First National Bank of Corning v. Dowdy
| Decision Date | 11 December 1913 |
| Citation | 161 S.W. 859,175 Mo.App. 478 |
| Parties | FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CORNING, ARKANSAS, Respondent, v. S. M. DOWDY, Administrator of the Estate of T. W. DOWDY, Deceased, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Butler County Circuit Court.--Hon. J. P. Foard, Judge.
REVERSED.
Judgment reversed.
Phillips Lentz and Phillips for appellant.
Granting that the judgment was a valid one and that the circuit court of Clay county had the power to appoint a special administrator, and that a judgment against the said special administrator would be valid in the State of Arkansas, still the judgment must be considered as a judgment against an administrator of the estate of T. W. Dowdy, in the State of Arkansas. A judgment recovered against the administrator of a deceased person, in one State is no evidence of debt in a subsequent suit by the same plaintiff in another State against an administrator, whether the same or a different person appointed there, or against or in favor of the person having assets of the deceased. Story on Conflict of Laws sec. 522; Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. 159; Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. (U.S.) 19; Stacey v. Thrasher, 6 How. (U.S.) 57-62; McLean v. Meek, 18 How. 16; Low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259; Greer v. Ferguson, 19 S.W. 968; Elting v. Bank, 50 N.E. 1102-3; Rosenthal v. Rennick, 44 Ill. 207; McGarvey v. Darnell, 134 Ill. 367, 25 N.E. 1005; Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 213; Railroad v. Dooley, 32 Ill.App. 228; Burton v. Williams, 88 N.W. 766; Flandrow v. Hammond, 43 N.Y.S. 143; Rentchler v. Jamison, 6 Mo.App. ___
F. G. Taylor and David W. Hill for respondent.
(1) Our Supreme Court in construing Sec. I, art. 4 of the Federal Constitution places a judgment of a court of a sister State upon the same footing as a judgment of a like court in our own State, and it is not open to collateral attack. Tootle v. Buckingham, 190 Mo. 195; Barney v. White, 46 Mo. 137; Vennum v. Mertens, 119 Mo.App. 464. (2) Our courts will give the same faith and credit to a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in a sister State as it would to a judgment rendered in our own State, and it is only necessary to file in the probate court, a copy of the judgment, uncertified and unauthenticated, and the fact whether it is a copy or not may be proven by an authenticated copy of the judgment or by parol evidence, and the judgment in the case at bar was proven both ways. Etz v. Wheeler, 23 Mo.App. 449. (3) It is argued by counsel for appellant that respondent should have filed in the probate court the promissory note, and have it allowed and classified. Such proceeding is utterly impossible for the reason that the original cause of action, to-wit, the promissory note, merged in the judgment of the Clay County Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction, and that cause of action is extinguished, and the only cause of action that the respondent had after the rendition of that judgment, is the judgment itself. Wernse v. McPike, Admr., 100 Mo. 488.
On April 4, 1910, T. W. Dowdy, a resident and citizen of Butler county, Missouri, executed a note to the plaintiff in the State of Arkansas for the sum of twelve hundred dollars, due June 15, 1910, and on March 10, 1911, the plaintiff instituted a suit and attachment proceedings in the circuit court of Clay county, Arkansas, against the said Dowdy. On October 2, 1911, the said Dowdy appeared and filed his answer therein. On January 26, 1912, the death of Dowdy was suggested and the action revived in the name of a special administrator ad litem, who refused to act; and thereafter, on April 9, 1912, the action was revived in the name of J. N. Moore as special administrator, who adopted the answer theretofore filed in the case as his answer. On April 11, 1912, the cause was prosecuted to judgment against the special administrator in the sum of $ 1072.71, with interest at the rate of ten per cent from said date. On August 17, 1912, a copy of the judgment was filed in the probate court of Butler county, in this State, for allowance against the estate of said Dowdy and his administrator, the defendant herein, duly notified. The amount of the judgment was allowed by the said probate court as a claim against the said estate and the administrator appealed to the circuit court, where, upon a trial anew, the administrator met with the same fate and has appealed to this court.
The alleged statutory law of the State of Arkansas, by virtue of which the special administrator was appointed, reads as follows: "In all cases where suits may be instituted and either plaintiff or defendant may die pending the same, it shall be lawful for the court before which such suit or suits may be pending, on a motion of any party interested, to appoint a special administrator, in whose name the cause shall be revived, and said suit or suits shall progress in all respects in his name with like effect as if the plaintiff or defendant (as the case may be) had remained in full life." It further reads: "The powers of such administrator shall extend and be confined alone to the mere prosecution or defense of the particular suit or suits he may be appointed by the court to prosecute or defend." Another section reads:
The rule is that, " A judgment against an ancillary administrator furnishes no cause of...
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