LEWIS v. SUN TIME Corp. d/b/a Prime Time
Decision Date | 06 December 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 3D09-746.,3D09-746. |
Citation | 47 So.3d 872 |
Parties | Sandra LEWIS, Appellant, v. SUN TIME CORPORATION d/b/a Prime Time and Waldorf Towers, Ltd., Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Greenspoon Marder, Neal Hirschfield and Bradley A. Ross, Ft. Lauderdale; Steven M. Goldsmith, Boca Raton, for appellant.
Cozen O'Connor and Raquel M. Fernandez, Miami, for appellee Sun Time Corporation; Conroy Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow & Schefer and Hinda Klein, Hollywood, for appellee Waldorf Towers, Ltd.
Before COPE and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
On June 1, 2006, the plaintiff Sandra Lewis fell on a rain soaked outside flight of terrazzo steps while leaving a hotel-restaurant on Miami Beach. She sued the operators and now appeals from a jury verdict and judgment for the defendants. She raises what is essentially a single issue, the claim that the trial court erred in permitting evidence that there had been no prior falls since the building was constructed and opened as the Waldorf Hotel in 1937. While the issue is far from unsubstantial we are compelled to disagree.
[1] It is well recognized that a no-accident history of the location of a premises liability case may be admitted into evidence for a variety of purposes including the central one of showing that the area was not in fact dangerous or defective. See Springtree Props., Inc. v. Hammond, 692 So.2d 164, 165 (Fla.1997) ( ); Cent. Theatres v. Wilkinson, 154 Fla. 589, 18 So.2d 755 (1944) ( ); State, Dep't of Transp. v. Patterson, 594 So.2d 830, 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (); McAllister v. Robbins, 542 So.2d 470, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ( ); see also Doe v. U.S., 718 F.2d 1039, 1043 (11th Cir.1983) ( ); see generally Kenneth S. Broun, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 200 n. 34 (6th ed. 2009) 1 ; 23 Fla. Jur.2d Evidence and Witnesses § 186 (2010); 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 564 (2010).
We conclude that reversal is not justified by the challenged ruling because in the last analysis, we cannot find the trial court abused the discretion it is said to have:
(1) in the admission of evidence in general, see Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 852 n. 51 (Fla.2001); Fla. Inst. for Neurologic Rehab., Inc. v. Marshall, 943 So.2d 976, 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); LaMarr v. Lang 796 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001);
(2) more specifically, in the admission of testimony concerning the prior safety history of the site in question, that is, previous accidents or their absence, see Perret v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 299 So.2d 590, 594 (Fla.1974); Williams v. Madden 588 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Nance v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); see generally cases collected, Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Absence of Other Accidents or Injuries at Place Where Injury or Damage Occurred, 10 A.L.R. 5th 371 (1993);
[2] [3] (3) in the even narrower but determinative issue as to whether the similarities in the previous circumstances outweigh the dissimilarities, so as to permit the introduction of that testimony. See Lawrence v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 346 So.2d 1012, 1015 (Fla.1977) ( ); Friddle v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 306 So.2d 97 (Fla.1974); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Fulmer, 227 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla.1969); Hogan v. Gable, 30 So.3d 573, 575-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Warn Indus. v. Geist, 343 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); but cf. Godfrey v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 46 So.3d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Cooper v. State, 45 So.3d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ( ). As to this latter point, the record shows that while there were (as there had to be) variations in the circumstances surrounding the steps and their use, 2 their basic dimensions, configuration, and composition-and their dangerous character, or lack of it remained constant for the seventy plus years they were in use. 3 See Erickson, supra note 1. The significance of that stark fact was properly for the jury to consider. 4
Affirmed.
1Citing Zheutlin v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 149 Conn. 364, 179 A.2d 829 (1962) ( ); McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk, 282 Minn. 262, 164 N.W.2d 380, 382 (1969) ( ); Wollaston v. Burlington N., Inc., 188 Mont. 192, 612 P.2d 1277, 1282 (1980) ( ); Wozniak v. 110 South Main St. Land & Dev. Improvement Corp., 61 A.D.2d 848, 402 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (1978) ( ); Rathbun v. Humphrey Co., 94 Ohio App. 429, 113 N.E.2d 877 (1953) ( ); Baker v. Lane County, 37 Or.App. 87, 586 P.2d 114, 117-18 (1978) ( ). See also Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Marsan, 823 So.2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Williams v. Madden 588 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
McCormick highlights why the admissibility of non-accidents as well as actual accidents is only fair.
[I]t would seem perverse to tell a jury that one or two persons besides the plaintiff tripped on defendant's stairwell while withholding from them the further information that another thousand persons descended the same stairs without incident.
2The plaintiff argues,
the essential showing of substantially similar conditions would require some or all of the following facts: (1) it was raining and the stairs were wet; (2) the terrazzo on the stairs had been polished and the non-skid strips on the stairs had been removed and not replaced; (3) the hostess or manager was not in front of the stairs to warn people to be...
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