Fish v. Ramler Trucking, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 November 2019
• Docket Number: A18-0143
• Citation: 935 N.W.2d 738
• Parties: Frederick S. FISH, Respondent, v. RAMLER TRUCKING, INC., Appellant, and Wells Concrete Products Company and Albany Manufacturing, Inc., Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

935 N.W.2d 738

Frederick S. FISH, Respondent,

v.RAMLER TRUCKING, INC., Appellant,andWells Concrete Products Company and Albany Manufacturing, Inc., Third-Party Defendants.

A18-0143

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: November 27, 2019

Scott Wilson, Scott Wilson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Michel Steven Krug, Krug & Zupke, P.C., Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Teri E. Bentson, Law Offices of Thomas P. Stilp, Golden Valley, Minnesota, for appellant.

Daniel J. Cragg, Eckland & Blando LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.

Lance D. Meyer, Dale O. Thornsjo, O’Meara, Leer, Wagner & Kohl, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

In a line of decisions going back almost sixty years, we have held that an employer liable to an injured employee under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and a third party liable in tort to that same employee, do not have common liability, whether joint or several. In this case, we consider whether the 2003 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 1 (2018), overturned that line of decisions and thereby made an employer and a third-party tortfeasor "severally liable" for a workplace injury. If so, a third-party tortfeasor’s liability to the injured employee would be reduced by the employer’s fault. We conclude that, by the plain words of section 604.02, a tortfeasor’s liability to an injured employee is not reduced by the employer’s fault. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTS

This case arises out of an employee’s workplace injury. Respondent Frederick Fish was an employee of Albany Manufacturing, Inc. and Wells Concrete Product Company (collectively, Fish’s employer). On December 17, 2012, Fish was working on a semi-trailer platform, helping to load an oversized concrete beam. In response to hand directions from Fish’s coworkers, the truck driver began to move the truck and trailer forward. Fish jumped off the moving trailer platform and was injured. The truck driver was an employee of appellant Ramler Trucking, Inc.

Fish and his employer settled Fish’s workers’ compensation claim. Fish then brought a common-law negligence claim against Ramler, which in turn brought a third-party contribution claim against Fish’s employer. Ramler and the employer settled the contribution claim and the employer’s possible subrogation claim.

Fish’s lawsuit against Ramler proceeded to trial. Having settled with both Fish and Ramler, Fish’s employer did not participate in the trial. The special verdict form directed the jury to allocate fault among all persons involved, including the non-party employer. The jury found that the injury was caused by Fish, his employer, and Ramler, and allocated fault as follows: 5 percent to Fish; 75 percent to the employer; and 20 percent to Ramler.

Post-trial, Ramler, citing Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, argued that its liability to Fish should be proportionate to its 20 percent fault. In other words, Ramler’s tort liability would be reduced, not just by Fish’s 5 percent fault, but also by the employer’s 75 percent fault.

Fish countered that, by its plain language, section 604.02 did not apply because Ramler and Fish’s employer were not both "severally liable." Employers, Fish argued, are shielded from tort liability by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Absent two or more severally liable parties, Fish contended, Ramler is liable to Fish for the full damage award, reduced only by Fish’s 5 percent contributory fault and any damages duplicative of workers’ compensation benefits awarded to Fish.

The district court agreed with Ramler and applied section 604.02 to reduce the net damage award by an amount proportionate to the employer’s fault. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that it was error to apply section 604.02 in these circumstances, and remanded to the district court for recalculation of the judgment. Fish v. Ramler Trucking, Inc. , 923 N.W.2d 337, 342–44 (Minn. App. 2019). We granted Ramler’s petition for review.

ANALYSIS

Whether section 604.02, subdivision 1, applies to limit Ramler’s liability to Fish is a question of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Bruton v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. , 923 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Minn. 2019). "The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). If the intent is clear, we apply the statute according to its plain meaning. State v. Rick , 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013).

Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 1, governs damage apportionment in civil negligence actions. As amended in 2003, section 604.02 reads in relevant part:

Subdivision 1. Joint liability. When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award:

(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent;

(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan that results in injury;

(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or

(4) a person whose liability arises under [a variety of environmental and public health laws].

Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1.

Ramler argues that section 604.02, subdivision 1, limits a third party’s liability to an amount proportionate to its fault when (a) a third party and an employer are both at fault for a workplace injury, and (b) the third party’s fault is not greater than 50 percent. Fish disagrees and argues that, because an employer and a third-party tortfeasor are not severally liable persons, section 604.02, subdivision 1, is not triggered and Ramler’s liability is not limited to the 20 percent fault assigned to Ramler by the jury.

The direction in section 604.02, subdivision 1 to apportion liability according to fault is triggered only when "two or more persons are severally liable." Several liability is "liability that is separate and distinct from another’s liability," so that a severally liable person is responsible only for his or her equitable share of damages. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud , 813 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Several Liability , Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). To determine whether an employer and a third party are severally liable for an injury and section 604.02 is triggered thereby, a short review of our case law and relevant statutes at the intersection of the workers’ compensation and tort systems is necessary.

At common law, when two or more negligent persons caused an injury, the persons were "jointly and severally liable."

Maday v. Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis , 311 N.W.2d 849, 850 (Minn. 1981) ("It has always been the [common-law rule] of this state that parties whose negligence concurs to cause injury are jointly and severally liable although not acting in concert."). When two or more persons were jointly and severally liable, "a plaintiff [could] bring an action to hold any or all of the jointly and severally liable tortfeasors liable for the entire harm." Staab , 813 N.W.2d at 74. It made no difference whether the injury arose inside or outside the workplace. See, e.g. , Pelowski v. J.R. Watkins Med. Co. , 120 Minn. 108, 139 N.W. 289, 292 (1912) ("[I]f the negligence of both [the employer] and the stonesetters concurred as the proximate cause of [the employee’s] death, a recovery could be had."); Coleman v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. , 113 Minn. 364, 129 N.W. 762, 763 (1911) (holding that where an employee was injured by the concurrent negligence of his employer and a third party, he was entitled to recover damages against both defendants).

That changed with the passage of the Workers’ Compensation Act in 1913. The Act established a statutory alternative to common-law tort liability for workplace injuries, elective at the option of employers and their employees. In 1937, the Act was amended to make statutory liability mandatory and exclusive, thereby immunizing employers from common-law tort liability. Minnesota Statutes section 176.04 (1941)—now codified at Minnesota Statutes section 176.031 (2018)—provided that an employer’s liability under the Act was "exclusive and in the place of any other liability." This exclusivity provision meant that an employee injured in the workplace could not bring a common-law negligence action against an employer, and the employee’s recovery against the employer was limited to workers’ compensation benefits regardless of fault. The exclusivity did not, however, alter an employee’s ability to bring a common-law negligence action against a third-party tortfeasor.

The establishment of two separate remedies for workplace injury—workers’ compensation and tort—raised the question of the relationship between these systems. The Workers’ Compensation Act provided that an employer could recover in subrogation from the tortfeasor. See Minn. Gen. Stat. § 8229 (1913). But the Act was silent on whether a tortfeasor could recover in contribution from an employer.

In answering that question through several cases, we identified the precise nature of the legal relationship between an employer and a third-party tortfeasor. Our leading case was Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co. , 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), overruled in part on other grounds by Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc. , 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). In Hendrickson , a third-party tortfeasor sued by an employee for a workplace injury sought contribution from an at-fault employer. We held that contribution was not available. 104 N.W.2d at 849.

In denying contribution to the third party, we discussed the black-letter common law of tort liability. We noted that contribution requires "common liability," which exists when two or more tortfeasors jointly or concurrently cause the injury. Id. at 847, 849.¹...