Fischer v. Fed. Express Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 December 2020
• Docket Number: Civil No. 5:19-cv-04924-JMG
• Citation: 509 F.Supp.3d 275
• Parties: Christa B. FISCHER, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

509 F.Supp.3d 275

Christa B. FISCHER, Plaintiff,

v.FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 5:19-cv-04924-JMG

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed December 23, 2020

Benjamin L. Davis, III, George E. Swegman, Kelly Anne Burgy, Law Offices of Peter T. Nicholl, Baltimore, MD, Scott M. Pollins, Pollins Law Firm, Wayne, PA, for Plaintiff.

Brandon D. Pettes, Frederick L. Douglas, Barak J. Babcock, Federal Express Corp., Memphis, TN, for Defendant Federal Express Corporation.

Benjamin J. Ferron, Fedex Ground Package Sys., Moon Twp, PA, Barak J. Babcock, Frederick L. Douglas, Federal Express Corporation Legal - Employment Litigation, Memphis, TN, for Defendant Fedex Ground Package Systtem, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GALLAGHER, United States District Court Judge

I. OVERVIEW

For the better part of the last decade, Christa Fischer and Andre Saunders worked as security specialists at their respective FedEx Ground facility assignments in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Although they are employed by FedEx Express, security specialists provide various loss-prevention and site monitoring services at FedEx Ground locations pursuant to a Professional Services Agreement. Ms. Fischer and Mr. Saunders allege that, during their time as security specialists, they regularly worked more than 40 hours a week. However, because FedEx Express classified them as salaried employees who were exempt from overtime pay requirements, they were not paid for those extra hours worked. As a result, Ms. Fischer and Mr. Saunders brought suit alleging that, by misclassifying security specialists as exempt employees, FedEx Express failed to pay them proper overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification and Court-Authorized Notice. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employees alleging a breach of the Act's provisions by their employer may bring suit on behalf of themselves and any other similarly situated employees. This "collective action" mechanism enables plaintiffs to vindicate their rights under the Act at lower cost to each individual and promotes judicial economy by consolidating each employee's claim into a single proceeding. Ms. Fischer and Mr. Saunders seek conditional certification of a nationwide collective comprised of all security specialists employed by FedEx Express and FedEx Ground who were improperly classified as overtime exempt. However, district courts disagree as to whether the Supreme Court's holding in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty.¹ precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over opt-in plaintiffs alleging violations that occurred outside of the state. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant conditional certification of Plaintiffs’ proposed collective, but will limit its scope to security specialists who worked for FedEx Express in Pennsylvania. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted in part.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

a. Allegations

Defendants Federal Express Corporation (FedEx Express) and FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc. (FedEx Ground) operate in the package delivery industry nationwide. FedEx Express is a federally certified air carrier that operates airline hubs throughout the United States. Defs.’ Resp. 2, ECF No. 30. FedEx Ground is a separate business entity which is a federally registered motor carrier engaged in business and residential ground package pickup and delivery services. Id. FedEx Express provides security services under a Professional Services Agreement to its parent company, FedEx Corporation, as well as several subsidiaries including FedEx Ground. Id. Pursuant to the agreement, FedEx Ground pays a contractor's fee for the security services provided by security specialists. Id.

FedEx Express hired Plaintiff Christa Fischer as a part-time Courier on August 22, 2007 and promoted her to the position of Security Specialist III on November 16, 2009. Answer ¶ 26, ECF No. 27. Ms. Fischer was later promoted to Senior Security Specialist in 2011, a position she held until July 2019. Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1; Answer ¶ 34. FedEx Express hired Plaintiff Andre Saunders in 2011 as a Security Specialist I and promoted him to Senior Security Specialist in 2013. Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2 ¶ 5-6. According to Plaintiffs, the primary duties of security specialists are observing and reporting on the security processes at their assigned locations, in addition to investigating possible instances of theft, pilfering, vandalism, and other similar occurrences. Pls.’ Mot. 3.

During the relevant period, Ms. Fischer and Mr. Saunders were "dedicated" FedEx Ground security specialists. Defs.’ Resp., Attach. 2 ¶ 5. As a result, they were assigned to and responsible for only FedEx Ground facilities. Id. Not all security specialists are FedEx Ground dedicated, since some may be responsible for FedEx Express facilities as well. Defs.’ Resp., Attach. 2 ¶ 6. In her final thirteen months of employment, Ms. Fischer was assigned to two FedEx Ground locations in Pennsylvania, one in Lewisberry and the other in Williamsport. Id. at ¶ 6. From 2013 to 2019, Mr. Saunders was assigned to three FedEx Ground locations in Maryland, one in Dundalk and two in Beltsville. Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2 ¶ 6.

Plaintiffs allege that they were regularly required to work more than 40 hours a week due to understaffing and the workload requirements of their jobs. Pls.’ Mot. 3. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that their "on-call" duties required them to work evenings and weekends outside of their regular work schedules. Id. Because they were classified as salaried employees exempt from FLSA overtime pay requirements, Plaintiffs claim that they were never compensated for their overtime work. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs assert that by misclassifying security specialists as exempt employees, Defendants evaded paying proper overtime wages to Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id.

Defendants counter that, as exempt employees, security specialists may work outside of normal business hours without being entitled to overtime compensation. Defs.’ Resp. 4. However, Defendants argue, security specialists do not have a defined 40-hour workweek, nor are they required to work evenings or weekends. Id. Defendants claim that specialists set their own schedules and make individual determinations concerning the focus of their security efforts. Id. They likewise assert that FedEx Express has no on-call policy. Id. at 4-5. Finally, Defendants maintain that they do not have a policy of understaffing specialists. Id.

b. Procedural History

Ms. Fischer filed her Complaint in this action on October 22, 2019 (ECF No. 1).² On December 21, 2019, Mr. Saunders filed a notice of consent to become a party plaintiff (ECF No. 12). Ms. Fischer filed a Motion for Conditional Certification on May 15, 2020 (ECF No. 24). Defendants’ filed their Response in Opposition on July 1, 2020 (ECF No. 30). Plaintiffs filed a Reply to Defendants’ Response on July 21, 2020 (ECF No. 34) and Defendants filed a Sur-Reply in Opposition on July 29, 2020 (ECF No. 38). Following a status conference on October 22, 2020, the Court ordered the Parties to file supplemental briefs providing additional arguments concerning conditional certification, jurisdictional limitations that may apply thereto, and the possible joint employer relationship between Defendants (ECF No. 46). The Parties each filed their supplemental briefs on November 20, 2020 (ECF Nos. 48, 49).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) "establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract." Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U.S. 66, 69, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013). Under the FLSA's collective action mechanism, an employee alleging that their employer violated these provisions may bring an action "on behalf of himself ... and other employees similarly situated" provided that "[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This means that a collective action relies on the participation of opt-in plaintiffs who must affirmatively join the action by filing written notice with the court. Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc. , 842 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2016). Collective actions enable plaintiffs to vindicate their rights under the FLSA at lower cost to each individual and promote judicial economy by resolving common issues arising from the same activity in the same proceeding. Id. at 223.

The Third Circuit has adopted a two-step process in certifying collective actions. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC , 849 F.3d 61, 85 (3d Cir. 2017) ; Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc. , 691 F.3d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 2012). During the first stage, known as conditional certification, the court "makes a preliminary determination whether the employees enumerated in the complaint can be provisionally categorized as similarly situated to the named plaintiff." Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp. , 656 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, plaintiffs need only make a "modest factual showing" that the putative class members are similarly situated. Karlo , 849 F.3d at 85 (quoting Halle , 842 F.3d at 223 ). This requires evidence "beyond pure speculation" demonstrating a factual nexus between the manner in which an employer's policy affected the named plaintiff and other members of the collective. Symczyk , 656 F.3d at 193 (citing Smith v. Sovereign Bancorp, Inc. , No. 03-2420, 2003 WL 22701017, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2003) ). This is a lenient standard given the minimal evidence available at the early stages of litigation. Viscomi v. Diner , No. 13-4720, 2016 WL 1255713, at *3 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 2016).

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