Fisher v. Ahmed

Decision Date31 March 2020
Docket NumberNo. 29340,29340
Citation2020 Ohio 1196,153 N.E.3d 612
Parties Holly Trivett FISHER, et al., Appellants v. Kassim AHMED, et al., Appellees
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

WARNER MENDENDALL and LOGAN TROMBLEY, Akron, Attorneys at Law, for Appellants.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JAQUENETTE S. CORGAN and MARVIN EVANS, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Appellee.

JUSTIN S. GREENFELDER, JUDE B. STREB, Canton, and PETER T. CAHOON, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

SCHAFER, Judge.

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Holly Trivett Fisher, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion of Defendant-Appellee, Summit County, for judgment on the pleadings and granting the motion of Defendant-Appellee, Kassim Ahmed, to dismiss for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, this Court reverses the judgment as to the two counts of defamation only.

I.

{¶2} Fisher and her husband filed a complaint against Ahmed and the Summit County Prosecutor's Office on July 10, 2018. The original complaint asserted causes of action for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. Ahmed and the Prosecutor's Office each filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

{¶3} The Fishers filed an amended complaint on September 21, 2018. In the amended complaint they named as defendants Ahmed and Summit County and dropped the Prosecutor's Office as a defendant. The amended complaint asserted two counts of defamation per se, and one count each of intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and civil liability for violation of R.C. 2917.32. Ahmed filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The County filed an answer to the amended complaint and then moved, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), for judgment on the pleadings. Fisher filed an omnibus response to the motions. Ahmed and the County each filed a reply in support of their respective motions.

{¶4} The trial court issued its judgment entry on February 20, 2019. The trial court granted the County's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all counts asserted in the amended complaint and entered judgment in favor of the County. The trial court also granted Ahmed's motion and dismissed all claims asserted against Ahmed.

{¶5} Fisher timely appealed the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the County and dismissal of her claims against Ahmed as to the two counts of defamation only. Fisher has not appealed the trial court's entry of judgment and dismissal of her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or civil liability for violation of R.C. 2917.32. Fisher's husband has not appealed the entry of judgment and dismissal of his loss of consortium claim. Fisher raises four assignments of error for our review.

II.

{¶6} On appeal, Fisher presents four assignments of error contesting the trial court's decision dismissing the claims for defamation as to Ahmed and entering judgment on the defamation claims in favor of the County. Fisher argues that the trial court failed to properly and appropriately apply the standard for ruling on the motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings. Fisher contends that the trial court construed facts alleged in the complaint in the movant's favor, ignored facts alleged in the complaint, and asserts that the decision contained errors of law, and fact.

{¶7} Preliminarily, we will discuss topics germane to each of the assignments of error. Ahmed's and the County's motions presented similar and overlapping arguments, and the trial court did not distinguish between the motions as to the basis for its decision. Accordingly, we will address the applicable standards of review for a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings and a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss

{¶8} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint, and dismissal is appropriate where the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Regarding sufficiency, notice pleading only requires that the complaint "shall contain * * * a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief[.]" Civ.R. 8(A). However, "the complaint must still set forth operative facts to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature of the action.’ " Vagas v. City of Hudson , 9th Dist. Summit No. 24713, 2009-Ohio-6794, 2009 WL 4981219, ¶ 10, quoting Mogus v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. , 9th Dist. Wayne Nos. 03CA0074, 2004-Ohio-5177, 2004 WL 2244247, ¶ 15. " ‘[A] complaint must be more than ‘bare assertions of legal conclusions.’ " Id. quoting Copeland v. Summit Cty. Probate Court , 9th Dist. Summit No. 24648, 2009-Ohio-4860, ¶ 10.

{¶9} When construing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the court must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. , 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). Before the court may dismiss the complaint, it must appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to recovery. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc. , 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus. When considering a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the court cannot rely on evidence or allegations outside of the complaint. State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander , 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 680 N.E.2d 985 (1997). However, "[m]aterial incorporated in a complaint may be considered part of the complaint for purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss." State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health , 77 Ohio St.3d 247, fn. 1, 673 N.E.2d 1281 (1997).

{¶10} This Court reviews an order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. City of Rossford , 103 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. "A de novo review requires an independent review of the trial court's decision without any deference to the trial court's determination." State v. Consilio , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22761, 2006-Ohio-649, 2006 WL 335646, ¶ 4.

Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings

{¶11} Civ.R. 12(C) provides that, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) is properly characterized as a belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; therefore, the same standard applies to both motions. Business Data Sys., Inc. v. Figetakis , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22783, 2006-Ohio-1036, 2006 WL 551547, ¶ 7. Although similar to a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, Civ.R. 12(C) motions "are specifically for resolving questions of law[.]" (Internal citation omitted.) State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV Inc. v. Pontious , 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). " Civ.R. 12(C) presents an onerous burden for litigants and consequently, a trial court must be circumspect in its analysis of Civ.R. 12(C) motions." Figetakis at ¶ 10. The trial court must limit its inquiry to the material allegations in the pleadings—accepting those allegations and all reasonable inferences as true—and, if it is clear from the pleadings that plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate as a matter of law. Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co. , 96 Ohio App.3d 160, 163, 644 N.E.2d 731 (9th Dist.1994).

{¶12} Because a Civ.R. 12(C) motion presents only questions of law, our review of the decision is de novo. White v. King , 147 Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-2770, 60 N.E.3d 1234, ¶ 13.

R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity

{¶13} Ohio's Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, which governs political subdivision liability and immunity, is codified in Chapter 2744 of the Revised Code. In its judgment entry, the trial court held that all defendants had immunity from this action pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. In support of this conclusion, the trial court briefly stated that the County "is a political subdivision that is generally immune from tort liability under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) for its own acts and the acts of its employees[,]" and "[n]one of the five statutory exceptions of R.C. 2744.02(B) immunity apply to abrogate the County's comprehensive immunity[.]"

{¶14} The trial court flatly rejected Fisher's position that, pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(B), political subdivision immunity would not apply to the County in this action. The trial court found that Fisher failed to "ple[a]d any facts to support the[ ] argument that [her] causes of action necessarily arose out of her employment relationship with Summit County, such that R.C. 2744.09(B) would [apply]."

{¶15} Additionally, the trial court summarily stated that Fisher had not pleaded "any facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, to overcome Ahmed's immunity as an employee of the County under R.C. 2744.03(A). On this basis, and without discussion or analysis, the trial court apparently concluded that Ahmed was immune from suit as an employee of a political subdivision.

{¶16} On the grounds of political subdivision immunity, the trial court dismissed all counts of the action as to Ahmed and granted judgment on all counts in favor of the County. In the first two assignments of error, Fisher contends that the trial court erred by entering judgment on and dismissing the claims for slander and libel pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. We agree.

Assignment of Error I
The trial court erred in finding Fisher alleged no set of facts that could prove Fisher's slander and libel claims did not arise out of Fisher's employment relationship with Summit County under R.C. [ ] 2744.0(B).

{¶17} In her first assignment of error, Fisher asks this Court to...

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