First Nat. Bank of Miami v. Dade-broward Co.

• Citation: 171 So. 510,125 Fla. 594
• Parties: FIRST NAT. BANK OF MIAMI et al. v. DADE-BROWARD CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 10 June 1936
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

171 So. 510

125 Fla. 594

FIRST NAT. BANK OF MIAMI et al. v. DADE-BROWARD CO. et al.

Florida Supreme Court

June 10, 1936

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1937.

Suit in equity by the Dade-Broward Company and another against the First National Bank of Miami and others. From an order denying a motion to dismiss and to strike certain portions of bill and interrogatories, defendants appeal.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Uly O Thompson, judge.

COUNSEL

Crate D. Bowen, John P. Stokes, M. L. Mershon, Herbert S. Sawyer Shutts & Bowen, Loftin, Stokes & Calkins, and Evans, Mershon & Sawyer, all of Miami, for appellants.

James M. Carson and Charles A. Morehead, both of Miami, for appellees.

OPINION

DAVIS Justice.

This was a suit in equity for discovery in aid of actions at law. A motion to strike certain portions of the bill of complaint and a motion to dismiss the bill, and certain interrogatories therein contained, was interposed. This case is now before this court on appeal from an order denying the motion to dismiss and denying, in the main, the action to strike certain portions of the bill and interrogatories.

The sole question presented here is whether or not the interlocutory order appealed from was a proper order on the motions directed to the bill of complaint, or in short whether or not the bill for discovery filed is a good bill and the interrogatories therein contained such as ought in equity to be propounded and answered by the appellants.

After averring the specific facts of the controversy between the parties, it is then averred that the facts and contents of certain documents in defendant's possession, as to which discovery was prayed, are not within complainant's knowledge and that complainant has no other means of ascertaining and proving same other than by discovery pursuant to the prayer of complainant's bill; that all of the facts, including the facts alleged to be unknown to each of the defendants, can be proved by a proper discovery; and that said facts and documents which are referred to with reasonable certainty in the bill are so material to complainant's action at law that complainant cannot safely proceed to try the said actions at law without the discovery sought from each of the defendants.

The prayer of the bill is in substance that defendants, the First National Bank, E. C. Romfh, T. F. McAuliffe, and Victor J Sharman may, upon their several and respective corporate oaths, full, true, direct, and perfect answer make, and may discover and set forth replies to eleven specified and numbered interrogatories concerning the subject-matter of the controversy and that defendants may set forth a list or schedule of all of the particularly mentioned letters, contracts, instructions, evidence, and writings of whatsoever nature of character, and may leave the same in the hands of a master for the inspection of complainant, and that until such discovery is complied with, that defendants be restrained by the order of the court from further proceedings in the pending actions at law.

The bill in controversy is a pure bill for discovery.

Such a bill lies to obtain the disclosure of facts within the defendant's knowledge, or deeds or writings or other things in his custody, in aid of the prosecution or defense of an action pending or about to be commenced in some other court. The fact that there are legislative acts separately authorizing a discovery at law or in equity in other ways than by a bill in equity in the form of a pure bill for discovery is immaterial. Pure bills for discovery have so long been an acknowledged subject of equity jurisdiction that statutes purporting to give other and simpler means of obtaining that identical relief are not regarded as ousting the equity jurisdiction, at least in the absence of some clear legislative declaration to that effect. See McCarthy's 1931 Chancery Act annotated, pp. 102-110, inclusive, and cases cited.

The allegations of the bill now under consideration sufficiently show the matters concerning which the discovery asked for is sought, the interests of the several parties in the subject of the inquiry, the complainant's right to have the relief prayed, its title and interest, and what the relationship of same is to the discovery claimed, and that the discovery so attempted to be had is material to the complainant's rights that have been duly brought into litigation on the common-law side of the court under...