieux's death was a homicide was likely to lead the jury to believe that FINR—through its employees—had committed a crime. FINR contends that "[b]y telling the jury the death was a `homicide,' [the medical examiner] told them that the death was not an `accident' as FINR claimed."³

In common parlance, homicide means "a killing of a human being through human agency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1083 (1993); see also 7 Oxford English Dictionary 332 (2d ed.1989) (defining homicide as "[t]he action, by a human being, of killing a human being"). The legal meaning of homicide is no different. "`The legal term for killing a [human being], whether lawfully or unlawfully, is "homicide." There is no crime of "homicide."'" Black's Law Dictionary 751 (8th ed.2004) (quoting Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 204 (1978)). The existence of the legal categories of excusable homicide, see § 782.03, Fla. Stat. (2003), and justifiable homicide, see § 782.02; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.1, makes clear that the term homicide does not denote criminality. The categories of justifiable and excusable homicide have long existed in the law. See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *177-78 ("Now homicide, or the killing any human creature, is of three kinds; justifiable, excusable, and felonious. The first has no share of guilt at all; the second, very little; but the third is the highest crime against the law of nature, that man is capable of committing."). It is thus well established in the law—as well as in common usage— that homicide does not entail criminality.

It is thus also well established—both in common parlance and legal usage—that a homicide may be accidental. Indeed, a noncriminal homicide is noncriminal ordinarily because it is accidental. The human agency that precipitates the killing of a human being may be exercised by accident. "[B]y accident" is a central element in the definition of excusable homicide. § 782.03.

FINR's argument regarding the use of the term homicide exploits a difference between the broad meaning of the term accident in its common and legal usage and its narrower meaning in the terminology used by medical examiners for classifying the manner of death. In describing the manner of death, a medical examiner chooses from five distinct categories: natural, accident, suicide, homicide, or undetermined. It is inherent in this classification scheme that the different classifications are mutually exclusive. Under this scheme, the meaning of homicide is the same as it is in common and legal usage, while the meaning of accident is more restrictive than in common and legal usage.

The primary definition of accident is "[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence." Black's Law Dictionary 15 (8th ed.2004). Under the manner of death classification system, the manner of death is by accident when the death results from such an injurious occurrence and no human agency other than the agency of the deceased is involved. Accidents thus fall into two subcategories: (1) occurrences involving no human agency; and (2) occurrences involving the unintentional agency of the deceased.

If the death is through human agency— whether intentional or by accident—of a person other than the deceased, it is classified a homicide. The fact that a death is placed in the homicide category does not indicate that the death was the product of an intentional act.⁴

Despite its well-established meaning, the term homicide certainly may be misunderstood as referring exclusively to deaths caused by a criminal act—namely, murder or manslaughter. See A...