Fisher v. State

• Decision Date: 08 September 1898
• Citation: 17 Del. 388,41 A. 184
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Parties: WILLIAM FISHER, defendant below, plaintiff in error, v. THE STATE OF DELAWARE, plaintiff below, defendant in error. [*]

41 A. 184

17 Del. 388

WILLIAM FISHER, defendant below, plaintiff in error, v. THE STATE OF DELAWARE, plaintiff below, defendant in error. ^[*]

Supreme Court of Delaware

September 8, 1898

Supreme Court, adjourned June Term (September 8), 1898.

Writ of error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County. See facts in opinion of Court.

The judgment of the court is affirmed.

John P Nields for plaintiff in error.

Robert C. White Attorney General, for defendant in error.

NICHOLSON Ch., and PENNEWILL and BOYCE, J. J., sitting.

OPINION

PENNEWILL, J.

This is the first case of a criminal character in the history of this State which has been heard upon a writ of error in the appellate court, there having been no right of review given in such cases until the promulgation of the present Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution which confers upon the defendant in criminal cases the right to a writ of error is found in Section 12 of Article 4, and is as follows, viz: The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction as follows: * * * * "To issue upon application of the accused, after conviction and sentence, writs of error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer and the Court of General Sessions in all cases in which the sentence shall be death, imprisonment exceeding one month, or fine exceeding one hundred dollars, and in such other cases as shall be provided by law; and to determine finally all matters in error in the judgments and proceedings of said Court of Oyer and Terminer and Court of General Sessions in such cases."

This case therefore in addition to its very serious nature and its vital interest to the plaintiff in error, has a further and peculiar importance by reason of the fact that it is the first of the kind in the history of the State that has come before this Court for review and adjudication. In nothing perhaps have the Courts of Delaware been more commended in the past than the expeditious hearing and disposition of criminal cases. It has been a subject of frequent mention and favorable comment, that while in so many jurisdictions criminals have often escaped punishment because of the ease and facility with which the execution of the judgments of the courts were delayed, yet in this State execution has followed so close upon the sentence as not only to speedily punish the guilty, but also to create in the criminal classes a wholesome fear of the penalties of the law. But notwithstanding such position which our courts have hitherto held in the matter of criminal procedure, when no right of review was given, yet it has ever seemed to many of our people to be consistent with reason and justice, as it certainly was with the constitutions or statutes of other states, that the defendant, in at least all important criminal trials, should enjoy the same rights and privileges that have been so long accorded to defendants in civil causes. Such was the view that was taken by the framers of our present Constitution and accordingly in their wisdom they provided that the Supreme Court should have power to issue writs of error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer and the Court of General Sessions. But while this power now exists, and while the defendant is entitled to have the proceedings in the Court below carefully reviewed and considered, and while it is important that his rights should be carefully guarded and his interests fully protected, yet the appellate court must also have regard to the due administration of justice and the proper execution of the law. It is not every error that will justify reversal, and it is not every mistake that may be made in the hurry of a trial court, that will warrant the setting aside of the judgment of that tribunal. But such seems not always to have been the law, for Repallo, J., in an opinion delivered in the celebrated case of Stokes vs. State, 53 N.Y. 164, says, "the refusal to reverse, even when the appellate court was satisfied that by no possibility could the error have produced injury, was an innovation upon ancient rules, under which it was a matter of course to reverse when error appeared, without inquiring into its materiality." But whatever may have been the practice of appellate courts under ancient rules, there can be no doubt as to the law that governs them in this particular to-day.

"In this country it is a general rule in criminal cases that a new trial will not be granted for the erroneous admission or rejection of evidence, where it clearly appears that the defendant could not have been prejudiced thereby." "If on the whole record it appears that justice has been done, and there appears no substantial misdirection of the Court by which the prisoner's rights were injuriously affected, the Court is not justified in reversing the judgment." "When it appears from the record that the error alleged therein on behalf of the appellant could have worked no injury to him, and could not have changed the the result, the judgment of the court below will be affirmed."

"The admission of irrelevant testimony is no sufficient reason for reversing a judgment, when it is apparent that it cannot affect the verdict or the finding injuriously to the plaintiff in error." "Courts now undertake to judge for themselves of the materiality of evidence found to have been improperly admitted or rejected, and when satisfied that no injustice has been done, and that the verdict would have been the same, with or without such evidence, they have refused a new trial." In such language have some of the ablest courts in this country expressed their opinions upon this question, and that it embodies the law on the subject at the present time is abundantly shown by the whole trend of modern decisions.

Mining Co. vs. Taylor, 100 U.S. 37, 25 L.Ed. 541. Leach vs. People, 53 Ill. 311. McGean vs. Manhattan R. Co., 117 N.Y. 219, 22 N.E. 957. Forrest vs. Forrest, 25 N.Y. 501. State vs. McCaffrey, 63 Iowa 479, 19 N.W. 331. Wing vs. Chesterfield, 116 Mass. 353. Ham vs. Wisconsin & R. Co., 61 Iowa 716, 17 N.W. 157. Girard Ins. Co. vs. Marr 46 Pa. 504. Gregg vs. Moss, 81 U.S. 564, 14 Wall. 564, 20 L.Ed. 740. Gilbert vs. Moline Plough Co., 119 U.S. 491, 30 L.Ed. 476, 7 S.Ct. 305. Wallace vs. People, 159 Ill. 446, 42 N.E. 771. Stephens Digest of Ev. (2nd Ed.) 350 (note). 2 Ency. of Plead. & Prac., 500, 507, (and many cases there cited).

The only authority cited by the plaintiff in error which at first glance might seem to announce a different doctrine, is the case of Waldron vs. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361, 39 L.Ed. 453, 15 S.Ct. 383, in which Mr. Justice White used the following language: "It is elementary that the admission of illegal evidence over objection, necessitates reversal." But this case when the entire opinion is carefully examined, is found to be fully in accord with the authorities above mentioned. The learned Justice, by "illegal evidence," undoubtedly meant such evidence as was prejudicial to the defendant, because at the close of his opinion he says, "we have not rested our decree upon the question of the admissibility of this evidence, because the mere illegal introduction of irrelevant evidence does not necessarily constitute reversible error." It has been frequently held that some regard should be had by appellate courts to public policy, and that such courts should not encourage litigation by reversing judgments for technical, formal or other errors which the record affirmatively shows could not have prejudiced the appellant's rights. Every interest of the public demands that the judgment of the lower court should stand in the court above, if on the whole record it appears that justice has been done, and that the defendant has sustained no injury. When the accused has had a fair and legal trial in the court below, the appellate tribunal should not for technical error or harmless mistake nullify the result of such trial. This we believe to be sound doctrine, and it is certainly consistent with good sense and reason. The public should not be subjected to the expense of a second trial unless there has been some illegality in the proceedings of the first which was injurious to the prisoner.

We have taken some pains to state as clearly as we could in this first criminal case the rule laid down by the courts upon this question. We believe it to be the law, and that public policy as well as the public interest and the public security, demand its application and enforcement by appellate courts. We did not understand that the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error, in his exceptionally able and exhaustive argument before this Court, really questioned the soundness of the law as above stated, but that he denied the application of that law to the present case. We are therefore required to examine with some care the facts and proceedings disclosed by the record in this case, in order to be able the more intelligently to judge whether or not ...