First Nat. Bank of Gainesville v. Loggins, A92A1942
| Decision Date | 03 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A1942,A92A1942 |
| Citation | 429 S.E.2d 278,207 Ga.App. 814 |
| Parties | FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GAINESVILLE v. LOGGINS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Stewart, Melvin & House, J. Douglas Stewart, Gainesville, for appellant.
Robert E. Andrews, Gainesville, for appellee.
The appellee, Sandra G. Loggins, brought an action against Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company ("Nationwide"), for an unjustified refusal to pay her claim for fire loss and against First National Bank of Gainesville, Georgia ("the bank"), for wrongful foreclosure, wrongful seizure and application of funds maintained in her checking account with the bank, fraud and violation of the state's banking regulations. Both Nationwide and the bank responded. Nationwide subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the appellee's claim against the company was time barred based upon a statute of limitation contained within the insurance policy. The bank also moved for summary judgment, maintaining that the appellee was in default on the loan; therefore, their foreclosure on the property was proper and the foreclosure proceeding was not in violation of any banking regulations. The trial judge denied both motions. Nationwide has not sought an appeal of the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. We granted the bank's application for interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment.
The record shows that on October 16, 1987, the appellee and her then husband, Don Loggins, obtained a $55,000 construction loan from the bank and signed a single-payment note for repayment as well as a deed to secure the debt in favor of the bank. On December 22, 1987, the appellee and her husband increased the loan amount to $60,000. The initial due date on the loan was March 22, 1988. However, the loan was subsequently renewed on March 15, 1988, and October 10, 1988, by the appellee and her husband executing new notes, with the last note being due and payable on April 10, 1989. The house was completed in December 1988. In February 1989, as a result of their divorce, the appellee's husband quitclaimed his interest in the property to the appellee, although the deed was not filed until August 16, 1989. On May 1, 1989, the due date on the note was extended by the bank to August 30, 1989, based upon a telephone request of the appellee to William Glosson (Glosson), the assistant vice president of the bank.
The appellee's home was damaged by fire on August 30, 1989, and the appellee did not pay the principal and interest on the loan by its due date of August 30, 1989. According to Glosson's affidavit, the note went into default on August 31, 1989. Glosson maintains that the appellee was mailed foreclosure notices and a copy of the advertisement of the sale that was published in the local newspaper. He admits that after the account went into default, pursuant to the terms of the checking agreement, the bank offset funds from the appellee's checking account and applied the money to the interest balance on the loan on the property as well as another loan that the appellee had with the bank that was in default. The bank purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for $30,000, and whether the property was appraised by the bank before the sale is in dispute. On January 19, 1990, the bank received payment of $54,664.73 from Nationwide and applied it to the appellee's indebtedness, which created an overage, the amount of which is also in dispute.
In her deposition of January 22, 1991, the appellee testified that she did not become aware of any foreclosure proceedings until she received a telephone call from her mother who saw the foreclosure notice in the newspaper. After the fire, she moved to a motel and subsequently moved in with her present husband. In both her affidavit and deposition testimony, the appellee maintains that during her conversations with Glosson after the fire, she was informed that her property would not be foreclosed upon and she should not worry. He further told her that the insurance proceeds would settle all matters of indebtedness and if she had her attorney talk with him and show him that a claim had been filed with Nationwide, he would stop the foreclosure proceeding. She subsequently informed her attorney of her conversation with Glosson.
In Glosson's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Smith v. Suntrust Bank
...Court nor the trial court is authorized to assess the credibility of the various witnesses. See First Natl. Bank of Gainesville v. Loggins, 207 Ga.App. 814, 816–817, 429 S.E.2d 278 (1993). 4. The father of Appellant Beneficiaries Don Smith, Roy Smith, Jr., and Christie Romano died in 1985. ......
-
World Ins. Co. v. Blalock, A92A1894
... ... Blalock, Jr., Gainesville, for appellee ... [207 Ga.App ... Leader Nat. Ins. Co., 167 Ga.App. 800, 307 S.E.2d 698 ... ...
-
Smith v. SunTrust Bank
...Court nor the trial court is authorized to assess the credibility of the various witnesses. See First Natl. Bank of Gainesville v. Loggins, 207 Ga. App. 814, 816-817 (429 SE2d 278) (1993). 4. The father of Appellant Beneficiaries Don Smith, Roy Smith, Jr., and Christie Romano died in 1985. ......
-
Shell v. Tidewater Fin. Co.
...cannot discount affidavit because it is self-serving). 6. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) First Nat. Bank of Gainesville v. Loggins, 207 Ga.App. 814, 816–817, 429 S.E.2d 278 (1993). 7. See Brack Rowe Chevrolet Co. v. Walls, 201 Ga.App. 822, 824(2), 412 S.E.2d 603 (1991) (directed verdi......