First Nat. Bank of Vicksburg v. Middleton

Decision Date27 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. 55828,55828
Citation480 So.2d 1153
PartiesFIRST NATIONAL BANK OF VICKSBURG, MS v. William T. MIDDLETON, Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., Individually, and Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., Admr. of Estate of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Robert R. Bailess, John C. Wheeless, Jr., William G. Beanland, Wheeless, Beanland, Shappley & Bailess, Vicksburg, for appellant.

John W. Prewitt, Sr., Prewitt & Courteau, Bobby D. Robinson, Vicksburg, for appellees.

Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ.

ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

The First National Bank of Vicksburg, Mississippi, (The Bank) appeals from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Warren County, dismissing the complaint of interpleader filed by the bank involving funds claimed, respectively, (1) by William T. Middleton and (2) by Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., individually, and Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr. The bank assigns two errors in the judgment of the lower court.

The Facts

Clabe K. Middleton, Sr. was eighty (80) years of age at the time of his death on July 15, 1983. He was a lifelong resident of Warren County, Mississippi, maintaining his residence at Yokena, Mississippi, during the last years of his life. He was survived by two sons, William T. Middleton, who had lived with his father until William's marriage in 1974, and Clabe K. Middleton, Jr. William T. Middleton enjoyed a close personal relationship with his father, visiting with him on an average of once each week and assisting him in various matters.

Clabe K. Middleton, Sr. had a certificate of deposit in the First National Bank (appellant) dated July 26, 1982, and with maturity date of January 24, 1983, in the sum of thirty-five thousand three hundred seventy-three dollars ninety-three cents ($35,373.93). According to the certificate of deposit, Clabe K. Middleton (Sr.) and William T. Middleton were joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common. On or after the maturity date of the certificate, William T. Middleton redeemed the certificate of deposit and the proceeds were placed in a joint account in the name of "Clabe K. Middleton, by William T. Middleton," and a signature card establishing the account was executed by William T. Middleton.

After the death of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr., his son, Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., qualified as administrator of his estate and made demand upon the bank to transfer the funds in the account designated "Clabe K. Middleton, Sr. by William T. Middleton" into the estate account, and, accordingly, the bank transferred the sum of thirty-one thousand four hundred fifteen dollars seventy-two cents ($31,415.72) into the account of "Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr., Deceased." Upon learning of the transfer of said funds, William T. Middleton made demand upon the bank for the funds in the account designated "Clabe K. Middleton, Sr., by William T. Middleton," which bore only the authorized signature of William T. Middleton. Attorneys representing William T. Middleton and his brother, Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., individually and as administrator, made respective demands upon the bank for the funds on behalf of their clients, and there was oral and written contact made between those attorneys and the bank's attorneys. As a result, the bank froze the funds in the Clabe K. Middleton, Sr. estate account, and, after a written demand from the attorney of William T. Middleton for the money, on September 16, 1983, the bank filed a complaint of interpleader on September 20, 1983, requesting the court to determine whether William T. Middleton or Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr., Deceased, was entitled to the funds and to discharge the bank from all liability in the matter.

William T. Middleton filed an answer and counterclaim to the complaint for interpleader wherein he stated that the bank erroneously transferred the funds from the account of "Clabe K. Middleton, Sr. by William T. Middleton" to the estate account and that he has consistently and persistently made demand upon the bank for said funds. He admitted the allegation of the complaint for interpleader that both he and Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., as administrator of the estate of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr., have made demand upon the bank for the said funds. He further asked for judgment against the First National Bank in the sum of $31,415.72 together with interest. William T. Middleton also filed a cross-claim against Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr., alleging that Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., on or about January 21, 1983, requested the First National Bank to close out the said accounts and move the proceeds of the funds into the estate account; that Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., then attempted to remove the funds from the estate account, but that the bank froze said account; and that he, William T. Middleton, is the owner of said funds and is entitled to same.

Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Clabe K. Middleton, Sr., answered the complaint for interpleader and alleged that the bank arbitrarily froze the funds which had been transferred to the estate account when the bank knew that William T. Middleton was not making any claim to said funds, but, to the contrary, William T. Middleton had advised officers of the bank that he desired the funds continued in the estate; and that the bank had exercised willful, wanton, and arbitrary bad faith in freezing the funds, causing harm and damage to Clabe K. Middleton, Jr., individually, and as administrator of his father's estate. He then filed a counterclaim against the bank asking damages in the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000).

The Law

The bank has assigned the following errors in the judgment of the lower court, which questions will be addressed as one:

(1) The lower court erred in holding that Rule 22 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure extended the jurisdiction of the chancery court in this case beyond its constitutional limits.

(2) The lower court erred in dismissing the interpleader based upon allegations that the stakeholder had independent liability.

The chancery court is a court of limited jurisdiction, as provided by Section 159, Miss. Const.1890. This includes all matters in equity and interpleader actions have historically been considered equitable matters within the chancery court's jurisdiction. Historically, equitable interpleader has four requirements:

1. The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties against whom the relief is demanded;

2. All their adverse titles or claims must be dependent on or be derived from a common source;

3. The person asking the relief--the plaintiff--must not have or claim any interest in the subject matter;

4. He must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants; that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them in the position of a stakeholder.

Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, Sec. 23 (2d ed. 1950).

We are of the opinion that Rule 22 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted by this Court on May 26, 1981, terminated the historical requirements for interpleader in the chancery courts. We are of the opinion that Rule 22 does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the chancery courts, that it is procedural, and its purpose is to broaden and extend the scope of the remedy in the chancery court.

In 48 C.J.S. Interpleader Sec. 5, at 125-126 (1981), the principle is stated as follows:

Some statutes or rules expressly provide for interpleader....

Unless the statute clearly provides otherwise, it does not supersede the ordinary equitable remedy. In fact, the remedy for interpleader provided for by statutes or rules is in addition to and in no way limits, the remedy of equitable interpleader. The statute is purely procedural, and does not destroy, or change the nature of, equitable interpleader; it merely broadens or extends the scope of the remedy.

* * *

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11 cases
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    ...that the four classic requirements for interpleader were abolished by modern interpleader practice); First Nat. Bank of Vicksburg v. Middleton, 480 So.2d 1153, 1156-57 (Miss.1985) (citing federal cases interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority, the court held that its interplead......
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    ...The interpleader action here brought by Nationwide is an action commonly tried in the chancery court. First National Bank of Vicksburg v. Middleton, 480 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Miss.1985). In Middleton, this Court held that where a chancery court has properly taken jurisdiction on any one ground ......
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    ...Supreme Court "has looked to the comparable federal rule for guidance" in interpreting Rule 22. First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v. Middleton , 480 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Miss. 1985).9 A determination of rights in an interpleader action may be made through summary judgment if there are no genuine ......
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