First Congregational Church of Cripple Creek v. Grand Rapids School-Furniture Co.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1900
• Citation: 60 P. 948,15 Colo.App. 46
• Parties: FIRST CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH OF CRIPPLE CREEK v. GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL-FURNITURE CO.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

60 P. 948

15 Colo.App. 46

FIRST CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH OF CRIPPLE CREEK v. GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL-FURNITURE CO.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

April 9, 1900

Appeal from El Paso county court.

Action by the Grand Rapids School-Furniture Company against the First Congregational Church of Cripple Creek upon a promissory note. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J.W. Horner, for appellant.

William H. Nash, for appellee.

BISSELL P.J.

The Grand Rapids School-Furniture Company of Michigan brought suit in the county court of El Paso county against the First Congregational Church of Cripple Creek, a Colorado corporation; and the cause of action stated was on a promissory note dated the 1st of July, 1895, whereby, six months after date, the church promised to pay to the order of the furniture company $488.32, at Cripple Creek, with exchange, for value received, with 8 per cent. interest. There was attached to the note, and made a part of it, a recital that the note was given for the purchase price of 267 chairs. It was further agreed that the title to the property should remain in the furniture company until the purchase price was paid, and in case of default the property might be taken back at the expense of the maker. The complaint stated a partial payment, alleged a balance due, its nonpayment, and demanded judgment. The church denied the corporate existence of the plaintiff, and, as affirmative defenses, set up what may be summarized in a statement that the title to the property did not pass, and that while it was in the possession of the church a fire occurred, and the chairs were burned up, and the plaintiff thereby rendered unable to deliver on performance. The plaintiff demurred to the defenses. The demurrer was sustained, judgment entered and therefrom this appeal was prosecuted.

The statement of the case virtually disposes of the appeal. The first proposition, respecting the denial of the incorporation, is easily disposed of. The abstract recites that the plaintiff made no proof of its corporate existence when it took judgment. This is answered first by the suggestion that the record itself does not support the contention, and we are not thereby advised that the plaintiff did not offer full proof. Whether this be or be not true, it is immaterial, since it is well settled in this state, as in all other jurisdictions, that it is not open to a person who has dealt with a corporation recognizing it as such, to deny the corporate existence. Plummer v. Mercantile Co., 23 Colo. 190, ...