Willis v. Stanley

• Decision Date: 09 November 1909
• Docket Number: Case Number: 230
• Parties: HARLEY & WILLIS v. STANLEY.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1909 OK 275

105 P. 188

25 Okla. 89

HARLEY & WILLIS v. STANLEY.

Case Number: 230

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: November 9, 1909

Syllabus

¶0 SALES--Conditional Sale--Loss of Property--Obligation to Pay. Where personal property is sold and delivered to the vendee under an agreement that title is to remain in the vendor until payment, the loss or destruction of the property while in the possession of the vendee before payment, without his fault, does not relieve him from the obligation to pay the price.

J. B. Wilkinson, for plaintiffs in error.--Citing: 6 A. & E. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 455, and cases cited; Savely v. Revinal, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 96; Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N. C. 47; Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48; Owensby v. Swan, 59 S.W. 378; Cole v. Hines, 81 Md. 476; First Cong. Church v. Furniture Co., 15 Colo. App. 46; Phillips v. Hollenberg Music Co., 82 Ark. 9; Marion Mfg. Co. v. Buchanan, 118 Tenn. 238.

Gilbert & Bond, for defendant in error.--Citing: Arthur v. Blackman (C. C.) 63 F. 536; Bishop v. Minderhout, 128 Ala. 162; Randle v. Stone, 77 Ga. 501; Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. 355; Cobb v. Tufts, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App., sec. 154; La Valley v. Ravenna, 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 684; Morris v. Cohn, 55 Ark. 401.

J. B. Wilkinson, for plaintiffs in error

Gilbert & Bond, for defendant in error

DUNN, J.

¶1 December 7, 1907, Harley & Willis, plaintiffs in error, as plaintiffs, filed their action in the county court of Stephens county, Okla., against Mrs. P. Stanley, to recover the price agreed to be paid by the defendant for certain furniture and other items sold and delivered by plaintiffs to the defendant. The answer was a general denial. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the bill of goods was sold by plaintiffs to defendant under an agreement that the title was to remain in plaintiffs until they were paid for. The defendant received the goods and placed them in her house, which, without her fault, were destroyed by fire, and the defense seems to be predicated upon the proposition that this destruction of the property purchased under such a contract relieved defendant of any obligation to pay for the same; that the loss fell on the vendors, and not on herself. The case was tried to a jury which on this evidence and the instructions of the court returned a verdict in favor of defendant, upon which the court rendered judgment, to reverse which the case has been brought to this court by petition in error and case-made.

¶2 There are a number of questions raised by the brief of counsel for plaintiffs in error, but they all revolve around the single legal proposition suggested above, and with its determination they will be rendered of no consequence. There is some conflict of authority on the question presented, but to our minds the great weight of authority supports the general rule laid down in 6 American & English Ency. of Law, p. 455, which is stated as follows:

"Where personal property is sold and delivered to the vendee under an agreement that title is to remain in the vendor until payment, the loss or destruction of the property while in the possession of the vendee before payment, without fault, does not relieve him from the obligation to pay the price."

¶3 This text finds support in a large number of authorities: La Valley v. Ravenna, 78 Vt. 152., 62 A. 47, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 97, 112 Am. St. Rep. 898, 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 684, with note; Osborn v. South Shore Lumber Company, 91 Wis. 526, 65 N.W. 184; Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 5 So. 627, 14 Am. St. Rep. 540; Planters' Bank of Tennessee v. Vandyck, 4 Heisk. 6171; American Soda Fountain Company v. Vaughn, 69 N.J.L. 582, 55 A. 54; Goldie & McCulloch Company v. Harper, 31 Ont. 284; Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N.C. 47, 12 S.E. 68, 10 L. R. A. 526, 22 Am. St. Rep. 863; Tufts v. Wynne & Thompson, 45 Mo. App. 42; Marion Mfg. Co. v. Buchanan et ux., 118 Tenn. 238, 99 S.W. 984, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590; Phillips v. Hollenberg Music Co., 82 Ark. 9, 99 S.W. 1105; Cole v. Hines, 81 Md. 476, 32 A. 196, 32 L. R. A. 455, and note; First Congregational Church v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Company, 15 Colo. App. 46, 60 P. 948.

¶4 The cases holding to the contrary are set forth in the note in the case of La Valley v. Ravenna, 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 684, and are as follows: Arthur v. Blackman (C. C.) 63 F. 536; Bishop v. Minderhout, 128 Ala. 162, 29 So. 11, 52 L. R. A. 395, 86 Am. St. Rep. 134; Randle v. Stone, 77 Ga. 501; Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mas. 355; Cobb v. Tufts, 2 Wilson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 154; Glisson v. Heggie, 105 Ga. 30, 31 S.E. 118; Mountain City Mill Co. v. Butler, 109 Ga. 469, 34 S.E. 565.

¶5 In the case of Burnley v. Tufts, supra, the defendant in error sold to the plaintiff in error a soda water fountain under practically the same terms as the goods in the case at bar were sold. Prior to complete payment it was destroyed by fire, and the vendee refused to make payment on the same grounds as are raised by the vendee in the case at bar. Discussing the case the Supreme Court of Mississippi said:

"Burnley unconditionally and absolutely promised to pay a certain sum for the property, the possession of which he received from Tufts. The fact that the property has been destroyed while in his custody and before the time for the payment of the note last due, on payment of which only his right to the legal title of the property would have accrued, does not relieve him of payment of the price agreed on. He got exactly what he contracted for, viz., the possession of the property and the right to acquire an absolute title

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