Fisher v. Bishop

• Citation: 15 N.E. 331,108 N.Y. 25
• Parties: FISHER v. BISHOP et al.
• Decision Date: 17 January 1888
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

108 N.Y. 25

15 N.E. 331

FISHER

v.BISHOP et al.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

January 17, 1888.

Appeal from general term, supreme court, Fourth department.

This is an action brought by Henry E. Fisher against Enoch H. Bishop and Sluman L. Wattles for the cancellation of a bond and mortgage. The special term decreed cancellation. The general term modified the decree so as to provide for the return of one dollar to defendants; and the defendants appealed to this court.

W. H. Johnson, for appellants.

W. & G. W. Youmans, for respondent.

RUGER, C. J.

This is an action in equity to procure the surrender and cancellation of a bond and mortgage alleged to have been procured by duress and undue influence exercised by the defendants upon the plaintiff to that end. The proof showed that the plaintiff was a farmer, almost 70 years of age, residing in Sidney, and had become much involved as an indorser for his son, who had recently failed in business and absconded. On the day of his flight, the son had executed to his father a transfer of property, for the purpose of securing him, as far as he was able, for the liabilities which his father had incurred on his account. The plaintiff had become much embarrassed by these liabilities, as well as mortified and distressed by the shame and disgrace which he apprehended from his son's misconduct. The defendant Wattles was also a resident of Sidney, where he had been a justice of the peace for many years, and was largely employed by the people of the vicinity as a legal adviser and conveyancer. He had been frequently employed in that capacity by the plaintiff, and was engaged by him in the transaction wherein the son attempted to secure the plaintiff, and drew the transfer made on that occasion. Three days after the son had absconded, the defendants obtained the bond and mortgage in suit, and the proof shows that it was executed by the plaintiff through fear excited by the representations of Wattles that the transfers by the son to plaintiff were fraudulent against creditors, and that, unless the plaintiff secured the defendants, they could and would set aside such transfers as fraudulent. These threats were several times repeated during the two or three days occupied by the negotiations between defendants and plaintiff, and during which the plaintiff resisted all efforts to induce him to give the security demanded. Finally, on the third day, his resistance was overcome, and he consented to execute the mortgage. He was under no legal or moral obligation to give this security, as his liabilities for his son already exceeded the value of the property received by him as security.

We think the circumstances of the case establish the fact of undue influence, within the meaning of the rule which avoids contracts and conveyances so obtained. It is said in 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 951. ‘Where an antecedent fiduciary relation exists, a court of equity will presume confidence placed and influence exerted. Where there is no such fiduciary relation, the confidence and influence must be proved by satisfactory extrinsic evidence. The rules of equity, and the remedies which it bestows, are exactly the same in each of these two cases. The doctrine of equity concerning undue influence is very broad, and is based upon principles of the highest morality. It reaches every case, and grants relief where influence is acquired and abused, or where confidence is reposed and betrayed.’ It was said by Lord CRANWORTH in Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 771: ‘There is no branch of the jurisdiction of the court of chancery which it is more ready to exercise than that which protects infants, and persons in a situation of dependence, as it were, upon others, from being imposed upon by those upon whom they are so dependent. The familiar cases of the influence of a parent over his child, of a guardian over his ward, of an attorney over his client, but best instances;’ but as said by Lord ELDON in Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves....